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Abstract 
The digital era is witnessing a remarkable evolution of digital services. While the prospects 
are countless, the e-marketplaces of digital services are encountering inherent game-theoretic 
and computational challenges that restrict the rational choices of bidders. Our work examines 
the limited bidding scope and the inefficiencies of present exchange e-marketplaces. To meet 
challenges, a free exchange e-marketplace is proposed that follows the free market economy. 
The free exchange model includes a new bidding language and a double auction mechanism. 
The rule-based bidding language enables the flexible expression of preferences and strategic 
conduct. The bidding message holds the attribute-valuations and bidding rules of the selected 
services. The free exchange deliberates on attributes and logical bidding rules for automatic 
deduction and formation of elicited services and bids that result in a more rapid self-managed 
multiple exchange trades. The double auction uses forward and reverse generalized second 
price auctions for the symmetric matching of multiple digital services of identical attributes 
and different quality levels. The proposed double auction uses tractable heuristics that secure 
exchange profitability, improve truthful bidding and deliver stable social efficiency. While 
the strongest properties of symmetric exchanges are unfeasible game-theoretically, the free 
exchange converges rapidly to the social efficiency, Nash truthful stability, and weak budget 
balance by multiple quality-levels cross-matching, constant learning and informs at repetitive 
thick trades. The empirical findings validate the soundness and viability of the free exchange. 
Keywords 
rule-based bidding, bidding lifecycle, market economy, free exchange, preference deduction, 
bid formation, double auction, quality levels, stable efficiency, market profitability. 
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Chapter 1  
1 Introduction 
The phenomenal evolution of digital services and smart interactions is empowering a new 
culture that is transforming social lifestyles into commodities. The dynamics of mobile 
influence, digital engagement, constant learning, smart conduct, and real-time immediacy 
are rather disruptive for e-marketplaces. While it reveals massive opportunists, it raises 
concerns about restricted bidding choices, inflexible strategic conduct and inefficiencies 
of online trading mechanisms. Our work identifies and examines some potential issues of 
current exchange e-marketplaces from microeconomic, game-theoretic and computational 
perspectives. The work here reflects on our bias to free market economy practices and 
presents briefly the proposed free exchange e-marketplace model that follows free market 
economy. The problem definition statement outlines the desired exchange e-marketplace 
properties with respect to an expressive and flexible rule-based bidding language and 
truthfully stable, socially efficient and profitable double auction matching mechanism.                 
1.1 Exchange e-Marketplaces: Potential Issues 
The digital era trends are manifested by the thriving digital services (referred to as e-
services) as mobile apps, online advertising (ad), and interactive digital marketing. While 
the prospects are countless, the e-marketplaces are encountering inherent game-theoretic 
and computational challenges that restrict the rational choices, preferences and strategic 
conduct of bidders. The remarkable evolution of interactive digital services is, in fact, 
inciting the industry to diligently fetch more viable delivery and revenue trading models 
that thrive in the market ecosystem (Moore, 1996). The game-theoretic complexity, 
however, impacts the strategic stability of trading mechanisms that dictate the rules of 
encounter. At stable equilibrium, a mechanism	ࣧ	implements a social welfare function 
with solution concepts that predict strategies rational bidders select with assumptions 
about rationality of bidders and knowledge bidders have about other bidders. The 
computational complexity, otherwise, relates to the tractable algorithmic efficiency that 
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drive  ࣧ to compute, in polynomial time, a combinatorial allocation problem (CAP) 
where number of possible bids is exponential in number of e-services.  
Our work identifies and examines, particularly, the potential challenges that initiate from 
the restricted bidding conduct and the inefficiencies of present exchange e-marketplaces. 
While complexities may justify the restrictive bidding practices, the de facto auctions are 
often designed for the strategic benefit of revenue maximizing e-marketplaces. For 
instance, in Google AdWords and DoubleClick exchange (Mansour et al., 2012; Google, 
2013), the advertisers often bid with restricted number of keyword choices. Bidders 
submit single bids that do not adequately convey preferences for various ad positions 
while paying for, perhaps, no-sale cost-per-clicks. Google applies, otherwise, a rather 
fuzzy cost-per-acquisition pricing model at real conversions. The Facebook FBX 
exchange breaches the privacy of online users by using intruding cookies. The cookies 
collect and trade user personal profiles on the real-time-bidding exchange and charge 
using the revenue-per-page-view pricing rule. The restrictive bidding practices, however, 
provokes adverse strategies of bidders that may lead to digital market (referred to as e-
market) failures. For instance, bidder agents (referred to as agents) may collude by 
submitting untruthful reduced bids for false partial requirements and form coalitions that 
act as super-agents to benefit from reduction in competition that harm social welfare. 
Collusion can be, even, more problematic in computational settings as bidders unleash 
several agents and adopt multiple identities name (i.e., false name bidding).  
The inefficiencies of present exchange mechanisms, on the other hand, is understood in 
the context of Hurwicz impossibility theorem (Hurwicz, 1975) that states it is impossible 
to implement an allocative efficient (AE), strategy proof (SP) and budget balance (BB) 
social welfare function in dominant strategy equilibrium (DSE) in a simple exchange e-
market and quasi-linear preferences even without requiring individual rationality (IR). 
(Green & Laffont, 1977) , demonstrates no AE and SP mechanism can be safe from 
manipulation by coalitions, even in quasi-linear environments. A simple exchange is one 
in which there are buyers and sellers selling single units of the same good (Parkes, 2001).      
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It is useful at this point to briefly define some of the related economic and computational 
concepts. The elaborate definitions are found in later chapters. A mechanism	ࣧ ൌ ሺߑ, 	ग़ሻ 
holds the rules of interaction that define strategies ߑ௜ of each agent and the outcome rule 
ग़: ߑଵ ൈ …ൈ ߑ௟ → ࣩ.  The social choice function maps the profile of preferences to an 
outcome, while the social welfare function maps preferences to an efficient outcome. The 
social allocative efficiency (AE) maximizes the sum of utilities or valuations of bidders. 
An incentive compatible (IC) mechanism ࣧ is the one in which agent best max utilities 
is at truthful (direct) revelation of private information. A direct-revelation mechanism 
(DRM) ࣧ is strategy-proof if its truth-revelation is a DSE, a useful game-theoretic and 
computational property. A stronger solution concept is DSE at which every agent has the 
same utility-maximizing strategy, for all strategies of other agents. A Strategy ݏ௜ is a 
dominant strategy if it (weakly) maximizes the agent's expected utility ݑ௜	for all possible 
strategies of other agents	ݏି௜, ݑ௜ሺݏ௜, ݏି௜, 	ߠ௜ሻ ൒ ݑ௜൫ݏ௜, , ݏି௜, 	ߠ௜൯, ∀ݏ௜, ് ݏ௜, ݏି௜ ∈ 	 Σି௜. Agent 
can compute its optimal strategy without modeling the preferences and strategies of other 
agents. At weak budget balance (BB) the ࣧ	total utility transfers is positive (No deficit). 
The BB propriety maps to e-marketplace profitability. The individual rationality (IR) 
relates to voluntary participation in a trade at which an agent can achieve as much 
expected utility from participation using	ࣧ	as without participation. The computational 
efficiency means that, ࣧ is computed in polynomial time (i.e., tractable algorithms). The 
strategic (game-theoretic) stability means that ࣧ	implement a social welfare function at 
equilibrium with solution concepts that predict strategies agents will select with diverse 
assumptions about rationality of agents and knowledge agents have about other agents. 
The quasi-linear preferences simplify the utility transfer across agents, via side-payments. 
The exchange challenges to achieving desirable properties for full symmetric exchange 
mechanisms influences industry exchange e-marketplaces. This is evident in the famous 
e-marketplaces as Google, e-Bay, Facebook and Amazon that utilize asymmetric auctions 
(i.e., single auction mechanisms) with reserve value of sellers. For instance, in (Mansour 
et al., 2012) Google DoubleClick ad exchange uses generalized second price (GSP) and 
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optional second price (OSP) auctions for matching (see Figure 1, source: (Mansour et al., 
2012)). The OSP enables advertiser ݅ submits mandatory bid ܾ௜ and optional bid	0௜ ൑ ܾ௜ 
for ߩ reserve price to mitigate exposure. The OSP, charges	݉ܽݔ	൛݉ܽݔ௝ஷ௜ ௝ܾ, 	0௜, 	ߩൟ.  
 
Figure 1: Google DoubleClick ad exchange OSP auction  
1.2 Towards Free Symmetric Exchange of Market Economy  
Our work examines the restrictive bidding conduct and inefficiencies of present exchange 
e-marketplaces. In that vein, Adam Smith, remarkably, observed that bidders interacting 
in free market economy act as if guided by “invisible hand” that leads to desirable market 
outcomes. The market economy is the free market in which resources allocated by bidder 
buying and selling free decision making, as primarily governed by the opportunity cost, 
and influenced by the society (Hall & Lieberman, 2010). The invisible hand aligns the 
dynamics of the dual self-interests and essential needs of bidders that allocate the scarce 
assets efficiently and works best in economy of perfect competition. The dual dynamics 
promote collaborative strategies while discouraging monopolies. In this context, strategic 
practices would be the truthful rational reactions to constant learning of e-market 
disruptions, particularly, at repetitive trades that must be freely expressed. The flexible 
bidding language that is adequate for the free expression of rational conduct would 
facilitate, hence, the truthful revelation of the strategic reactions. Following the 
microeconomic perspective of free market economy, our work advocate, hence, an 
adequate e-marketplace allows for symmetric bidding with flexible expression of free 
choices and strategic conduct. The e-marketplace should have, also, an exchange 
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mechanism that enables fully symmetric matching trades between e-service providers and 
consumers. The exchange e-marketplaces should maintain its position as bidders most 
preferred trading platform by providing endlessly growing inventory and information 
liquidity with reliable visibility, metrics, and focus targeting. The exchange model should 
deliver, also, adequate desirable game-theoretic and computational properties as stable 
social efficiency, exchange profitability, and computational efficiency (i.e., tractability). 
The fully symmetric exchange would deliver a fair and equal trading flexibility and free 
bidding conduct for both buyers, who are currently enjoying much of the allowed trading 
flexibility, and sellers, who are most often confined with the reserve value model. 
Our work advocates the flexible bidding conduct by introducing the free exchange (FX) 
e-marketplace that follows the free market economy (Hall & Lieberman, 2010). The free 
market economy has proved to be effective in organizing the economic activities for the 
social well-being, despite the self-interested decision making (Mankiw, 2012). The FX 
includes a flexible RBBL that empowers bidders to expressing free conduct. Our work 
endow the free exchange, also, with a double auction mechanism that improve stable 
efficiency. The rule-based bidding language (RBBL) enables free, flexible and concise 
expressions of preferences and strategic conduct by bidders using logical rules. The 
RBBL message includes distinct attribute-values of e-services and logical rules formulae 
that the FX deliberates on for automatic deduction and formation of the e-services and 
bids. The FX automatic bidding allows for least preference elicitation and multiple rapid 
trades. The RBBL is completely symmetric that enables the rule-based bidding not only 
for buyers but also for sellers, often, confined with their reserved values model.  
The double auction (DA) exploits the forward and reverse generalized second price 
(GSP) auctions for a class of multiple e-services of identical attributes and different 
quality levels (Q-levels). The multiple Q-levels GSP based DA matching (GSPM) 
motivates truthful bidding and deliver symmetric social efficiency and strategic stability 
with constant learning at repetitive trades that deliver the truthful best response strategies 
of bidders. The DA heuristics are computationally tractable and secures, also, the FX 
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profitability. However, the GSPM social efficiency and e-market profitability is better 
realized with market thickness (Roth, 2007). Realizing perfect stable efficiency in 
profitable exchanges, however, is unfeasible game-theoretically (Hurwicz, 1975). Our 
work establishes, though, that the FX converges to the stable efficiency of the full 
information setting with constant learning at repetitive trades. The FX exploits the GSPM 
DA to achieving strategic equilibrium of self-interested rational bidders of private 
independent information and free strategic conduct. The GSPM takes advantage of the 
successes of the efficient, yet simple de facto GSP (Edelman et al., 2007) (Varian, 2007), 
and the repeated best response auction (Nisan et al., 2011). The proposed multiple Q-
levels, GSPM DA enables tractable and IC exchange that delivers stable efficiency and 
profitability. This is evident in the rapid stable convergence of thick e-markets, i.e., large 
number bidders and transactions. The desirable properties of the FX free exchange RBBL 
rules bidding and GSPM DA is thoroughly verified through experimental analysis.  
1.3 Problem Definition Statement  
Our work examines the status quo of the restricted bidding conduct and inefficiencies of 
present exchange e-marketplaces. An adequate market economy exchange must allow for 
symmetric bidding with flexible expression of free choices and strategic conduct. The 
exchange should, also, have a symmetric double auction mechanism that enables for fully 
matching trades between e-service providers and consumers. The exchange model should 
deliver adequate desirable game-theoretic and computational properties like stable social 
efficiency, exchange profitability, and computational efficiency (i.e., tractability). Our 
work, hence, targets the realization of the following desirable properties in the bidding 
language: (1) Expressiveness: ability to flexibly, correctly and completely, represent the 
semantics and structure of the bidding preferences and strategic conduct ; (2) Ease-of-
use: ability to express the semantics and structure of the bidding preferences and strategic 
conduct in direct and easy manner; (3) Conciseness: ability to express the semantics and 
structure of the bidding preferences and strategic conduct compactly with the least use of 
notations and structure; (4) Flexibility: ability to extend the bid semantics and structure to 
incorporate diverse logical rules formulae; (5) Symmetry: ability to express attributes and 
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logical rules formulae of any e-service and request and ask bids in the same bidding 
message; (6) Computational efficiency: ability to compute a tractable polynomial time 
preference deduction, bid formation and winner determination;  (7) Rapid automation: 
ability to have command on the bidding lifecycle to delivering to more rapid trades, and 
(8) Distributed computation: ability to distribute the computational workload between the 
software agents of bidders and exchange for best resource utilization. Our work proposes 
that the strategic conduct may be exhibited by logical rule and operator formulae. The 
rule-based expressions allow bidders to share part of their problem constraints without 
full exposure. Another compelling aspect, is the fact the rule-based expressions expedite 
the trades with faster bidding lifecycle due to the automatic deduction and aggregation of 
rules of action that. Hence, our work introduces the rule-based bidding language (RBBL) 
for the free exchange e-marketplace that enables the flexible expression of strategic rules 
of conduct as logical rule and operator formulae in the bidding structure. The RBBL is 
fully symmetric that enables a simultaneous rule-based bidding, not only for buyers but 
also for sellers and those of mixed roles. The RBBL empowers the free exchange to 
deliberate on the logical rules and operators for automatic preference and service 
deduction and bid formation that secures rapid trades.  
Furthermore, the strategic and computational complexities of the exchange impossibly 
theorem (Hurwicz, 1975) have motivated our work to target some relaxed (weaker) 
desirable properties for an adequate fully symmetric DA. While Hurwicz strong budget-
balance is often not necessary, we can achieve adequate truthfulness, efficiency and weak 
budget balance using market economy settings: (1) Allocative Efficiency (AE): that 
maximizes the social utility welfare; the aggregate valuations of all buyers and sellers. 
The e-services are allocated to the bidders who value them most highly (2) Incentive 
Compatibility (IC): in which bidders maximize their utilities when they truthfully reveal 
private information. The truthful attitude of bidders is based on their ex ante expectations, 
given the mechanism outcome and their ex-post expectations, given their constant 
learning at repetitive trades. In (McAfee, 1992) and (Wurman et al., 1998), however, 
there is no DA that is both AE and IC; (3) Weak Budget Balance (BB): in which the total 
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payment that bidder agents make is positive so the exchange doesn’t run at deficit, but 
secures sufficient profits; The weak BB guarantee a fairly positive e-market profit,  at 
which no outside subsidy inwards or transfers outwards are required for a deal to be 
reached (4) Individuals rationality (IR): in which the agent’s expected utility from using 
exchange is more than that of other choices given prior beliefs about preferences of other 
agents; The exchange matching do not make any bidder worse off than has the bidder not 
participates, (5) Strategic equilibrium: a mechanism implement a social welfare function 
at equilibrium with solution concepts that predict strategies agents will select with diverse 
assumptions about rationality of agents and knowledge agents have about other agents.; 
and (6) Computational tractability: extends to the polynomial time tractable performance 
of the RBBL bidding, exchange deduction, bid formation and winner matching heuristics. 
Generally, given bidders' preferences, an AE matching is NP-hard (Sandholm, 2008).  
In summary, our work targets the stable and socially efficient matching allocation of a 
class of decentralized CAP of multiple units of e-services that share identical attributes at 
different Q-levels. Our work develops an expressive free exchange e-marketplace using 
the RBBL rules bidding that enables the flexible expression of bidding strategic conduct.  
Our work empowers the free exchange, also, with the GSPM GSP based multiple Q-level 
double auctions that facilitates fully symmetric exchange trades, while delivering social 
efficiency, strategic stability, computational tractability and e-market profitability.  
1.4 Thesis Organization 
Chapter 2 presents the formal description, and analysis of the combinatorial allocation 
problem. Chapter 3 expands on the related work and fundamentals. Chapter 4 introduces, 
describes and analyzes the formal modelling of the rule based bidding language (RBBL) 
and the inherent properties, while Chapter 5 introduces and investigates the GSPM, 
generalised second price based matching double auction and the inherent economic and 
computational properties. Chapter 6 describes, examines, and analyses the experimental 
simulation environment and empirical findings. Chapter 7 concludes with a summary of 
general research issues, contributions, empirical analysis, limitations, and future outlook.  
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Chapter 2  
2 Problem Modeling, Analysis, and Issues 
Our work in this chapter targets the formal problem modeling and analysis of a special 
decentralized CAP of e-services that target the socially efficient symmetric allocation 
matching of request and ask e-service assets between self-interested rational bidders. The 
bidders may have conflicting goals that motivate their strategic conduct as manifested by 
their varying preferences for, indeed, maximizing expected utilities, given their beliefs 
about other bidder preferences. The decentralised CAP social efficiency optimizes the 
aggregate valuations and utilities of request and ask bidders for any discriminatory DA 
clearing prices. As the proposed DA matching mechanism is anticipated to incite the 
truthful revelation of request and ask bidders as will be proven later on in our work,   the 
formal described and decentralized CAP assumes a truthful state of choices and rules of 
conduct of bidders. Hence, the decentralized CAP may be formally reduced and modeled 
as centralized CAP integer program (IP) for the winner determination problem (WDP). In 
fact, the DA mechanism selects the payment rule that motivates the IC of IR bidders with 
free disposal in which bidders have increasing values for e-services. The DA secures, 
also, BB for e-market profitability. The CAP IP is limited, however, by constraints (i.e., 
bids, budgets), local objectives, and the proposed DA rules of encounter.  
The modeled CAP targets the efficient matching of multiple units of a particular e-service 
that shares identical attributes of varied attribute values and, essentially, different quality 
levels (Q-levels). For instance, the e-service commodity of the digital advertising (ad) 
CAP is the ad impression, that is a user single viewing of single ad, while the bidders are 
the publishers and advertisers. For mobile apps, the e-service is a software application 
that delivers certain functionality that run on buyers (consumers) who navigate app stores 
for a required app using mobile devices, smart phones or tablet computers. The seller 
(provider), however, is typically the application distribution platform such as Apple App 
Store, Google Play, and BlackBerry World. With larger number of Q-levels, however, the 
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CAP class may also be extended to the matching of multiple units of rather multiple 
different e-services. In fact, the multiple Q-levels concept is suites e-services that often 
comprise distinct attributes. While there are many e-services that share identical 
functionality, it may differ in some functional or nonfunctional (i.e., software quality) 
attributes. For instance, similar e-services from multiple sources would differ in their 
quality of services or user acceptance or reputation score. Otherwise, some games may 
differ in their functional complexity levels. In fact, the more the number of presented Q-
levels, the narrower the tactical maneuverability of bidders with a Q-level solution space 
that, eventually, incites a rather truthful revelations.  
2.1 Combinatorial Allocation Problem Description 
Considering the time horizon as a set of discrete decision periods ߬௧, ݐ ൌ ሼ1,… , ܶሽ during 
which the exchange e-marketplace collects the seller and buyer RBBL messages (i.e., e-
service attributes, values, and rules), deduces the request and ask bids of the targeted 
multiple e-services to be traded. The FX ranks and sorts the request and ask bids of the 
selected e-services based on their valuations and Q-levels. The FX computes, the, the 
efficient matching for the multiple winners. Our work assumes bidders act exclusively as 
either e-service sellers or buyers, while  the CAP allocation and pricing decisions are 
taken off-line at the end of decision periods	߬௧, ݐ ൌ ሼ1, … , ܶሽ, ܶ is number of decision 
periods. The following is a formal description of the CAP at ߬௧ that manifests a sequence 
of events (Mansour et al., 2012) as shown in the matching CAP environment of Figure 2:   
1) 	݉	e-service providers	ܲ ൌ ൛ ଵܲ, … , ௝ܲ, … , ௠ܲൟ	construct ask bids	∐〈 ௉݂௝, ݒ௉௝, ݎ௉௝, ܳ௉௝ , ݐ௉௝ 〉	 
that include: (1) feature-group attributes set ௉݂
௝ of provider ௝ܲ that form the e-service 
combinations:	 ௉݂௝ ൌ ൛ሺ ଵ݂, ଵ݃ሻ, … , ሺ ௟݂, ݃௟ሻ, … , ሺ ௙݂, ݃௙ሻൟ, (2) initial true costs set	ݒ௉௝ ൌ
൛ݒଵ, … , ݒ௟, … , ݒ௙ൟ		of attributes set ௉݂௝(i.e., value of	ሺ ௟݂ , ݃௟ሻ is	ݒ௟) (3) rational rules 
ݎ௉௝of provider ௝ܲ that direct the exchange deduction of various e-services and net 
valuations of asks, (4) assigned Q-levels ܳ௣௝  set of the FX deduced ask e-services, 
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and (5) expiry times ݐ௉௝ 	of the conveyed logical rules.  The logical rule formulae ݎ௉௝ 
represent the rational rules of action/reaction to the e-market anticipated disruptions.   
2) Simultaneously, 	݊ e-service consumers ܥ ൌ ሼܥଵ, … , ܥ௞, … , ܥ௡ሽ construct 	݉ request 
bids ∐〈 ௖݂௜, ݒ௖௜, ݎ௖௜, ܳ௖௜ , ݐ௖௜ 〉	to request e-services that include: (1)	 ௖݂௜	 attribute-group 
attributes of requested e-services 	 ௖݂௜ ⊆ ௉݂௝; (2) initial true valuations ݒ௖௜		of the e-
service attributes	 ௖݂௜; (3) rational rules ݎ௖௜ that direct the exchange deduction and 
aggregation of e-services and their bids; (4) assigned Q-level ܳ௖௜  set of the FX 
deduced request e-services; and (5) the expiry times ݐ௖௜ 	of the logical rules. 
3) The exchange collects the bidding message requests and asks and exploits the 
rational rules	ݎ௉௝	, ݎ௖௜		to deduce the offered and requested e-services. Eventually, the 
FX produces ݆݌ number of e-services for provider ௝ܲ 	݁௉௝ ൌ ൛݁௉௝ଵ, … , ݁௉௝௤, … , ݁௉௝௣ൟ	with 
related Q-levels ܳ௉௝ ൌ ൛ܳ௉௝ଵ, … , ܳ௉௝௤, … , ܳ௉௝௣ൟ and ask bids ܾ௉௝ ൌ ൛ܾ௉௝ଵ, … , 	ܾ௉௝௤, … , ܾ௉௝௘ൟ 
and ݅ܿ number of request e-services  in set	݁௖௜ ൌ ൛	݁௖௜ଵ, … , 	݁௖௜௞, … , ݁௖௜௖ൟ with related Q-
levels set 	ܳ௖௜ ൌ ൛	ܳ௖௜ଵ, … , ܳ௖௜௞, … , ܳ௖௜௖ൟ	and request bids set	ܾ௖௝ ൌ ൛ܾ௖௜ଵ, … , ܾ௖௜௞, … 	, ܾ௖௜௖ൟ. 
The e-services	݁௣௝௤ ⊆ ௉݂௝ , is a combination of provider feature-group attributes, while 
݁௖௜௞ ⊆ ௉݂௝ a combination of consumer attributes that are induced by the stored logical 
rules, while the ask bid and request bids are the sum of the selected attribute values 
and the revised valuation of the FOL active rules. That is, for the deduced request e-
service	݁௖௜௞ ∈ 	݁௖௜ , the request bid net value	ܾ௖௜௞ ൌ ∑ ݒሺ ௖݂௜ሻ ൅ ݒሺݎ௖௜ሻ௞ , i.e., the sum of 
values of eligible attributes and the value adjustments of the FOL rules. Similarly, 
for eligible ask e-services	݁௣௝௤ ∈ ܾ௖௝ the ask bid values	ܾ௣௝௤ ൌ ∑ ݒሺ ௣݂௝ሻ ൅ ݒሺݎ௣௝ሻ௤ . 
4) The exchange e-marketplace announces the requested e-services with Q-levels ܳ௖௜  
and the time horizon	߬௧: ∐〈݁௖௜ , ܳ௖௜ , ߬௧〉	 to the provider bidders	ܲ. The exchange also 
announces the offered e-services with	ܳ௣௝  set and the time horizon	߬௧: ∐〈݁௉௝, ܳ௉௝ , ߬௧〉	to 
consumers	ܥ ൌ ሼܥଵ, … , ܥ௜, … , ܥ௡ሽ. The exchange stores the bidding attribute-values, 
FOL rules ݎ௉௝  and	ݎ௖௜ and their expiry times ݐ௉௝ , ݐ௖௜ 	 while hiding the request and ask 
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valuations ܾ௉௝ , ܾ௖௜  to mitigate the impact of exposure problem. The exchange signals 
consumers and providers, while collecting RBBL messages during	߬௧. 
5) At expiry of	߬௧, the exchange: (1) deduces all ask ܾ௣௝௤and request bids ܾ௖௜௞	using the 
RBBL attribute-values, Q-levels, logical rules and other constraints; (2) ranks all 
request and ask bids based on the Q-levels; (3) sorts all request (ask) bids in 
descending (ascending) orders based on their net values; and (4) computes the AE 
matching allocations and pricing rules for clearing the exchange. 
6) Finally, the exchange e-marketplace returns ∐〈݁௖௜௞, ܳ௖௜௞, ߨ௖௜௞〉 
and	∐〈݁௣௝௤, ܳ௣௝௤, ߨ௣௝௤〉to winning bidders such that		݁௖௜௞ ൌ ݁௉௝௤ 	∧ 	݉݅݊	ܳ௖௜௞ ൒ 	ܳ௉௝௤. The 
costs and payments	ߨ௖∗, ߨ௣∗  are the prices for the matched pairs.  
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Figure 2: Combinatorial allocation problem environment of digital services 
2.2 Formal Combinatorial Allocation Problem Model 
Considering the time horizon as a set of discrete decision periods during which multiple 
e-services with the same attributes and different Q- levels are allocated to multiple 
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winners, our work assumes the matching allocation and pricing decisions are taken off-
line at the end of a decision period	߬௧, ݐ ൌ ሼ1, … , ܶሽ. Generally, the objective of the FX is 
to implement a trade 	ߣ∗௧ for the CAP at period	߬௧	 that delivers social efficiency. Our 
work defines the social AE as the objective that maximizes the total request and asks 
valuations of bidders while securing e-market profitability. Formally, let ߣ௧௜௝௞௤ொ ∈ ߣ௧ொ ൌ 1 
if 	݁௖௜௞ ൌ ݁௉௝௤ 	∧ 	݉݅݊	ܳ௖௜௞ ൒ 	ܳ௉௝௤ and	ߣ௧௜௝௞௤ொ ൌ 0,	otherwise. For ൫݁௖௜௞, ݁௉௝௤൯ matched pairs, 
the bidders have a quasi-linear utility: ݑ௖௜௞൫ߣ௧ொ൯ ൌ ܾ௖௜௞൫ߣ௧ொ൯ െ ݌௖௜௞൫ߣ௧ொ൯	for consumers who 
buy the e-services	݁௖௜௞ and ݑ௣௝௤ሺߣ௧ொሻ ൌ ܿ௣௝௤ሺߣ௧ொሻ െ ܾ௣௝௤ሺߣ௧ொሻ for the providers who sell the 
e-services	݁௉௝௤, ∀݌௖௜௞, ܿ௣௝௤ ∈Թା (i.e., payments and costs).  Bidders are assumed risk 
neutral in the formal model below, who pay as much as expected of an e-service with 
budget bounds (ܤ௖௜). Given instance ܨܺሺܾ, Q, ߣ, 	߬௧	ሻ	at period		߬௧, then, the CAP AE 
trade	ߣ௧ொ ൌ ߣ∗௧ maximizes the aggregate values of bids (i.e., ݒሺ݁௖௜௞ሻ ൌ ܾ௖௜௞ and minimizes 
the aggregate values of asks (i.e.,	ݒሺ݁௣௝௤ሻ ൌ 	ܾ௣௝௤) given the multiple Q-levels. That is: 
݉ܽݔ
ఒ೟ೂ
෍෍෍෍ߣ௧௜௝௞௤ொ
௝௣
௤ୀଵ
௜௖
௞ୀଵ
௠
௝ୀଵ
௡
௜ୀଵ
ܾ௖௜௞ ൅ ݉݅݊ఒ೟ೂ
෍෍෍෍ߣ௧௜௝௞௤ொ
௝௣
௤ୀଵ
௜௖
௞ୀଵ
௠
௝ୀଵ
௡
௜ୀଵ
ܾ௣௝௤ 
That is equivalent to  
݉ܽݔ
ఒ೟ೂ
෍෍෍෍ߣ௧௜௝௞௤ொ
௝௣
௤ୀଵ
௜௖
௞ୀଵ
௠
௝ୀଵ
௡
௜ୀଵ
ܾ௖௜௞ െ ݉ܽݔఒ೟ೂ
෍෍෍෍ߣ௧௜௝௞௤ொ
௝௣
௤ୀଵ
௜௖
௞ୀଵ
௠
௝ୀଵ
௡
௜ୀଵ
ܾ௣௝௤	 
݉ܽݔ
ఒ೟ೂ
෍෍෍෍ߣ௧௜௝௞௤ொ
௝௣
௤ୀଵ
௜௖
௞ୀଵ
௠
௝ୀଵ
௡
௜ୀଵ
.		ሺܾ௖௜௞ െ	ܾ௣௝௤	ሻ																																					ሺ૚ሻ 
Given quasi linear utilities of request and ask bidders :	ݑ௖௜௞൫ߣ௧ொ൯ =ܾ௖௜௞൫ߣ௧ொ൯ െ ݌௖௜௞൫ߣ௧ொ൯ ൒ 0 
and	ݑ௣௝௤ሺߣ௧ொሻ ൌ ܿ௣௝௤ሺߣ௧ொሻ െ ܾ௣௝௤ሺߣ௧ொሻ ൒ 0, then (1) becomes: 
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݉ܽݔ	
ఒ೟ೂ
෍෍෍෍ߣ௧௜௝௞௤ொ
௝௣
௤ୀଵ
௜௖
௞ୀଵ
௠
௝ୀଵ
௡
௜ୀଵ
൫ݑ௖௜௞ ൅ ݑ௣௝௤൯ ൅ ݉ܽݔ	ఒ೟ೂ
෍෍෍෍ߣ௧௜௝௞௤ொ
௝௣
௤ୀଵ
௜௖
௞ୀଵ
௠
௝ୀଵ
௡
௜ୀଵ
	൫݌௖௜௞ െ ܿ௣௝௤൯		ሺ૛ሻ 
Hence, the social welfare objective of the CAP in formula (1) transforms to formula (2) 
that maximizes the aggregate utilities of the request and ask bidders and maximizes, also, 
the net FX e-market profit that should be of a positive value at all situations. In fact, the 
eligible criteria of the GSPM matching (i.e.,		݁௖௜௞ ൌ ݁௉௝௤ 	∧ 	݉݅݊	ܳ௖௜௞ ൒ 	ܳ௉௝௤ሻ is that	ܾ௖௜௞ ൒
ܾ௣௝௤. However, as per the GSPM forward GSP for buyers and reverse GSP for sellers the 
pricing rules,	ܾ௖௜௞ ൒ ݌௖௜௞൫ܾ௖௜௞ାଵ൯	for the second bid in rank and ݌௖௜௞൫ܾ௖௜௞ାଵ൯ ൒ ܿ௣௝௤ሺܾ௣௝௤ାଵሻ 
for matching condition, then	݌௖௜௞ ൒ ܿ௣௝௤. Hence, the GSPM realizes AE while maximizing 
the FX profitability that grows with the thick e-market. For an instance	ܨܺሺܾ, Q, ߣ, 	߬௧ሻ	of 
at	߬௧, ݐ ൌ ሼ1,… , ܶሽ, ߣ௧௜௝௞௤ொ  =1 if	݁௖௜௞ ൌ ݁௉௝௤ ∧ ݉݅݊	ܳ௖௜௞ ൒ 	ܳ௉௝௤,	ߣ௧௜௝௞௤ொ =0	otherwise: 
ܾ௖௜௞ ൌ෍ݒሺ ௖݂௜ሻ ൅ ݒሺݎ௖௜ሻ
௞
; ܾ௣௝௤ ൌ෍ݒሺ ௣݂௝ሻ ൅ ݒሺݎ௣௝ሻ
௤
∀ܾ௖௜௞, ܾ௉௝௤
൒ 0		ሺRBBL	valuation	modelሻ 
݌௖௜௞ ൌ ܾ௖௜௞ାଵ	; 	ܿ௣௝௤ ൌ ܾ௣௝௤ାଵ;		∀݌௖௜௞, ∀ܿ௉௝௤ 	∈ ሼԹା, 0ሽ			ሺGSPM	DA	pricing	ruleሻ 
ߣொ∗ , solves the following IP model of the FX CAP with an objective similar to (1) and (2):  
݉ܽݔ
ఒ೟ೂ
෍෍෍෍ߣ௧௜௝௞௤ொ
௝௣
௤ୀଵ
௜௖
௞ୀଵ
௠
௝ୀଵ
௡
௜ୀଵ
. ൫	ܾ௖௜௞ െ ܾ௣௝௤൯		∀	߬௧													ሺAE, ICሻ		ሺ૜ሻ 
ݏ. ݐ.෍෍ߣ௧௜௝௞௤ொ
௜௖
௞ୀଵ
௡
௜ୀଵ
൑ 1, ∀ ௝ܲ, ݁௉௝௤, 	∀ܳ௉௝௤									ሺUnique	Matchingሻ		ሺ૝ሻ 
෍෍ߣ௧௜௝௞௤ொ
௝௣
௤ୀଵ
௠
௝ୀଵ
	൑ 1, ∀ܥ௜, 	݁௖௜௞∀ܳ௖௜௞																							ሺUnique	Matchingሻ	ሺ૞ሻ 
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෍෍ߣ௧௜௝௞௤ொ . ܾ௖௜௞ ൑ ܤ௖௜		∀݅, ܥ௜, ܾ௖௜௞
௜௖
௞ୀଵொ
																												ሺMax	Budgetሻ		ሺ૟ሻ 
෍෍෍෍ߣ௧௜௝௞௤ொ
௝௣
௤ୀଵ
௜௖
௞ୀଵ
௠
௝ୀଵ
௡
௜ୀଵ
. ൫	݌௖௜௞ െ ܿ௣௝௤൯ ൒ 0		∀ܳ௖௜௞, ܳ௉௝௤	ሺWeak	ܤܤሻ			ሺૠሻ 
෍෍෍෍ߣ௧௜௝௞௤ொ
௝௣
௤ୀଵ
௜௖
௞ୀଵ
௠
௝ୀଵ
௡
௜ୀଵ
൑ ݉݅݊ ቐ෍|݁௖௜|
௜
,෍ |݁௉௝|
௝
ቑ ሺCardinalityሻ		ሺૡሻ 
ߣ௧௜௝௞௤൫	݁௖௜௞, 	݁௉௝௤, 	ܳ௖௜௞, 	ܳ௉௝௤൯ ∈ ሼ0,1ሽ	∀݁௖௜௞, ݁௣௝௤							ሺIntegralityሻ						ሺૢሻ 
Constraint (9) ensures integrality, while constraints (4) and (5) restrict any winning 
request-bid to be assigned at most to one ask-bid of the same unique e-service attributes, 
and restrict any wining ask-bid be assigned at most one request-bid of the same attributes. 
Hence, the CAP turns into the generalized assignment problem known to be ܰܲ-Hard; 
constraints (6) and (7) ensure the weak budget balance that secures the e-marketplace 
profitability, while restricting the budget boundaries (i.e.,	ܤ௖௜). Constraint (8) imposes the 
multiple Q-level cardinality balance of the offered and requested (supply and demand) of 
particular e-services by free disposal. 
2.3 Combinatorial Allocation Problem Complexity Analysis 
The CAP problem at period		߬௧, as formulated above is an instance (i.e., reduction) of a 
set-packing problem (SPP) (deVries & Vohra, 2003). Given a set of ܯ elements and a 
collection ܸ of subsets with non-negative weights, find the largest weight collection of 
subsets that are pairwise disjoints. Formally: let 	ߣ௝ ൌ 1 if ݆௧௛ subset of ܸ with weight 	ݒ௝ 
is selected,	ߣ௝ ൌ 0, otherwise. Let 	݉௜௝ ൌ 1 if ݆௧௛ subset of ܸ contains	݅ ∈ ܯ,	݉௜௝ ൌ 0, 
otherwise. Then the SPP model is formulated as followed: 
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max௝∈௏ ෍ 	ߣ௝. 	ݒ௝																																																																					ሺAE, ICሻ			ሺ૚sppሻ 
ݏ. ݐ.෍ 	ߣ௝.
௝∈௏
	݉௜௝ 	൑ 1, ∀݅ ∈ ܯ	;																			ሺUnique	Machingሻ		ሺ૛sppሻ 
	ߣ௝ ∈ ሼ0,1ሽ	∀ܸ																																																									ሺIntegralityሻ			ሺ૜sppሻ 
The SPP is equivalent to the IP in equations (3), (4), (5) and (9) of the exchange CAP IP 
with fewer constraints. Hence, the SPP is a functional reduction of exchange CAP and 
could be reduced or transformed in polynomial time (i.e., SPP ൑௣ CAP). Indeed, the 
exchange CAP is an instance of SPP, as noted in (Rothkopf et al., 1998) and (Sandholm, 
2002). However, the SPP is, generally, NP-Hard with fairly large number of bidders, 
while the recognition version is NP-complete (deVries & Vohra, 2003). Hence, the 
exchange CAP is generally NP-hard, in which the computation demanded for solving 
practical size problems is usually prohibitive. Hence, the exchange CAP would be 
computationally intractable for thicker e-market trades of practical size of bidders and 
cannot be solved using the exact approaches like Branch and Bound, Cutting planes, or 
Branch and Cut. In addition, the decentralized CAP has other inherent game-theoretic and 
computational challenges pertinent to the decentralized distribution of knowledge and 
control, quite evident in the bidder’s rationality, strategic conduct, self-interest, decision 
making autonomy, and private information and actions. The NP-hard complexity of our 
CAP IP model motivates our work, hence, to adopt the rather more natural economic 
based approaches for rational bidders. Our proposed mechanism has to motivate, first, the 
truthful revelation of preferences and strategic rules of bidders, then computes socially 
efficient matching allocations and pricing out of the modeled CAP IP based on the 
truthful revelations as detailed in the next chapters. In that vein, our work investigates 
how to attract bidders to be strategically truthful, not tactically manipulative, how to 
develop a flexible, concise and expressive bidding messaging model that enables the free 
expressions of choices and strategic conduct, and how to reach tractable closure with 
rapid, efficient and stable allocations, while delivering profitability to the e-marketplace.    
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2.4    Research Issues 
While the prospects of the digital era are enormous, e-marketplaces are encountering 
inherent and persistent game-theoretic and computational complexities that challenge the 
strategic and computational efficiencies of the matching mechanisms. In addition to the 
computational complexity of the centralized CAP, the distributed knowledge and control 
of the decentralized CAP imposes a rather further coordination and mechanism design 
complexities. The work in (Kalagnanam & Parkes, 2004) identified four areas of 
computational constraints that restrict the solution space of feasible mechanisms, 
including strategic, communication, valuation, and winner determination complexities. In 
the context of communication complexity, our work examines the limited bidding scope 
and trading conduct of e-market mechanisms that often provoke adverse strategies and 
lead to e-market failures. In the context of strategic, valuation and winner determination 
complexities, our work investigates, also, the inefficiencies of the symmetric exchange 
mechanisms with respect to allocation and revenue models. A fundamental challenge is 
the fact symmetric exchange models are hard to implement, as per Hurwicz impossibility 
theorem (Hurwicz, 1975). In fact, most present exchange e-marketplaces implement a 
rather single reserve price auction mechanism with the fixed reserve values of sellers.  
The design of an adequate exchange, though, promotes flexible and efficient symmetric 
interactions between rational bidders. In that vein, our work presents a realistic view of a 
symmetric exchange that delivers stable efficiency while facilitating the flexible choices 
and strategic tolerance of rational bidders. The decentralized CAP reveals, however, 
some hard game-theoretic and computational complexities as the following explains:      
Limited bidding conduct and language complexity: Our work identifies and examines the 
potential challenges that initiate from the restricted bidding conduct and trading practices. 
While complexities may justify the restrictive bidding practices, the de facto auctions are 
often designed for the strategic benefit of revenue maximizing e-marketplaces. The 
restrictive bidding practices, however, provokes adverse strategies of bidders that may 
lead to digital market failures. Given the complex semantics and structure of interactions 
in open systems, preference formation becomes a hard problem, especially if preferences 
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are uncorrelated (Dash et al., 2003). The design of flexible bidding language that promote 
free strategic conduct has to deliver expressiveness, ease of use, conciseness, flexibility, 
and computational	efficiency. Generally, the bidding model often confines agents express 
preferences that impact the computational e-market model. In (Nisan, 2000), a trade-off 
between the compactness and simplicity is analyzed, in which, at one extreme, there are 
the bidding programs that provide methods to compute valuations, while at the other far 
extreme, there are myopic bids used in iterative auction. A concise and expressive 
bidding language mitigates preference elicitation and lets agents convey their valuations 
compactly. The CAP would require an agent to specify 2|୒|– 1 bids, while few may be of 
interest. The proposed rules bidding would allow for expressing the logical and operators 
rule formula in the bidding structure with distinct attribute level valuations which exposes 
new challenges to the bidding complexity. Our work proposes the first order logic (FOL) 
for modeling the logical rules formulae. The free exchange smart preference deliberation, 
deduction, aggregation and bid formation are other emerging challenges.  
Mechanism design (MD) complexity: The inefficiencies of present exchange mechanisms 
is understood in the context of Hurwicz impossibility theorem (Hurwicz, 1975) that states 
it is impossible to implement an AE, SP and BB social welfare function in DSE in a 
simple exchange and quasi-linear preferences. There are limitations related to developing 
tractable mechanism design (MD), game-theoretically and computationally, that delivers 
stable efficiency. For instance, while GVA is an AE SP mechanism, it is computationally 
intractable as it has to solve a complex optimization problem multiple times: once to 
determine the optimal matching allocation and once for each agent with its bid removed 
to determine the residual payment (Wellman et al., 2001). The agents compute solution 
concepts as Nash equilibrium (NE) or DSE, given information about the mechanism and 
beliefs about preferences, rationality, and beliefs of other agents. A NE or DSE MD 
mitigate the strategy selection problem that results in minimal agent computation (Varian, 
1995), however, with limited choice of desired properties.
 
Otherwise, an iterative-MD 
(Parkes, 2001) enables bounded agents to play myopic best-response strategy and reason 
about one round of the game at a time. Another approach is to select MD with 
19 
 
 
 
polynomial‐time computable equilibrium (Nisan & Ronen, 2000) best‐response that 
restricts strategies an agent in computing its best‐response to a knowledge subset of the 
strategy space. While our work targets the stable social efficiency as adequacy objectives 
for the exchange DA design, our work realizes the particular game-theoretic complexity 
of o symmetric exchange in the context of Hurwicz impossibility theorem. In (McAfee, 
1992) and (Wurman et al., 1998), there is no DA that is both efficient and IC. 
Computational complexity: bounded computational resources impose challenges on the 
software agents and the MD that may necessitate explicit approximations and restrictions. 
However, approximations can change economic properties. For instance, approximating 
VCG auction payment and matching allocation rules break SP. Agents, for instance, are 
computationally bounded-rational when resolving the combinatorial complexity of 
computing their preferences on all outcomes given other agents strategists. In fact, 
solving even typical centralized CAP problems, where the number of possible bids is 
exponential as the number of items is most often NP-hard (Sandholm, 2008). Agents may 
use indirect iterative mechanisms (Wellman, 1993) (Parkes, 2001) and computing, rather, 
a myopic best-response bundle set. Direct MD one-shot agents, however, act in a game-
theoretic sense, modeling the expected effect of their actions on other agents’ actions. 
Another approach formulates queries about agent valuations that relieve agents from 
formulating preferences for all outcomes (Hudson & Sandholm, 2002). 
In summary, our work targets a market economy based solution approach for a special 
class of decentralised CAP for the matching of multiple units of e-services that may share 
identical attributes and differs in quality levels. The game-theoretic and NP-hard 
computational complexities of the decentralised CAP between rational self-interested 
bidders in addition to the symmetric exchange inherent inefficiencies motivate selecting 
the economic based solution approach. Our work targets a fully symmetric exchange e-
marketplace for the double auction matching of e-services that deliver fairly adequate 
properties like truthfulness, social efficiency, strategic stability and market profitability in 
a rather weaker sense to relax the symmetric exchange game-theoretic challenges.          
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Chapter 3  
3 Literature Review 
Our approaches to designing adequate free exchange e-marketplace are multidisciplinary 
that draw concepts from microeconomics theory that studies impact of market allocations 
and pricing decision rules on bidder preferences and rational strategic conducts. Game 
theory is an essential mathematical framework for studying the models of conflict and 
cooperation among rational bidders. Our work exploits, also, the mechanism design 
theory that examines game-theoretic solution concepts for private information settings. 
The mechanism design theory uses the framework of non-cooperative games and 
incentive engineering to determine how the private preferences can be elicited. The 
combinatorial optimization and operation research analyze the problem computationally 
and help developing tractable algorithms for the matching CAP. Software engineering is 
crucial in the development and implementation of the multiagent based approaches for 
the decentralized rationality and interaction. It is a natural framework for realizing agent 
collaboration, rational self-interest and autonomy (Jennings, 2001) that map state history 
to actions and translate strategies into outcomes. The work in this chapter reviews aspects 
of the above mentioned disciplines that are relevant to the proposed free exchange model.   
3.1 Bidding Languages 
The bidding language relates to the efficient CAP across multiple bidders that requires 
the determination of their preferences over the matching allocations and then choosing an 
allocation that satisfies certain criteria. Bidders may consider bundles of substitutes or 
complements or express complex preferences over combinations of items. Bidders 
provide	2|୒|– 1 bid valuations on ܰ	 items over bundles that make it a computationally 
NP-hard problem (Sandholm, 2000) (Parkes, 2006). Furthermore, the complex semantics 
and syntactic structure of the interactions in combinatorial open systems, turn preference 
formation into a hard problem especially if preferences are uncorrelated (Dash et al., 
2003). However, combinatorial bids eliminate the “exposure problem” as in SAA 
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(Milgrom, 2004). A bid defines values for matching allocations that constrain the spaces 
of acceptable matching allocations. However, the bidding language often, confine agents 
express preferences that impact properties of the computational e-market model. In fact, 
the structure of bids, and the rules specified, often, restricts the choice of bids by bidders. 
Bid structure relates closely to e-market structure. Some common bid structures are found 
in (Kalagnanam & Parkes, 2004), like divisible and indivisible bids with price‐quantity 
pairs, divisible bids with price schedule, , bundled bids with price‐quantity pairs and 
configurable bids for multifactor items.  
The e-market model has a crucial impact on the bidding language complexity. Agents 
trading with iterative mechanism (Parkes, 2001) compute myopic best-response bundles 
using simple bidding structure. Another approach is to formulate queries about agent 
valuations (Hudson & Sandholm, 2002). Agents act in game-theoretic sense and require a 
complex form of bidding to formulate preferences. A concise and expressive bidding 
language mitigates preference elicitation problems and let agents communicate their 
valuations compactly. The work in (Boutilier & Hoos, 2001) (Boutilier, 2002), 
introduced two forms of logical bidding, ॷீ	and ॷீ஻	that allow for logical formulae of 
requests and asks where goods present atomic propositions (i.e., substitutes), combined 
using logical connective, with a price of formulae. The ॷ஻ logical bidding (Nisan, 2000) 
(Sandholm, 2000) uses bundles with related prices as atomic propositions combined 
using logical connectives. The additive‐or	ॷ୆୓ୖ has one or more disjoint bids, and the total 
bid price is the sum of the bidder bid prices. ॷ୆୓ୖ, is compact for particular valuations, but 
not expressive for general valuations. In exclusive‐or	ॷ୆ଡ଼୓ୖ bids state that at most one bid 
can be accepted. The total bid price is the value of the maximal bid price across the 
bundles when multiple bundles are accepted. One can also consider nested languages, as 
OR‐of‐XORs and XOR‐of‐ORs, and a generalization, ॷ୆୓ୖ∗ (Nisan, 2006) that supports 
constraints using phantoms, dummy goods, within atomic bids to provide more 
expressiveness and compactness.  
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The TBBL, tree-based bidding language (Cavallo et al., 2005) is a concise and expressive 
tree-structured bidding language that uses the interval to choose (IC) logical operator for 
internal nodes to combine bundles, while the leafs represent single items, facilitating by 
which a symmetric bidding for buyers and sellers. The TBBL allows agents to specify 
bounds on their true values for trades, to be refined during bidding. Computationally, the 
TBBL can be captured, concisely, in IP for the matching allocation problem. The TBBL 
uses IC operators to provide more concise representations than OR∗ or ॷୋ୆.  The	ܫܥ௡௡ሺߚሻ 
is equivalent to an AND;	ܫܥଵ௡ሺߚሻ	is equivalent to an OR, and ܫܥଵଵሺߚሻ	is equivalent to XOR 
operator. Computationally, the TBBL can be captured, concisely, in an integer program 
(IP) for the CAP. The TBBL has an IC logical operator on internal nodes coupled with 
semantics for propagating values within the tree. The TBBL uses IC operators to provide 
more concise representations than OR∗ or ॷୋ୆ (Boutilier & Hoos, 2001) (Nisan, 2006) 
(see Figure 3). Leafs of the tree are annotated with traded items and all nodes are 
annotated with changes in values. For bid tree ௜ܶ from bidder	݅, let ߚ ∈ ௜ܶ node in the 
tree, and ݒ௜ሺߚሻ ∈ Թ the value specified at node	ߚ. Let	ܮ݂݁ܽ	ሺ ௜ܶሻ 	⊆ 	 ௜ܶ the subset of 
nodes representing leafs of ௜ܶand ܥ݄݈݅݀ሺߚሻ ⊆ 	 ௜ܶthe children of	ߚ. All nodes are labeled 
with operator	ܫܥ௫௬ሺߚሻ. Each leaf ߚ is labeled as a buy or sell, with units ݍ௜ሺߚ, ݆ሻ ∈ 	Ժ for 
the impression ݆ associated with leaf	ߚ, and ݍ௜ሺߚ, ݆′ሻ ൌ 0	otherwise. Same impression j 
may simultaneously occur in multiple leafs of the tree, given the semantics of the tree. 
ܫܥ௫௬ሺߚሻ, node (ݔ and ݕ	are non-negative integers) indicates the bidder is willing to pay 
for the satisfaction of at least ݔ and at most ݕ of her children. An extended TBBL (i.e., 
multiple parents DAG or using ܫ௔௕ ܥ௫௬ operator) subsumes both ܱܴ∗ and	ॷீ஻, and is more 
expressive. TBBL can express XOR, OR and XOR/OR languages (Nisan, 2006).	ܫܥ௡௡ሺߚሻ 
with ݊ children is equivalent to an AND operator; 	ܫܥଵ௡ሺߚሻ	is equivalent to an OR 
operator; and 	ܫܥଵଵሺߚሻ	is equivalent to XOR operator. 
Given a tree	 ௜ܶ, the (change in) value of a trade ߣ is defined as the sum of the values on 
all satisfied nodes, where the set of satisfied nodes is chosen to provide the maximal total 
value. Let ݏܽݐ௜	ሺߚሻ ∈ ሼ0, 1ሽ denote whether node ߚ	in tree ௜ܶ of bidder ݅ is satisfied, 
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if	ݏܽݐ௜ ൌ ሼݏܽݐ௜ሺߚሻ, ∀ߚ	 ∈ 	 ௜ܶሽ, is valid for ௜ܶ and trade	ߣ௜	ݏܽݐ௜ ∈ ݒ݈ܽ݅݀	ሺ ௜ܶ, 	ߣ௜ሻ:  
∀ߚ ∈ ሼ ௜ܶ\ܮ݂݁ܽሺ ௜ܶሻሽ	ܫܥ௫௬ሺߚሻ, ݔ	ݏܽݐ௜ሺߚሻ ൑ ෍ ݏܽݐ௜ሺߚᇱሻ
ఉᇲ∈஼௛௜௟ௗሺఉሻ
൑ ݕ	ݏܽݐ௜ሺߚሻ 
ݏܽݐ௜ ∈ 	ݒ݈ܽ݅݀	ሺ ௜ܶ, 	ߣ௜ሻ, means the total number of units of each item requested across all 
satisfied leafs is no greater than the total number of units awarded in the trade, that is:  
෍ ݍ௜ሺߚ, ݆ሻݏܽݐ௜ሺߚሻ
ఉ∈௅௘௔௙ሺ்೔ሻ
൑ 	ߣ௜௝	,										∀݆ ∈ ܩ			 
Given the constraints formulated in above two equations, the total value of trade	ߣ௜	given 
bid-tree ௜ܶ from bidder	݅, is defined as the solution to an optimization problem:  
						ݒ௜ሺ ௜ܶ, 	ߣ௜	ሻ ൌ 	 max௦௔௧೔∈	௩௔௟௜ௗ	ሺ்೔,	ఒ೔ሻ ෍ ݒ௜ሺߚሻݏܽݐ௜ሺߚሻఉ∈்೔
		 
 
Figure 3: An OR*, LGB and TBBL bidding instance 
In the ॷୖ	requirement bidding (Wang et al., 2009) the atomic propositions attach value to 
the job scheduling problem, given a performance requirement is satisfied. With timeline 
discretization, agents can express time related scheduling requirements, such as release 
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times, due dates, indirectly by attaching values to various time units combinations, that 
could be NP‐hard. As shown Figure 4, the	ॷୖ	Atomic proposition (root tree nodes) 
consists mainly of a requirement (level-1 node) for completing a set of Jobs (level-2 
node) according to a Performance in SX (level-2 node) and a Price (level-1 node), an 
agent willing to pay for requirement. Performance is defined by a Measure (level-3 node) 
and Level (level-3 node). An Atomic proposition is represented by a 4‐tuple leafs൏
Jobs,Measure, Level, Price ൐.  
 
Figure 4: Requirement bidding model for job shop scheduling problem 
3.2 Game-Theoretic Concepts  
Game theory (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1953) (Nash Jr., 1951) is the most reliable 
theoretical framework to investigating the states of the self-interested agents in conditions 
of strategic interaction. This is in comparison to many robust tools for analyzing decision 
making in decentralized systems with multiple autonomous agents. Blending these tools 
for computational settings, provide a basis for building multiagent systems (MAS) that 
exploits computational mechanism design by applying the microeconomic principles to 
computer systems design (Dash et al., 2003).
 
Agents, often, represent distinct bidders 
with potentially conflicting goals that seek to maximize own gains, and leads, hence, to 
the strategic analysis of uncooperative games, through which a designer can impose only 
the protocols of a mechanism but can’t control which strategies agents will implement. 
The game theoretic analysis considers the following basic concepts and assumptions: An 
agent ݅ ∈ ܰ holds private information about its preferences of type	ߠ௜ ∈ ߆௜ of possible 
types set, determines preference (i.e., agent’s value) for an outcome ݋߳	ࣩ over a set of 
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different outcomes of a game. The preferences 	ߠ௜ are general when they provide a 
complete and transitive preference ordering ≻	on outcomes. An ordering is complete if 
for all	݋ଵ, ݋ଶ ∈ ࣩ, we have ݋ଵ ≻ ݋ଶ or ݋ଶ ≻ ݋ଵ (or both). An ordering is transitive if for 
all	݋ଵ, ݋ଶ, ݋ଷ ∈ ࣩ, if	݋ଵ ≻ ݋ଶ	and	݋ଶ ≻ ݋ଷ	then	݋ଵ ≻ ݋ଷ. A general environment is one in 
which there is a discrete set of possible outcomes ࣩ and agents have general preferences. 
The agent’s utility 	ݑ௜ሺ. ሻ	determines preferences over own strategy and other agent 
strategies, given its type	θ୧, and expresses utility as ݑ௜ሺ݋, ߠ௜ሻ for outcome	݋	 ∈ ߴ, ߴ of the 
set of possible outcomes that define payments or costs and matching allocations. Agent ݅ 
prefers outcome	݋ଵ ≻ ݋ଶ	iff		ݑ௜ሺ݋ଵ, ߠ௜)൐ ݑ௜ሺ݋ଶ, ߠ௜). The strategy of agent	݅ ݏ௜ሺ	ߠ௜ሻ ∈
	ߑ௜	(i.e., ݏ௜ ∶ Θ௜ → ߑ௜ሻ	of agent’s	݅ possible strategies set given	ߠ௜, is a contingent plan or 
decision rule(s) that defines actions an agent will chose for every state of the world. In 
addition to pure strategy, an agent can have mixed or stochastic strategy	ߪ௜ ∈ ∆ሺߑ௜ሻ, a 
probability distribution over pure strategies. The game (i.e., auction) is a set of actions 
(i.e., bids) available to an agent and a mapping from agent strategies to an outcome.  An 
agent's utility	ݑ௜ሺݏଵ … ݏ௟, 	ߠ௜ሻ ൌ ݑ௜ሺ݋, ߠ௜ሻ	depends on agent strategies that realize strategic 
interdependence. The agent rationality relates to expected utility maximizing at which an 
agent selects a strategy that maximizes its expected utility, given the preferences	ߠ௜	over 
outcomes, beliefs about strategies of other agents, and the structure of the game. 
The mechanism	ࣧ ൌ ሺΣଵ, … , Σ௟, ग़(.))ൌ ሺΣ, ग़ሻ , is a protocol of social interactions that 
defines set of strategies Σ௜ available to each agent, an outcome rule	ग़: Σଵ ൈ …ൈ Σ௟ → ࣩ 
and payment rule	ݐ: Σଵ ൈ …ൈ Σ௟ → Ը , such that ग़(ݏ) is the outcome implemented by the 
mechanism for strategy profile	ݏ ൌ ሺݏଵ … ݏ௟ሻ. The mechanism	ࣧ implements a social 
choice function  (SCF) ݂ሺߠሻ if the outcome computed with equilibrium agent strategies is 
a solution to the SCF for all possible agent preferences i.e.,	ग़൫ݏଵ∗ሺ	ߠଵሻ, … , ݏ௟∗ሺ	ߠ௟ሻ൯ ൌ
݂ሺߠሻ, ∀	ሺߠଵ, … , ߠ௟ሻ ∈ ߆ଵ ൈ …ൈ ߆௟, where strategy profile	ሺݏଵ∗, … , ݏ௟∗) is an equilibrium 
solution to the game induced by	ࣧ. The mechanism, together with the agent types, 
defines a game. Agents are assumed autonomous and economically rational that selects a 
best-response strategy to maximize their expected utility in equilibrium with other agents, 
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means no agent benefit from unilateral deviation. The mechanism design (MD) problem 
is to design a set of possible agent strategies (e.g. bid at least the ask price) and an 
outcome rule (e.g. match highest bid with lowest ask) to implement a SCF with desirable 
properties based on agent’s strategies. A desirable property is a solution concept as 
strong as possible. Dominance is preferred to Bayesian-Nash as it makes less assumption 
about agents. Game theory analyzes the outcome of a mechanism.  Generally, in auction 
theory and MD, agents are risk neutral and have quasi-linear utility functions.  
The quasi-linear utility function for agent ݅ of type	ߠ௜	is	ݑ௜ሺ݋, 	ߠ௜ሻ ൌ 	ݒ௜ሺݔ, 	ߠ௜ሻ െ 	ݐ௜.  
Outcome ݋ ∈ ࣩ defines a choice ݔ ∈ ࣥ from a discrete choice set and a transfer payment 
	ݐ௜ by the agent. The type	ߠ௜ defines valuation function	ݒ௜ሺݔሻ for choice	ݔ ∈ ࣥ. In fact, 
ݔ ∈ ࣥ represent matching allocations (outcomes), and 	ݐ௜ transfer payments to the 
auctioneer. Risk neutrality states an expected utility maximizing agent pay as much as the 
expected value of an item. With quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of a SCF is divided 
into a choice 	ݔሺߠሻ ∈ ࣥ	and a transfer ݐ௜ሺߠሻ	∀agent	݅, i.e.,	݂ሺߠሻ ൌ ൫ݔሺߠሻ, 	݌ଵሺߠሻ…݌௟ሺߠሻ൯ 
∀ߠ ൌ ሺߠଵ, … , ߠ௟ሻ. The outcome rule, ग़(ݏ), in a mechanism with quasi-linear agent 
preferences, has a selected choice rule,	݇ሺݏሻ from the choice set given strategy profile ݏ, 
and selected payment rule	ݐ௜ሺݏሻ	for agent ݅	given strategy profile	ݏ. Hence, a quasi-linear 
mechanism	ࣧ ൌ ൫Σଵ, … , Σ௟, ग़ሺ. ሻ൯ ൌ ൫Σଵ, … , Σ௟, ݇ሺ. ሻ, ݐଵሺ. ሻ, … , ݐ௟ሺ. ሻ൯	defines strategy set 
Σ௜	available to each agent; a choice rule	݇: Σଵ ൈ …ൈ Σ௟ → ࣥ, such that ݇ሺݏሻ is the choice 
implemented for strategy profile	ݏ	 ൌ 	 ሺݏଵ, … , ݏ௟ሻ; and transfer rules	ݐ௜: Σଵ ൈ …ൈ Σ௟ → Թ, 
for each agent	݅, to compute her payment	ݐ௜ሺݏሻ. Properties of SCFs implemented by a 
mechanism can be stated separately, for both the choice selected and the payments. 
The SCF ݂ሺߠሻ ൌ ൫ݔሺߠሻ, ݌ሺߠሻ൯ is Allocative-efficient (AE) if	∀ߠ௜ ∈ ߠ ൌ ሺߠଵ, … , ߠ௟ሻ, an 
efficient matching allocation maximizes total value of all agents	∑ ݒ௜ሺݔሺߠሻ, ߠ௜ሻூ௜ୀଵ ൒
∑ ݒ௜ሺݔᇱ, ߠ௜ሻ	௜	  ,	∀ݔᇱ ∈ ࣥ. A Mechanism ࣧ is AE if it implements an AE SCF	݂ሺߠሻ. The 
mechanism selects the choice ݔሺߠሻ ∈ ࣥ that maximizes total agents value. 
Computationally, achieving AE is a hard computational problem (NP-complete). Yet, 
there are efficient algorithms that approximate maximum social welfare that gives a SCF 
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that approximates social welfare maximization, however, is different from it.  A SCF 
݂ሺߠሻ is Budget-balanced (BB) if	∀ߠ௜ ∈ ߠ ൌ ሺߠଵ, … , ߠ௟ሻ, there are no net transfers out of 
the system or into the system, i.e., ∑ ݌௜ሺߠሻ ൌ 0௟௜ୀଵ . A SCF ݂ሺߠሻ is weakly BB if	∀ߠ௜ ∈
ߠ ൌ ሺߠଵ, … , ߠ௟ሻ, a net payment can be made from agents to the mechanism, but no net 
payment from the mechanism to the agents, i.e., ∑ ݌௜ሺߠሻ ൒ 0ூ௜ୀଵ . A Mechanism ࣧ is 
݁ݔ	݌݋ݏݐ BB if the equilibrium net transfers to the mechanism are non-negative for all 
agent preferences, while ࣧ is ݁ݔ	ܽ݊ݐ݁ BB if the equilibrium net transfers to the 
mechanism are balanced in expectation for a distribution over agent preferences. An AE 
and BB imply Pareto optimality or Pareto efficiency. Given an initial matching allocation 
of items among a set of agents, a change to a different matching allocation that makes at 
least one agent better off without making any other agent worse off is a Pareto 
improvement. An matching allocation is Pareto efficient or Pareto optimal if no further 
Pareto improvements can be made. In other words, a SCF	݂ሺߠሻ is Pareto optimal if it 
implements outcomes for which no alternative outcome is strongly preferred by at least 
one agent, and weakly preferred by other agents	∀݋′ ് ݂ሺߠሻ, ݑ௜ሺ݋′, 	ߠ௜ሻ ൒ ݑ௜ሺ݋, 	ߠ௜ሻ ⟹
∃݆ ∈ ॎ	ݑ௝൫݋′, 	ߠ௝൯ ൏ ݑ௝൫݋, 	ߠ௝൯. A Pareto optimal mechanism implements a Pareto 
optimal SCF	݂ሺߠሻ. This is ex post Pareto optimality; i.e., the outcome is Pareto optimal 
for the specific agent types. At ex ante Pareto optimality is, there is no outcome that at 
least one agent strictly prefers and all other agents weakly prefer in expectation.  
The Individual-rationality (IR), or “voluntary participation" constraints, allows an agent, 
to decide whether or not to participate. It places constraints on the level of expected 
utility that an agent receives from participation. A mechanism ࣧ is interim IR if 
∀preferences ߠ௜ it implements a SCF݂ሺߠሻ with	ݑ௜ሺ݂ሺߠ௜, 	ߠି௜ሻሻ ൒ ݑത௜ሺߠ௜ሻ, where 
ݑ௜ሺ݂ሺߠ௜, ߠି௜ሻሻ is the expected utility for agent ݅ at the outcome, given distributional 
information about the preferences 	ߠି௜ of other agents, and ݑത௜ሺ	ߠ௜ሻ is the expected utility 
for non-participation. A mechanism	ࣧ, is ex post IR if agent's expected utility from 
participation is at least its best outside utility ∀ߠ௜ possible agent types, given prior beliefs 
about the preferences of other agents, a more suitable mechanism if agent can withdraw 
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once learns the outcome. A mechanism	ࣧ, is ex ante IR if agent chooses to participate 
before it even knows its own preferences; states that agent's expected utility in the 
mechanism, averaged over all possible preferences, must be at least its expected utility 
without participating, also averaged over all possible preferences (Parkes, 2001).  
Weak Monotonicity (WMON): A SCF ݂	satisfies WMON if ∀݅, ∀ݒି௜ → 	݂ሺݒ௜, ݒି௜ሻ ൌ ܽ ്
ܾ ൌ ݂ሺݒ′௜, ݒି௜ሻ implies that ݒ௜ሺܽሻെݒ௜ሺܾሻ ൒ ݒ ′௜ሺܽሻെݒ ′௜ሺܾሻ. If the social choice changes 
when a player changes valuation, then player must have increased more his value relative 
to his value of the old choice.  If a mechanism	ሺ݂, ݌ଵ …݌௡ሻ, is IC then ݂	satisfies WMON. 
If all domains of preferences ௜ܸ are convex sets then for every SCF that satisfies WMON 
∃݌ଵ …݌௡ such that ሺ݂, ݌ଵ …݌௡ሻ	is IC. The WMON condition is a local condition for each 
player separately and for each ݒି௜	separately. For global characterisation, there are two 
extreme cases: when ௜ܸ is unrestricted and when severely restricted as to be essentially 
single dimensional. The intermediate range where the	 ௜ܸ’s are somewhat restricted, a 
range in which most computationally interesting problems lie, is still wide open.  
3.3 Equilibrium Solution Concepts 
A major objective of implementing, economic based MD techniques is to mitigate the 
computational limitations. In fact, economics and computations, often, intertwined, in a 
way, that facilitates resolving mutual problems. For instance, an economic equilibrium 
strategy may lead to intractable computational solution approach. Similarly, an economic 
truth-revealing equilibrium MD, may lead to optimal computationally tractable solution. 
In fact, the blend of MD economic and computing techniques to developing efficient 
mechanisms (Conitzer & Sandholm, 2002) is a potential research space. In that vein, the 
game theoretic MD investigates solution concepts for private information games, and 
often solved by a truth revealing strategy. A mechanism	ܯ	 ൌ 	 ሺߑ, ݃ሻ may implement a 
SCF in equilibrium with diverse solution concepts that predicts strategies an agent select. 
Each solution concept differs in assumptions about agents’ rationality and knowledge 
agents have about other agents. The main solution concepts may be tabled as followed: 
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Dominant Strategy Equilibrium (DSE): Each agent has a best-response strategy no matter 
what other agent strategies		S୧∗ሺߠ௜ሻ ൌ ܽݎ݃݉ܽݔௌ೔ ݑ௜ሺߠ௜, ݃ሺݏ௜ሺ	ߠ௜ሻ, ݏି௜ሺ	ߠି௜ሻሻሻ, 
∀	ݏି௜, ∀	ߠି௜, ∀	ߠ௜ ∈ ߆௜. For ݏ௜ and ݏ௜ᇱ strategies of player	݅, ∀	ݏି௜ domination is classified 
as (1) strict, if		ݑ௜ሺݏ௜, ݏି௜ሻ ൐ ݑ௜ሺݏ௜ᇱ, ݏି௜ሻ;(2) weak if	ݑ௜ሺݏ௜, ݏି௜ሻ ൒ ݑ௜൫ݏ௝ᇱ, ݏି௜൯  and for at 
least one	ݏି௜, ݑ௜ሺݏ௜, ݏି௜ሻ ൐ ݑ௜ሺݏ௜ᇱ, ݏି௜ሻ; and (3) very weakly if ݑ௜ሺݏ௜, ݏି௜ሻ ൒ ݑ௜ሺݏ௜ᇱ, ݏି௜ሻ. If 
a strategy dominates all others, then it is (strongly, weakly or very weakly) dominant.  
The DSE provides a robust solution concept as agents don’t form beliefs about other 
agents’ rationality or distribution over other agent types. The single item second price 
auction is a DSE implementation, as agents truthfully reveal bid values.  
Nash equilibrium (NE): (Nash Jr., 1951): A strategy profile ݏ ൌ ሺݏ௜, ݏି௜ሻ is at NE if, for 
all agents	݅, ݏ௜ is a best response strategy to other agents, given their types and 
strategies	ݏି௜:		 ௜ܵ∗ሺߠ௜ሻ ൌ ܽݎ݃maxௌ೔ ݑ௜ሺߠ௜, ݃ሺݏ௜ሺ	ߠ௜ሻ, ܵି௜∗ ሺߠି௜ሻሻሻ , ∀ߠି௜, ∀	ߠ௜ ∈ ߆௜, ∀	ݏ௜. 
Nash equilibrium is a stable strategy profile: no agent would want to change his strategy 
if she knew what strategies the other agents were following. ∀݅, ∀ݏ, 	ݏ௜ᇱ ് ݏ௜,, a strict Nash 
strategy profile occurs if, ݑ௜ሺݏ௜, ݏି௜ሻ ൐ ݑ௜ሺݏ௜ᇱ, ݏି௜ሻ and a weak Nash strategy profile 
occurs if ݑ௜ሺݏ௜, ݏି௜ሻ ൒ ݑ௜ሺݏ௜ᇱ, ݏି௜ሻ, and ݏ is not a strict Nash equilibrium. Mixed‐strategy 
Nash equilibrium is necessarily always weak, while pure‐strategy Nash equilibrium can 
be either strict or weak, depending on the game.  
Ex post Nash equilibrium: requires common knowledge about the agents’ rationality but 
doesn’t require any knowledge about type distributions. In this sense, ex post Nash has a 
no-regret property and an agent doesn’t want to deviate from its strategy even once it 
knows the other agents’ types. English auction is an example of ex post Nash 
implementation (McAfee & McMillan, 1987), with direct bidding IC strategy of ask price 
݌ whenever ݌ ൑ ݒ௜  for value	ݒ௜, as long as other IC agents are direct. However, direct 
bidding is not DSE (e.g. with jump bids). Formally, a profile of strategies	ݏଵ … ݏ௡ is at ex-
post-Nash equilibrium if	∀	߆ଵ … 	߆௡ ,	ݏଵሺ	߆ଵሻ… 	ݏ௡ሺ	߆௡ሻ are in Nash equilibrium in the 
full information game. ∀݅, 	߆ଵ … 	߆௡,	ݏ௜′ :	ሺ߆௜, ݏ௜ሺ	߆௜ሻ, ݏି௜ሺ	߆ି௜ሻ)൒ 	ݑ௜ሺ߆௜, ݔ௜′ 	, ݏି௜ሺ	߆ି௜ሻ). 
Ex-post Nash requires ݏ௜ሺ	߆௜ሻ be a best response to ݏ௜ሺ	߆ି௜ሻ  ∀߆ି௜, without knowing 
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	߆ି௜	but only knowing the forms of the other players’ strategies ݏି௜	as functions. 
Let	ݏଵ … 	ݏ௡be an ex-post-Nash equilibrium of game	ሺ∑ଵ. . . ∑௡; Θଵ …Θ௡; ݑଵ … 	ݑ௡ሻ. If 
ग़௜′ ൌ ሼݏ௜ሺ	߆௜ሻ|߆௜ ∈ Θ௜ሽ, 	ݏଵ … ݏ௡is DSE in game	൫∑ଵ′ . . . ∑௡′ ; Θଵ …Θ௡; ݑଵ …ݑ௡൯.  
Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE): Agents select best-response strategies and announce 
types ߠ෠௜ ∈ Θ௜ to maximize their expected utility given their beliefs about the common 
prior about distributional information of other agent types, and assuming other agents are 
following expected-utility best-response maximizing strategies, announced type ߠ෠௜ need 
not equal true type: ௜ܵ∗ሺߠ௜ሻ ൌ ܽݎ݃maxௌ೔ ܧఏష೔ ቂݑ௜ ቀߠ෠௜	, ݃ሺݏ௜ሺ	ߠ௜ሻ, ܵି௜∗ ሺߠି௜ሻቁቃ , ∀	ߠ௜ ∈ ߆௜	. 
BNE is the weakest solution concept adopted in MD. In a BNE, every agent must hold 
both beliefs about other agents’ rationality and correct beliefs about the distribution on 
types of other agents. An example of BNE implementation is the first price sealed-bid 
auction. Comparing BNE with NE, the key difference is that agent	݅′ݏ strategy ݏ௜ሺ	ߠ௜ሻ 
must be a best response to the distribution over strategies of other agents. A refined 
solution concept is perfect BNE as applied to dynamic games of incomplete information 
(Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991). Strict incomplete information means no probabilistic 
information captured in the model, called also “pre-Bayesian”.  
Pareto optimality: Strategy profile ݏ is Pareto optimal, ݋ݎ strictly Pareto efficient, if there 
does not exist another strategy profile ݏᇱ ∈ ܵ that Pareto dominates	ݏ. A Strategy profile ݏ 
Pareto dominates strategy profile (not action profile) ݏᇱ if		∀݅ ∈ ܰ, ݑ௜ሺݏሻ ൒ ݑ௜ሺݏᇱሻ, and 
there exists some ݆ ∈ ܰ for which	ݑ௝ሺݏሻ ൐ ݑ௝ሺݏᇱሻ, means in a given Pareto‐dominated 
strategy profile some player can be made better without making any other player worse 
off. Every game must have at least one optimum.  
Other Solution Concepts (Leyton-Brown & Shoham, 2008): (a) Maxmin: a strategy of 
player ݅ in an n‐player, general‐sum game that maximizes	݅’s worst‐case payoff in hostile 
situations where all other players play the strategies that cause the greatest harm to	݅. The 
maxmin value or security level of the game for player ݅ is max௦೔min௦ష೔ݑ௜ሺݏ௜, ݏି௜ሻ, that 
minimum amount of payoff guaranteed by a maxmin strategy, while the maxmin strategy 
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is	arg	max௦೔min௦ష೔ݑ௜ሺݏ௜, ݏି௜ሻ; (b) Minmax: A useful strategy when we want to consider 
the amount that one player can punish another without regard to his own payoff. the 
minmax strategy for player ݅ against player ݆ ് ݅ is ݅ݏ a mixed‐strategy profile ݏି௝ in the 
arg	min௦షೕmax௦ೕݑ௝ሺݏ௝, ݏି௝ሻ, where‐j denotes the set players other than	݆. The minmax 
value for player j is min௦షೕmax௦ೕݑ௝ሺݏ௝, ݏି௝ሻ; (c) Minimax Regret: In settings in which the 
other agent is not believed to be malicious, but is entirely unpredictable, it makes sense 
for agents to care about minimizing their worst‐case loss, rather than maximizing their 
worst‐case payoff; (d) ઽ‐Nash; reflects the idea that players might not care about 
changing their strategies to a best response when the amount of utility that they could 
gain by doing so is very small. This leads us to the idea of ߝ‐Nash equilibrium:  Fix	ߝ ൐
0. A strategy profile ݏ	is an ߝ‐Nash equilibrium if, for all agents ݅ and for all 
strategies	ݏ௝ᇱ ് ݏ௜, ݑ௜ሺݏ௜, ݏି௜ሻ ൒ ݑ௜ሺݏ௜ᇱ, ݏି௜ሻ െ ߝ; and (e) Evolutionarily stable strategy: 
Roughly, a mixed strategy that  resists invasion by new strategies. 
3.4 Direct Revelation and Incentive Compatibility 
The direct revelation makes direct claims about preferences (i.e., reporting types). A 
direct-revelation mechanism (DRM) is a mechanism in which the only strategic action of 
an agent is to make direct claim	ߠ	෡about preferences. Formally, the DRM	ࣧ ൌ
൫Σଵ …Σ௟, ग़ሺ. ሻ൯, coordinates amongst agents with strategy sets	Σ௜	 ൌ ߆௜	∀݅, and delivers 
outcome rule	ग़: Σଵ ൈ …ൈ Σ௟ → ࣩ, which selects an outcome ग़൫ߠ෠൯	given reported types 
	ߠ෠ ൌ ሺߠ෠ଵ, … , ߠ෠௟ሻ. The revelation principle stated under weak conditions any mechanism 
ࣧ can be transformed into an equivalent incentive-compatible (IC) DRM (i.e., the SCF is 
IC if it cannot be manipulated), such that it implements the same SCF, a theoretic key 
concept for analysis of impossibility and possibility results (Mas-Colell et al., 1995). The 
revelation principle for DSE implementation states any SCF that is implementable in 
DSE is implementable in strategy proof (SP) mechanism, which focuses attention at 
DRMs.  If	ࣧ	 implements SCF݂ሺ. ሻ in dominant strategy equilibrium (DSE) then ݂ሺ. ሻ	is 
truthfully implementable in DSE, i.e., SP mechanism (i.e., the SCF is SP if it never 
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rewards agents for pretending preferences other than true ones). An IC-DRM ࣧ is 
strategy-proof (SP) if truth-revelation is DSE. A mechanism ࣧ is coalition-proof if truth 
revelation is a DSE for any coalition of agents, where a coalition is able to make side 
payments and re-distribute items after the mechanism terminates. An SP-DRM satisfies 
conditions : ሺ1ሻ ∀݅	, ∀ݒି௜, ݌௜ does not depend on	ݒ௜, but only on chosen outcome 
݂ሺݒ௜, ݒି௜ሻ, ∃	݌௢ ∈ Ը, ∀݋ ∈ ߴ,	such that	∀ݒ௜	ݓ݅ݐ݄	݂ሺݒ௜, ݒି௜ሻ ൌ ݋ → 	݌ሺݒ௜, ݒି௜ሻ ൌ ݌௢ (2) 
optimal for each player, ∀ݒ௜, ݂ሺݒ௜, ݒି௜ሻ ∈ 	 ܽݎ݃݉ܽݔ௢ሺݒ௜ሺ݋ሻ 	െ ݌௢ሻ. An IC-DRM ࣧ 
implements SCF 	݂ሺߠሻ ൌ ݃ሺߠ	ሻ, where ݃ሺߠ	ሻ,  is the outcome rule of a mechanism. The 
preference of each agent	݅	is modeled by a valuation function	ݒ௜:Α → Ը , where	ݒ௜ ∈
௜ܸ. 	 ௜ܸ 	⊆ Ը஺ is set of possible valuation functions for agent	݅. A DRM	ग is Bayesian-
Nash IC (BNE-IC) if truth-revelation is BNE. If a DRM ࣧ implements the SCF ݂ሺ. ሻ	 in 
BNE, then	݂ሺ. ሻis truthfully implementable in a BNE-IC DRM. In BNE implementation, 
though, the distribution over agent types is common knowledge to the DRM, and agents.  
The revelation principle was, initially, formulated for DSE (Gibbard, 1973), and later 
extended by (Green & Laffont, 1977) (Myerson, 1981). The outcome rule in the SP 
mechanism, 	݃ ∶ ߠଵ ൈ …	ൈ	ߠ௟ → ࣩ, equal to the SCF	݂ሺ. ሻ. DSE revelation principle 
suggests that to identify which SCFs are implementable in DSEs, just identify functions 
݂ሺ. ሻ for which truth-revelation is a DSE for agents in a DRM with outcome rule	݃ሺ. ሻ ൌ
݂ሺ. ሻ. In the absence of dummy bidders (i.e., false naming) or collusion, the second-price 
sealed-bid (Vickrey) auction is an SP DRM for the single-item matching allocation 
problem. The revelation principle states what can be achieved and what cannot, without 
stating the computational structure to achieve a particular set of properties. The IC 
captures the essence of MD, to minimizing the impact of agents’ rationality, learning, 
tactical and strategic self-interest in order to achieving a stable efficiency at economic 
and computational levels, given the bounded-computation and combinatorial complexity.  
The SP is a useful game-theoretic and computation property, at which DSE is robust to 
assumptions about information and rationality of agents. An agent, also, computes 
optimal strategy without modeling preferences and strategies of other agents. The SP-
33 
 
 
 
DRM Vickrey Clarke Groves (VCG) mechanism is a possibility that maximizes social 
welfare. However, the SP-DRMs are often expensive for agents because they place high 
demands on information revelation. In fact complete information revelation must be 
avoided in solving the combinatorial allocation problem (CAP), because agents often 
have hard combinatorial valuation problems to compute their value for any single 
outcome, and there are an exponential number of possible outcomes (deVries & Vohra, 
2003).  Iterative mechanism can sometimes implement DRM but with less information 
revelation and agent computation. In fact, computing NE in a game is difficult. It is even 
more difficult for BNE across games in which agents, owing to their continuous types, 
can play an infinite number of strategies (Nisan, 2000) (Reeves & Wellman, 2003). 
Designing IC mechanisms can mitigate strategy selection problem, especially, using DSE 
implementations. Other approaches include designing mechanisms using models of 
computationally limited agents. In the former model, the DSE MD require minimal agent 
computation (Varian, 1995).
 
However, would be a non-realistic solution concept, given 
challenges, as rationality, self-interest, strategic qualities.      
3.5 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Mechanisms  
The VCG mechanisms (Vickrey, 1961) (Clarke, 1971) (Groves, 1973) are one-shot 
DRMs that provide DSE solutions to the CAP. The mechanism aligns the incentives of 
bidder agents with the system-wide objective of computing an efficient  allocation. In 
fact, VCG mechanisms are, also, the only AE and SP mechanisms for agents with quasi-
linear preferences and general valuation functions, amongst DRMs (Green & Laffont, 
1977). The VCG mechanisms however, are not BB and often clear with deficit. In fact, 
one impossibility result, the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem (Mas-Colell et al., 1995),
 
shows no AE and BB mechanism can exist in many settings, including simple exchange. 
In special cases, however, VCG mechanisms are IR and satisfy weak BB, as in VCG for 
CA. Often, BB is compromised with efficiency loss. Approaches to addressing the BB 
problem include adjusting payments to get close to VCG payments but retain BB (Parkes 
et al., 2001)
 
and IC. However, the explicit clearing of exchanges sub-optimally sacrifices 
some of AE in return for BB (McAfee, 1992). The revelation principle extends this 
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uniqueness to general mechanisms, direct or indirect (i.e., iterative). This uniqueness 
extends to GSP to achieve AE in DSE implementation must implement a VCG outcome. 
Consider a set of possible allocations,	ࣥ and agents with quasi-linear utility functions 
	ݑ௜ሺ݇, 	݌௜, ߠ௜ሻ ൌ 	ݒ௜ሺ݇, 	ߠ௜ሻ െ 	݌௜, ݒ௜ሺ݇, 	ߠ௜ሻ agent's ݅ value for matching allocation	݇ ∈ ࣥ, 
and 	݌௜ is her payment given type	ߠ௜ ∈ ߆௜ that express her valuation function. In a DRM 
for quasi-linear preferences, the outcome rule ݃൫ߠ෠	൯	is presented in terms of choice 
rule	݇ ∶ 	߆ଵ ൈ …	ൈ	߆௟ → ࣥ, and payment rule	݌௜ ∶ 	߆ଵ ൈ …	ൈ	߆௟ → Թ, ∀݅. In VCG, 
agent ݅ reports type	ߠ෠௜ ൌ ݏ௜ሺ	ߠ௜ሻ; ߠ෠ ൌ ሺߠ෠ଵ, … , ߠ෠௟ሻ. The VCG choice rule	݇∗൫ߠ෠	൯ ൌ
ܽݎ݃max௞∈ࣥ ∑ ݒ௜൫݇, 	ߠ෠௜൯௜  maximizes total reported value over all agents.  The VCG 
payment rule is defined as	݌௜൫ߠ෠	൯ ൌ ݄௜൫	ߠ෠ି௜	൯ െ ∑ ݒ௜൫݇∗, 	ߠ෠௝൯௝ஷ௜ , ݄௜: ߆ି௜ → Թ is arbitrary 
function on the reported types of every agent except	i. In fact, different choices of 
arbitrary function		h୧	make different tradeoffs across BB and IR.   
VCG mechanisms are AE and SP for agents with quasi-liner preferences. SP insures DSE 
truth-revelation, from which AE follows with	݇∗൫ߠ෠൯ ൌ ܽݎ݃݉ܽݔ௞∈ࣥ ∑ ݒ௜൫݇, 		ߠ෡௜൯௜ . Then 
ݑ௜൫	ߠ෠௜൯ ൌ ݒ௜൫݇∗൫ߠ෠	൯, ߠ௜൯ െ ݌௜൫ߠ෠	൯ ൌ ݒ௜൫݇∗൫ߠ෠	൯, 	ߠ௜൯ ൅෍ݒ௜൫݇∗, ߠ෠௝൯
௝ஷ௜
െ ݄௜൫ߠ෠ି௜	൯ 
Since	݄௜൫	ߠ෠ି௜൯ is independent of agent	i's reported type; truth-revelation	ߠ෠ ൌ ߠ௜ solves: 
݉ܽݔ	ఏ෡೔∈௵೔ൣݒ௜ሺݔ, ߠ௜ሻ ൅ ∑ ݒ௜൫ݔ, ߠ෠௝൯௝ஷ௜ ൧; ݔ ൌ ݇∗൫	ߠ෠௜, ߠ෠ି௜	൯	the outcome selected by DRM. 
The only effect of the agent's announced type 	ߠ෠௜ is on	ݔ, and the agent can maximize 
ݒ௜ሺݔ, 	ߠ௜ሻ ൅ ∑ ݒ௜൫ݔ, 		ߠ෡௝൯௝ஷ௜ 	by announcing 		ߠ෡௜ ൌ 	ߠ௜ as then the mechanism computes 
	݇∗൫	ߠ෠௜, ߠ෠ି௜	൯ to explicitly solve: ݉ܽݔ௞∈ࣥሾݒ௜ሺ݇, 	ߠ௜ሻ ൅ ∑ ݒ௝൫݇, 		ߠ෡௝൯௝ஷ௜ ሿ . Truth-revelation 
is the DSE of agent	i, whatever reported types 	ߠ෠ି௜	by other agents. The effect of payment 
݌௜൫ߠ෠൯ ൌ ሺ. ሻ െ ∑ ݒ௜൫݇∗, 	ߠ෠௝൯௝ஷ௜   is to “internalize the externality" placed on other agents 
by reported preferences of agent	݅, hence aligns incentives with system-wide goal for AE;  
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The Pivotal, or Clarke, mechanism (Clarke, 1971) is a VCG mechanism in which the 
payment rule ݄௜൫ߠ෠ି௜൯ is set to achieve (ex post) IR, and weak BB in an AE SP 
mechanism, when choice-set monotonicity, no negative externalities, and no single-agent 
effect hold with quasi-linear agent preferences. In fact, the payment rule 	݄௜൫	ߠ෠ି௜	൯ ൌ
∑ ݒ௜൫݇ି௜∗ ൫ߠ෠ି௜൯, ߠ෠௝൯௝ஷ௜ ݇ି௜∗ ൫ߠ෠ି௜൯ ൌ ݉ܽݔ௞∈ࣥሾ∑ ݒ௝൫݇, 	ߠ෠௝൯௝ஷ௜ ሿ delivers optimal social choice 
without agent	݅. Then each agent makes payment	݌௜൫ߠ෠௜	൯ ൌ ݒ௜ሺ݇, ߠ෠௜ሻ		–	ሺܸሺܰሻ	– 	ܸሺܰ	\
	݅ሻሻ, ܸሺܰሻ is total reported value of ݇∗and ܸሺܰ	\	݅ሻ is total reported value ݇ି௜∗ 	without 
agent	݅. The first two terms of the payment align an agent’s incentives with VCG and 
make truth-revelation a DSE. In equilibrium, each agent receives as utility the marginal 
value it contributes to the system. The Clarke mechanism is Ex post IR when two 
(sufficient) conditions hold on agent preferences: (1) Choice set monotonicity: feasible 
choice set ࣥ (weakly) increases as additional agents are introduced to the system; means 
an agent cannot “block" a selection, and (2) No negative externalities: Agent i has non-
negative value, i.e., ݒ௜൫݇ି௜∗ , 	ߠ௝൯ ൒ 0 for any optimal solution choice, ݇ି௜∗ ൫ߠ෠ି௜	൯	without 
agent	݅, ∀݅ and all	ߠ௜, means any choice not involving an agent has neutral (or positive) 
effect on that agent. Assume truth-revelation in equilibrium, and prove the total transfers 
are non-negative, such that the mechanism does not require a subsidy, i.e.,	∑ ݐ௜ሺߠሻ௜ ൒ 0 
∀ߠ ∈ Θ:  ݑ௜ሺ	ߠ௜, ߠି௜ሻ ൌ 	ݒ௜ሺ݇∗ሺߠሻ, 	ߠ௜ሻ െ ൫∑ ݒ௜൫݇ି௜∗ ሺߠି௜ሻ, 	ߠ௝൯௝ஷ௜ െ ∑ ݒ௝൫݇∗ሺߠሻ, ߠ௝൯௝ஷ௜ ൯ 
ൌ ∑ ݒ௜൫݇∗൫ߠ	൯, 	ߠ௜൯௜ െ ∑ ݒ௜൫݇ି௜∗ ൫ߠି௜	൯, 	ߠ௝൯௝ஷ௜ ൒ 0 is non-negative	∀݅, because any choice 
with agents ݆ ് ݅ is also feasible with all agents (monotonicity), and has just as much 
total value (no negative externalities). The Clarke mechanism also achieves weak budget-
balance in special-cases. A sufficient condition is the no single-agent effect: For any 
collective choice ݇ᇱ that is optimal in some scenario with all agents, i.e.,݇ᇱ ൌ
max௞∈ࣥሾ∑ ݒ௜ሺ݇, 	ߠ௜ሻ௜ ሿ , for some ߠ ∈ Θ	then for all ݅	there must exist another choice ݇ି௜ 
that is feasible without ݅ and has as much value to the remaining agents	݆ ് ݅. In words, 
the no single-agent effect condition states that any one agent can be removed from an 
optimal system-wide solution without having a negative effect on the best choice 
available to the remaining agents. As soon as there are buyers and sellers in a market, we 
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very quickly lose even weak BB with Groves-Clarke mechanisms. The BB problem in a 
combinatorial exchange is addressed in (Parkes et al., 2001) including a number of 
methods to trade-off strategy-proofness and allocative efficiency for budget balance. 
The Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA) applies the Pivotal mechanism on the CAP. 
Let’s allocate set ࣡	of to ॎ agents. The set of choices ࣥ ൌ ሼ	ሺ ଵܵ, … , ௟ܵሻ∗: ௜ܵ ∩ ௝ܵ ൌ
∅, ௜ܵ ⊆ ࣡ሽ where ௜ܵ is an allocation of a bundle to agent	݅. Given type	ߠ௜, each agent ݅ has 
quasi-linear utility function, ݑ௜ሺܵ, 	݌௜, ߠ௜ሻ ൌ 	ݒ௜ሺܵ, 	ߠ௜ሻ െ 	݌௜ for bundle ܵ and payment	݌௜. 
Letݒ௜ሺܵ, 	ߠ௜ሻ ൌ ݒ௜ሺܵሻ. The AE maximize the total value: 
ܵ∗ ൌ ܽݎ݃maxௌୀሺௌభ…	ௌ಺	ሻ ∑ 	ݒ௜ሺ ௜ܵሻ௜∈ூ  s.t. ௜ܵ ∩ ௝ܵ=∅, ∀	݅ ് ݆. The Pivotal mechanism 
applied to this problem is a sealed-bid CA, often called the GVA. The GVA is AE, SP, IR, 
and weak BB for agents with quasi-linear preferences in the CAP. Each agent ݅ ∈ ॎ 
submits a (possibly untruthful) valuation function, ݒො௜ሺܵሻ	to the auctioneer. The outcome 
rule computes	݇∗ሺߠሻ, the allocation that maximizes reported value over all agents. In the 
GVA, this is equivalent to the auctioneer solving a winner determination problem (WDP) 
to solving the CAP with reported values and computing allocation	ܵ∗ ൌ ሺ ଵܵ∗ … ௟ܵ∗) to 
maximize reported value. Let	ܸ∗denote the total value of this allocation.  Allocation ܵ∗ is 
the allocation implemented by the auctioneer. The payment rule in the Pivotal mechanism 
also requires the auctioneer solve the CAP with each agent	݅ taken out in turn to 
compute	݇ି௜∗ ൫ߠି௜	൯, the best allocation without agent	݅. Let ൫ܵି௜	൯∗ denote this second-
best allocation, and ൫ܸି ௜	൯∗ denote its value. Finally, from Groves-Clarke payment rule 
݌௜൫ߠ෠൯ ൌ ݌௩௜௖௞൫݅	൯ ൌ ݄௜൫	ߠ෡ି௜	൯ െ ∑ ݒ௜൫݇∗, 		ߠ෡௝൯௝ஷ௜ ; 	݄௜൫	ߠ෡ି௜൯ ൌ ∑ ݒ௜൫݇ି௜∗ ൫	ߠ෡ି௜	൯, 		ߠ෡௝൯௝ஷ௜ ൌ
൫ܸି ௜	൯∗  , the auctioneer compute agent	݅'s payment: ݌௩௜௖௞൫݅	൯ ൌ ൫ܸି ௜	൯∗ െ ∑ ݒො௝ሺܵ௝∗ሻ௝ஷ௜ . 
An agent pays the marginal negative effect that its participation has on the (reported) 
value of the other agents. Equivalently, the Vickrey payment can be formulated as a 
discount ∆௩௜௖௞ሺ݅ሻ from its bid price,	ݒෝ௜ሺ ௜ܵ∗ሻ i.e., ݌௩௜௖௞൫݅	൯ ൌ ݒො௜ሺ ௜ܵ∗ሻ െ ∆௩௜௖௞ሺ݅ሻ for 
Vickrey discount	∆௩௜௖௞ሺ݅ሻ ൌ ܸ∗ െ ൫ܸି ௜	൯∗; ሺ	ܸ∗ ൌ 	ݒො௜ሺ ௜ܵ∗ሻ ൅	∑ ݒො௝ሺܵ௝∗ሻ௝ஷ௜ 	ሻ. AE and SP 
follow from the properties of the Groves mechanism. Weak BB holds; given all agents 
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pay non-negative amounts to the auctioneer, while IR holds as agents pay no more than 
their values for bundles they receive; Alternatively, one can verify that conditions choice-
set monotonicity, no negative externalities, and no single-agent effect hold for the CAP. 
3.6 Impossibility and Possibility Results 
Impossibility theorems sketch the properties that no mechanism can achieve with rational 
agents in certain environments. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem 
(Gibbard, 1973) (Satterthwaite, 1975) shows for adequate rich preferences on outcomes, 
it is impossible to implement a satisfactory non-dictatorial SCF in DSE. A SCF is 
dictatorial if one (or more) agents always receive one of its most-preferred outcomes. In 
fact, all dictatorial SCFs are SP (Mas-Colell et al., 1995). However, the impossibility 
theorem may not hold if there are: (1) additional constraints that relax agent preferences 
(e.g. quasi-linear) and reduce the onto (one to one) preference mapping to the outcomes, 
or (2) weaker implementation concept as the practical Bayesian Nash implementation. In 
fact, the e-market settings make implementation easier.  
The Hurwicz impossibility theorem (Hurwicz, 1975) states it is impossible to implement 
an AE SP and BB SCF in DSE e-market settings of simple exchange economy with 
quasi-linear preferences, even without requiring IR. (Green & Laffont, 1977) demonstrate 
no AE and SP mechanism can be safe from manipulation by coalitions, even in quasi-
linear environments. The general impossibility result follows from (Green & Laffont, 
1977) (Hurwicz, 1975) established no member of the Groves family of mechanisms has 
BB, and that the Groves family is the unique set of SP implementation rules in a simple 
exchange economy. The Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem (Myerson, 1983) 
strengthens Hurwicz impossibility to include Bayesian-Nash implementation, if interim 
IR is required. It states that it is impossible to achieve AE, BB and IR in a BN IC 
mechanism, even with quasi-linear utility functions. An immediate consequence of this 
result is that we can only hope to achieve at most two of AE, IR and BB in a e-market 
with quasi-linear agent preferences, even if we look for BN implementation.  
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A positive result is the VCG mechanisms, which are AE (but not BB) SP mechanisms in 
quasi-linear domains that clearly exhibit it is possible to implement non-dictatorial SCFs 
in more restricted domains of preferences. However, they are not efficient and strong BB. 
The possibility results are outlined by agent preferences, the equilibrium solution concept 
and the environment or problem domain. Contrary to impossibility results, for possibility 
results a strong implementation concept is more useful than a weak implementation, e.g. 
dominant is preferred to Bayesian-Nash, and a general environment such as an exchange 
is preferred to a more restricted environment such as a combinatorial auction. Groves 
mechanisms are consistent with the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem because 
agent preferences are not general but quasi-linear; and Groves mechanisms are consistent 
with the Hurwicz/Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility theorems because strong BB does 
not hold. Groves’ mechanisms are not strong BB. This failure of strong BB is acceptable 
in some domains; e.g., in one-sided combinatorial auctions with single seller and multiple 
buyers it may be acceptable to achieve weak BB and transfer net payments to the seller. 
3.7 Economic Based Mechanisms 
The economic based e-market mechanisms are well rooted in the microeconomics theory, 
particularly in general equilibrium theory and mechanism design. The economic activity 
takes place in a setting of institutions that range from relatively simple arrangements, to 
complex structures (i.e., mechanisms). A mechanism models the institutions (market 
rules of encounter) that govern economic activities amongst rational agents with, often, 
private information to achieve the desired social goals. In fact, the economic based 
mechanisms are natural to respecting autonomy and information decentralization in open 
systems. Inherently, while mechanisms of interaction can be imposed from the society, 
agents have control over their own actions and chose their own strategies in response to 
the mechanism imposed. Hence, the economic theory addresses the strategic implications 
of agent’s distributed private information, often manipulated for private advantage, where 
a mechanism is modeled as a game form. The desired outcome is given by a social goal 
function (SCF). A game form (i.e., mechanism) implements a SCF “rules of a game” if 
its equilibrium coincides with outcome (i.e., optimal system-wide solution) specified by 
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the SCF in the specified game theoretic solution concept, given the risk of the strategic 
manipulation of private information. Theoretically, in microeconomics, there are two 
approaches to modeling agent behavior: (1) Game-theoretic mechanism design (MD), in 
which agents’ best-response strategy to each other drives equilibrium state, at which 
agents cannot benefit from unilateral deviations to alternative strategies. Generally, the 
game theoretical MD investigates solution concepts for private information games, in 
which the game structure directs the game's outcome. The mechanism design theory uses 
the framework of non-cooperative games with incomplete information and investigates 
how the private preference information can be elicited. In fact, mechanism design can be 
viewed as reverse engineering of games or equivalently as the art of designing the rules 
of a game to achieve specific desired outcome.  (2) Price-taking-CE, in which agents’ 
myopic best-response to the current price drives equilibrium state, without modeling 
either the strategies of other agents or the effect of its own actions on the future states.   
The computational MD (CMD), however, resolves the challenge between game-theoretic 
and computational approaches. For instance, some best game-theoretic solutions provide 
computational benefits, as in DSE implementation. However, every agent must compute 
and reveal its complete preferences over all possible outcomes. While DSE is useful 
game-theoretically, it is intractable computationally (Parkes, 2001). In fact, the economic 
MD for decentralized optimization problem exposes number of computational problems. 
Costly computations at network and distributed processing and inherent combinatorial 
complexity can burden implemented game-theoretic mechanisms. Yet, self-interest and 
computation interact in non-obvious ways, while approximate solutions can destroy IC 
properties of a mechanism, software agent bounded rationality affect MDs that cannot be 
manipulated without agent solving an intractable problem (Parkes, 2001). An efficient 
mechanism must control the computational costs of the mechanism infrastructure and the 
computational costs of the agents, while retaining useful game-theoretic properties that 
handle agent self-interest. In (Kalagnanam & Parkes, 2004) the exchange should consider 
resources, market structure, preference structure; bid structure matching supply to 
demand e-market clearing and information feedback for direct or an indirect mechanisms. 
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In (Wellman et al., 2001), for instance, e-market mechanisms solve distributed resource 
allocation problems as in market-oriented programming (MOP (Wellman, 1995)). Agents 
require and produce resources, for which their decision problem is to evaluate the trade-
offs of acquiring different resources using e-market prices. CMD specifies configuration 
of resources traded, and the mechanism that decides prices. Message of bids and prices 
are, also, concise between agents and the e-market mechanism. In fact, price systems can 
minimize the number of messages required to determine Pareto optimal allocations. Some 
mechanisms, furthermore, can elicit the information necessary to achieve Pareto optima 
in well-characterized situations, though. For instance, while first and second welfare 
theorems (Mas-Colell et al., 1995) secure strong performance of market mechanisms, 
results are formally restricted to special cases. Also, scheduling problems often exhibit 
complementarities, which violate conditions for welfare theorems or e-market protocols. 
The MD sets incentives to induce the actions that deliver specific performance and 
economize on resources that operate the institutions (i.e., informationally efficient 
mechanisms) (Hurwicz & Reiter, 2006). The incentive theory tackles the private 
information problem, either of unobserved agent action, the case of moral hazard or 
hidden action; or ignored agent private knowledge, the case of adverse selection or 
hidden knowledge (Laffont & Martimort, 2002). The MD determines the economic 
incentives to encouraging agent truthful response that leads to best social solutions. The 
MD elicits the private information to select a desirable system wide outcome, despite the 
self-interested agents, through providing enough structure to enable strong theoretical 
claims about strategies agents will select and the optimality properties of final solutions. 
In fact, microeconomics, computer science and game theory empower research design of 
algorithmic solutions that optimize agent utilities in decentralised strategic settings. The 
following is a brief description of some well-known economic based mechanisms:   
The Combinatorial Auctions (CA) determine the efficient allocations in settings with 
multiple items and agents that wish to express complements and substitutes across items 
(i.e.,, “I only want A if I can also get B” or “I only want AB or CD”). CA is implemented 
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in many settings, including wireless spectrum rights allocation, takeoff and landing slots 
at airports, and multiagent planning (deVries & Vohra, 2003).
 
For allocative efficiency, 
the VCG mechanism provides an economic solution to the CA problem (CAP). The 
agents must submit bids on all item combinations. The central controller solves, then, a 
winner-determination problem (WDP) to determine the allocation that maximizes the 
reported value given agent bids. Buyers pay their bid prices for the bundles they receive 
in the efficient allocation, minus the Vickrey discount. However, the VCG mechanism 
for the CAP has several undesirable computational characteristics. The WDP in CA is 
NP-hard and difficult to approximate i.e., equivalent to weighted set-packing problem 
(deVries & Vohra, 2003). Furthermore, it is totally centralized, with all agents reporting 
their complete and exact valuations to the auctioneer center and the center-solving 
|ܰ| ൅ 1 WDPs to determine the allocation and payments.  
The Double Auction (DA) is, often, used for the exchange mechanisms, in application 
such as stock markets (i.e., NYSE), commodity markets (i.e., CME), etc. The DA allows 
multiple buyers and sellers to trade simultaneously or sequentially at either continuous 
(CDA) or periodic (Call) clear e-market (Shubik, 2005). Given the supply and demand of 
sellers and buyers, A DA matches request and ask bids and determines a clearing price. 
While our work targets desirable e-market adequacy objectives for the DA design of the 
FX such as, IC, AE, IR, it is almost impossible for a DA to have them all as per 
impossibility results. In (McAfee, 1992) and (Wurman et al., 1998), there is no DA 
mechanism that is both efficient and IC. The adoption of exchange DA institution, 
however, can be traced to its operational simplicity, efficiency, and agility to varying e-
market conditions. Yet, the DA challenge is how to reach e-market equilibrium with AE, 
given bidders’ self-interest, rationality, private information, knowledge, strategic choice 
and repetitive learning. 
The Combinatorial Exchange (CX): combines and the DA and CA mechanisms. While in 
DA, multiple buyers and sellers trade units of identical items (McAfee, 1992), in CA, a 
single seller has multiple heterogeneous items up for sale (deVries & Vohra, 2003) 
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(Cramton et al., 2006). Buyers in CA may have complementarities or substitutabilities 
between items, and use expressive bidding languages to describe these preferences. A 
common goal in the design of DAs and CAs is to implement efficient matching 
allocations that maximize total social welfare. The CX in (Parkes et al., 2001) is a 
combinatorial DA (DA) of multiple buyers and sellers trade multiple heterogeneous 
items. CXs have been use in many applications like wireless spectrum matching 
allocation (Kwerel & Williams, 2002), and airport takeoff and landing slot matching 
allocation (Rassenti et al., 1982). CX is used, also, for expressive sourcing by multiple 
bid‐takers (Sandholm, 2008) for expressive sourcing using one‐sided CAs. The work in 
(Lubin et al., 2008) introduced the iterative combinatorial exchange (ICE) that leverage 
their proposed tree-based bidding language (TBBL) to support simultaneously buy and 
sell bidders using valuation bounds and interval connect operators. The ICE converges to 
efficient trade with truthful bidders using duality theory (i.e., primal-dual) when prices 
are sufficiently accurate. Bidders annotate TBBL trees with initial lower and upper 
bounds on values of different trades. ICE, then, identifies provisional trade and payments 
in each round, and generates provisional clearing price on each item. In each round of 
ICE, each bidder tighten bounds on bid to make precise which trade is most preferred 
given current prices. When ICE terminates, a payment rule is used to determine the 
payments made, and received, by each participant. Since AE together with BB is not 
possible in CX due to Myerson‐Satterthwaite impossibility, our work (Parkes et al., 2001) 
developed the threshold payment rule for defining final payments, which minimizes the 
ࢋ࢞ post regret for truthful bidding across BB payment rules, when holding bids from 
other participants fixed; see (Milgrom, 2007). That allows ICE to inherit truthful bidding 
(i.e.,, revising TBBL bounds to remain consistent with a bidder’s true valuation) in an ݁ݔ 
post Nash equilibrium, just as can be achieved in iterative Generalized Vickrey auctions 
(Mishra & Parkes, 2007). DAs in which truthful bidding is in DSE are known for unit 
demand settings (McAfee, 1992) and also for expressive domains (Chu & Shen, 2008). 
The Dynamic Mechanisms handles the coordinated decision making with regard to both 
dynamics of internal agent preferences and the external uncertainty about the world, The 
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external uncertainties describe decision problems in which uncertain events occur in the 
environment. The internal uncertainties, though, describe a decision problem in which 
the uncertain events occur within the scope of an bidder agent’s view of the world. The 
dynamic mechanisms are quite realistic in their ability to embrace both uncertainty occurs 
outside and within bidder agents and coordinate self-learning and deliberation processes 
(Parkes, 2007). The IC constraints, however, must hold in every period, so that The 
dynamic mechanisms continually provide incentives for the bidders to share their private 
type information with the mechanism. The dynamics include arrival and departure of 
agents with respect a mechanism’s outcome space, as well as changes to the outcomes 
that are available to a mechanism. An agent that arrives must have fixed type, and be able 
to report type, truthfully upon arrival.  The dynamics are those of information acquisition, 
learning, and updates to local goals or preferences, all which trigger changes to an agent’s 
preferences. For external uncertainty where agent’s type is static, it is sufficient to align 
incentives only until the period in which an agent makes a claim about its type. Internal 
and external uncertainty could be combined, as well, (Cavallo et al., 2010). In fact, a 
various generalization of second price auction may deliver IC for uncertain environments 
with dynamic agents’ population and where agents have general valuation functions on 
sequences of actions. In dynamic VCG mechanism, for instance, payments are defined so 
agents expected total payment from every period is the expected externality imposed by 
agents on the other agents. With external uncertainty, this property on payments needs to 
hold at agent’s arrival. For internal uncertainty, this property must hold in every period.  
The Dynamic VCG Mechanism is a generalization of the VCG mechanism to dynamic 
environments (Parkes, 2003). Payments are collected so each agent’s expected payment 
is exactly the expected externality imposed by the agent on other agents upon its arrival. 
The expected externality is the difference between the total expected discounted value to 
the other agents under optimal policy without agent	݅, and the total expected discounted 
value to other agents under the optimal policy with agent	݅. The digital VCG mechanism 
aligns incentives of agents with the social objective of following a decision policy that 
maximizes the expected total discounted value to all participants. The kind of IC 
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achieved by VCG mechanism is weaker than the DSE achieved in the static VCG 
mechanism. Rather, truthful reporting is an agent’s best response in expectation, as long 
as the probabilistic model of the mechanism is correct and agents in the current and 
future periods are truthful. This is a refinement on a BNE, referred to as a within period 
ex post NE, because an agent’s best strategy is to report its true type whatever the reports 
of other agents up to and including the current period, just as long as other agents follow 
the truthful equilibrium in future periods. It is equivalent to DSE in the final period of a 
dynamic problem, when digital VCG is equivalent to the static VCG mechanism. 
3.8 Double Auction Mechanisms  
The double two-sided double auction (DA) is often used for the exchange mechanisms in 
applications like stock markets (i.e., NYSE) and commodity markets (i.e., CME). The 
DA allows multiple buyers and sellers to trade simultaneously or sequentially at either 
continuous (CDA) or periodic (Call) clear e-market (Shubik, 2005). Given the supply and 
demand of sellers and buyers, a DA matches request and ask bids and determines a 
clearing price. A commonly used sealed bid DA matching method is equilibrium 
matching (EM) (Wurman et al., 1998) sealed‐bid DA that is IC, in which the clearing 
price does not depend on the matching bidding prices, but rather externalities. The EM 
finds a uniform equilibrium price ݌∗ that balances request-bids and ask-bids so that all 
eligible requests with price ݌ ൒ ݌∗ and asks with ݌ ൑ ݌∗ are matched (Friedman, March 
1993). The 4‐Heap EM algorithm (Wurman et al., 1998) implements the incentive 
compatible IC ܯ௧௛	Price auction clearing rule that sets the matching price at the ܯ௧௛ 
highest among all bids and the	ሺܯ ൅ 1ሻ௦௧	price rule at the (ܯ ൅ 1ሻ highest among all 
bids. However, IC cannot extend to multi‐unit bids, or simultaneously to buyers and 
sellers. A uniform price is normally determined by the last matchable or the first 
unmatchable pair w.r.t. the matching order. The EM DA, however, can be IC or AE, but 
not both, with some special pricing policies (McAfee, 1992) (Wurman et al., 1998). The 
adoption of DA, though, can be traced to its operational simplicity, efficiency, and high 
agility to varying e-market conditions.  
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 Delivering AE as the uniform clearing price, however, might prohibit some matchable 
bids from being matched. However, IC cannot extend to multi‐unit bids, or 
simultaneously to buyers and sellers. To maximize the number of matches, it is essential 
to allow different matches to be cleared at different prices (i.e., price discrimination). In 
fact, IC is not compatible with most desirable properties and is also hard to achieve, 
especially in dynamic/digital double auction (e.g. stock exchanges), where bids are 
entering or leaving over time and there is more than one matching to search sequentially 
(Blum, 2006) (Parkes, 2007). The work in (Zhao et al., 2010), introduced a maximal 
matching (MM) DA algorithm that maximizes market liquidity, share and auctioneer 
profit. However, while it delivers social efficiency it cannot guarantee IC. Figure 5 
depicts, for visual comparison of matching and pricing, an instance of the EM, MM and 
proposed single Q-level GSPM DA models. The GSPM DA is described in chapter 5.   
 
Figure 5: GSPM DA in comparison with other DA models 
3.9 Preference Elicitation Models 
Privacy is a concern that impact information revelation. Ascending CAs (Wurman & 
Wellman, 2000) (Ausubel et al., 2006) (Parkes, 2006) (Ausubel & Milgrom, 2006), 
minimize information requirements by posting prices on all bundles for asking bidders to 
reveal their demands at the current prices. An elicitor model proposed in (Conen & 
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Sandholm, 2001), a preference elicitation model (PEM) alternative, in which bidders 
asked for limited, and relevant, information. The PEM in CAs refers to the process, by 
which an auctioneer (elicitor) queries bidders for specific valuations, and may decide to 
ask further queries, given the sequence of responses to previous queries, or stops to 
determine a feasible matching allocation and payments. Using incremental querying, the 
auctioneer gradually builds up a partial model of bidder valuations, one that becomes 
more refined with each query, until an optimal matching allocation can be determined. 
An attribute that distinguishes the PEM is the fact specific information about preferences 
of the bidder may be relevant, given preferences of others. Thus, interleaving of queries 
among bidders offers potential reduction in elicited information (Conen & Sandholm, 
2001). The PEM in CA exploits the general elicitation framework (GEF) (Sandholm & 
Boutilier, 2006) in which forms of incremental elicitation can be casted (Conen & 
Sandholm, 2001). The GEF for PEM includes: (1) Query types (i.e., Rank, order, bound, 
value or demand); (2) Queried information models: relate to query types and structural 
assumptions elicitor makes about valuations, since different queries impose different 
constraints; and (3) Termination: a critical process at which an elicitor requires enough 
information and a certificate to reach effective closure that require IC properties. The 
algorithmic GEF for PEM may be described as followed: (1) Let ܥ௧ the updated elicitor 
information regarding bidder valuations after iteration	ݐ. ܥ଴, reflects any prior 
information available to the auctioneer; (2) Given ܥ௧, either (a) terminate the process, and 
determine an matching allocation and payments; or (b) choose a set of queries ܳ௧ to ask 
bidders; and (3) Update ܥ௧ given response(s) to query set ܳ௧ to form	ܥ௧ାଵ, and repeat.  
Preference elicitation in ICE is performed by combining two activity rules: (1) modified 
revealed	preference activity rule (MRPAR) that requires each bidder decide which trade 
is most preferred in each round; and (2) delta improvement activity rule (DIAR) that 
requires each bidder refine his bid to improve price accuracy or prove no improvement is 
possible. ICE mitigates elicitation costs by directing bidders using price discovery and 
activity rules. As bidders prefer to reveal information as required to avoid leaks to 
competitors, ICE allows bidders specify lower and upper bounds on valuations and refine 
47 
 
 
 
bounds across rounds. Bounds allow price discovery, useful preference elicitation, and 
termination with efficient trade despite iterative valuations. ICE proxy model of revealed‐
preference activity rule, coupled with linear prices, ensures incremental progress. 
Activity rules are important in practice as they mitigate opportunities for strategic 
behavior. In (Milgrom, 2004), the Milgrom‐Wilson activity rule requires a bidder to be 
active on a minimum percentage of the quantity of the spectrum for which it is eligible to 
bid, is critical component of the auction rules used by FCC for wireless spectrum 
auctions. ICE adopts a variation on the clock‐proxy auction’s RPAR.  
3.10 Winner Determination Models  
The winner determination problem (WDP) is, typically, solved by the central exchange e-
marketplace from the agents’ reported valuations (bids). The FX e-market computes the 
stable socially efficient matching of the denaturalized CAP that, often, involves solving 
an NP-hard combinatorial optimization problem (Sandholm, 2008). Some solution 
approaches include: (1) Identify and exploit one shot models through identifying 
polynomially solvable matched cases of the WDP (deVries & Vohra, 2003) (Nisan, 
2000), that are rare to qualify, (2) Use approximations close to the optimal, but easier to 
compute that requires validation of the conservation of IC properties; or (3) Use an 
indirect iterative mechanisms, however, risk desired economic properties as SP and AE. 
Indirect mechanisms requires more time to converge to competitive equilibrium (CE) for 
e-market clearing due to the multiple round ascending auction model, though saving in 
processing time due to balanced distributed computing.  The combinatorial nature of the 
problem, however, makes it difficult for two reasons. First, a bidder in an auction has an 
exponential number of choices’ combinations that he can express bids on. Consequently, 
a bidder may need to submit an exponential number of bids. Second, the WDP is NP-hard 
(Sandholm, 2008); meaning rapid solution of large-scale problems is difficult. The WDP 
is the problem of determining an efficient trade given bids. The WDP in CAs and CEs is 
NP-hard (Rothkopf et al., 1998).  
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The work in (Lubin et al., 2008) formulates the ICE WDP as IP, and solve with branch-
and-cut algorithms (Nemhauser & Wolsey, 1999). A similar approach has proved 
successful for solving the WDP in CAs (deVries & Vohra, 2003) (Sandholm & Boutilier, 
2006). The work in (Lubin et al., 2008) allow bidder ݅	report a lower and upper bound 
(ݒ௜ሺߚሻ, ݒ௜ሺߚሻሻ	 on the value of each node	ߚ ∈ ௜ܶ, and refine these bounds across rounds. 
That in turn induces valuation functions ݒ௜ሺ ௜ܶ, 	ߣ௜	ሻ and	ݒ௜ሺ ௜ܶ, 	ߣ௜	ሻ. The exact value, and 
thus true willingness-to-pay, remains unknown except when ݒ௜ሺߚሻ ൌ ݒ௜ሺߚሻ	 on all nodes. 
The bid-tree ௜ܶ is well-formed if	ݒ௜ሺߚሻ ൑ ݒ௜ሺߚሻ	∀	ߚ ∈ ௜ܶ. In this case we 
have	ݒ௜ሺ ௜ܶ, 	ߣ௜	ሻ ൑ ݒ௜ሺ ௜ܶ, 	ߣ௜	ሻ	∀	ߣ௜	. ݒ௜ሺߚሻ െ	ݒ௜ሺߚሻ	, is the value uncertainty on node	ߚ.. 
For instance, Figure 6 portrays a matching allocation problem of two bidder agents, 
Bidder1 sells one of his items	ܣ	or	ܤ if he gets Bidder2’s item	ܥ at the right price. 
Bidder2 is interested in buying either of Bidder l’s items or selling his own items, with no 
structural constraints. Efficient trade assumes	ܣ, transfers to Bidder2, and ܥ to Bidder1. 
While transferring ܥ from Bidder2 to Bidder1 may not hurt, and since that trade is a 
prerequisite for Bidder1 to sell one of his items, it should executes. Bidders can begin 
with loose bounds on valuations, and gradually tighten them in response to pricing 
information provided by the mechanism. An interpretation of a revealed-preference 
activity rule, coupled with simple linear prices, ensures progress across rounds.  
 
Figure 6: A TBBL matching allocation instance of two bidders 
The WDP model ICE in (Lubin et al., 2008), may be modeled as followed: Given a bid 
tree	 ௜ܶ ∈ ܶ ൌ ሺ	 ௜ܶ … ௡ܶሻ, ߚ ∈ ௜ܶ a node	 that satisfies trade	λ୧.Then, the WDP for bids 
tree	ܶ	and matching allocation	ݔ଴:  
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ܹܦሺܶ, ݔ଴ሻ ൌ 	 ݉ܽݔሺఒభ,…,ఒ೙ሻ෍ݒ௜௜
ሺߣ௜ሻ ൌ ݉ܽݔఒ,௦௔௧ ෍ ෍ ݒ௜ሺߚሻݏܽݐ௜ሺߚሻ									ఉ∈்೔௜
 
																							ݏ. ݐ.		ߣ௜௝ ൅ ݔ௜௝଴ ൒ 0	, ∀݅, ∀݆													     
																																				∑ ߣ௜௝௜ ൌ 0, ∀݆																																			        
ݏܽݐ௜ ∈ 	ݒ݈ܽ݅݀	ሺ ௜ܶ, 	ߣ௜ሻ, ∀݅ ; ݏܽݐ	 ൌ ሺݏܽݐଵ, . . . , ݏܽݐ௡ሻ. 
ݏܽݐ௜	ሺߚሻ ∈ ሼ0, 1ሽ, 	ߣ௜௝	 ∈ Ժ								 
The decision variables represent the satisfaction of nodes and capture the logic of the 
bidding language through linear constraints; a related approach has been considered in 
application to ॷீ஻ (Boutilier, 2002). The formation determines the trade λ while in 
parallel determining the value to all bidders by activating nodes in the bid trees. Given 
reported valuation functions	ݒො ൌ ሺݒොଵ …ݒො௡ሻ the VCG collects the following payments:  
݌௩௖௚,௜ ൌ 	 ݒො௜ሺߣ௜∗ሻ െ	൫ܸሺݒොሻ െ ܸି ௜ሺݒොሻ൯,				 
ߣ∗, is the efficient trade, ܸሺݒොሻ is the reported value of this trade and ܸି ௜ሺݒොሻ is the reported 
value of the efficient trade in the economy without bidder	݅. Let’s refer to ∆௩௖௚,௜ൌ
	൫ܸሺݒොሻ െ ܸି ௜ሺݒොሻ൯,	as the VCG discount. The problem with the VCG mechanism in the 
context of a CE is that it may run at a budget deficit with the total payments negative. An 
alternative payment method is the Threshold rule of (Parkes et al., 2001):	݌௧௛௥௘௦௛,௜ ൌ
	ݒො௜ሺߣ௜∗ሻ െ	∆௧௛௥௘௦௛,௜	, ∆௧௛௥௘௦௛,௜ , is selected to minmax regret ݉ܽݔ௜ሺ∆௩௖௚,௜ െ	∆௧௛௥௘௦௛,௜ሻ	 
subject to ∆௧௛௥௘௦௛,௜൑ 	∆௩௖௚,௜ ∀݅ and ∑ ∆௧௛௥௘௦௛,௜௜ ൑ 	ܸሺݒොሻ.	Threshold payments are BB and 
minimize the max deviation from VCG outcome across all balanced rules.  
Example Consider possible trade of the two bidders in Figure 2: If Bidder 1 trades A for 
C he gets $2 and Bidder 2 gets $7. If Bidder 1 trades B for C he gets $-2 and Bidder 2 
gets $2. If no trade occurs both bidders get $0 value. Therefore the efficient trade is to 
swap A for C.  Because the efficient trade creates a surplus of $9 and removing either 
bidder results in the null trade, both bidders have a Vickrey discount of $9. Thus if we use 
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VCG payments, Bidder 1 pays $2-$9=$-7 and Bidder 2 pays $7-$9=$-2 and the exchange 
runs at a deficit. The Threshold payment rule chooses payments that minimally deviate 
from VCG while maintaining BB. This minimization reduces the discounts to $4.50, and 
thus Bidder 1 pays $2-$4.50=$-2.50 and Bidder 2 pays $7-$4.50=$2.50. 
3.11 Digital Advertising e-Marketplaces 
The digital advertising (ad) online and mobile e-markets are a bold manifestation of the 
digital era. The ad value chain (Thomas, 2008) includes advertisers, publishers, media 
agencies, ad networks (adnet) of demand and supply side platforms, and ad exchanges 
(adx). The ad inventory is the supply of potential impressions to display to the right users 
at the right times in the right digital medium.  As many publishers can't afford to maintain 
sales force, they sell ad inventory through adnets or adxs. Publishers maximize revenues 
by selling inventory at highest average price possible, due to the fact that ad inventory is 
perishable and finite. The adnet e-marketplaces create efficiency by providing targeting 
capabilities. There are vertical adnets which focus on a particular industry and contextual 
adnets that provide e-marketplace for selling keyword-based ads (i.e., Google AdSense).  
As it is complex for Adnets to forge many cross relationships, to manage the supply-
demand unbalances, the ad adx would be the right answer, where adnets would have just 
one trading relationship, and one ‘hop’ away from each other (see Figure 7). In fact, adxs 
bring more transparency and simplify trading Ads. Nevertheless, the adx is poised to 
have a transformative effect on the digital era. While adnets will likely see better margins 
by going through the adx for inventory they can’t clear themselves; the adx will level the 
playing field in terms of inventory access. 
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Figure 7: Ad Networks and ad Exchanges 
The digital ad auction serves various forms like web TV ads (i.e., Google TV), contextual 
ads on search engine results pages (i.e., Google AdWords) banner ads, social networking 
Ads (i.e., Facebook Ads). The Google TV (Google, 2013) is an open smart platform that 
extends the computing capabilities and interactive user experience of any TV. In (N. 
Nisan et al., 2009), the Google TV uses simultaneous ascending auction (SAA) subject to 
over demand (Demange et al., 1986) (Cramton et al., 2006) (Milgrom, 2004) for 
Walrasian competitive equilibrium (CE) price and efficient matching allocation of TV ad 
spots.  Advertisers bid their max daily budget and cost-per-view ads on target attributes 
that influence bid valuation. Pursuing tradeoff among cost minimizing advertisers and 
revenue maximizing publishers, the work in (N. Nisan et al., 2009) proposed an auction 
matching allocation at Walrasian minimum CE prices that is Pareto optimal and IC. 
While auction increases publisher revenues by exhausting winner budgets, advertisers are 
efficiently allocated set of ads at minimum price to win with little strategic incentive to 
reduce bids. However, while IC is realized for trivial case of Walrasian CE (Demange et 
al., 1986), no Pareto optimal auction is IC with budget limits (Dobzinski et al., 2008). 
Computing demand and matching allocations is also NP-hard (i.e., knapsack problem).   
The AdWords (Google, 2013) utilizes the GSP auction. Every time a user searches on 
Google, AdWords run GSP auction and ads of relevant keywords are shown as sponsored 
links on search result page. Advertisers select keywords that trigger their ads, bid and 
PPC, however, the pay value of advertiser below them in ranking. To meet requirements, 
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the quality score (QS) measures the relevance of keywords to ad text and to a search 
query. Ads, ultimately, are ranked by max CPC-Bids× QS; the minimum advertisers pay 
to hold position ݌ሺ௝ሻܳܵሺ௝ሻ ൒ ܾሺ௝	ାଵሻܳܵሺ௝ାଵሻ ⟹ ݌ሺ௝ሻ ൌ ܾሺ௝	ାଵሻ ቀொௌሺೕశభሻொௌሺೕሻ ቁ ൅ ߜ	ሺߜ=0 min 
payment).  Furthermore, the higher the QS, the higher ad rank is, the lower CPC payment 
is and the better ad position. However, in the GSP auction, advertisers do not necessarily 
fare best when they truthfully reveal any private information asked for by the ad auction. 
Hence, Google’s suggested CPC bidding strategies (i.e., cost per acquisition (CPA)). 
Compared to VCG, the GSP is not proof efficient and has no equilibrium in DSE. The 
equivalent one-shot complete information game, however, proved to converge to “locally 
envy-free” equilibrium, at which the payoffs of the players are the same as in DSE of 
VCG auction, even though bids and payment rules are different. (Edelman et al., 2007), 
analyzed the generalized English auction (GEA) that depicts GSP to capture convergence 
of bidding behavior to static equilibrium. GEA is similar to English auction except 
bidders are assigned to slots in the order they drop out of the auction. Let ߙ௜ known	∀	݅, 
valuations drawn from a continuous distribution	ܨሺ൉ሻ. The user knows own valuation 
andܨሺ൉ሻ. Let	݌ሺ௞,௛,௩ሺ೔ሻሻ ൌ ݒሺ௜ሻ െ ఈೖఈೖషభ 	ሺݒ
ሺ௜ሻ െ ܾሺ௞ାଵሻ), the price at which user ݅ drops out, 
where	݇, is no. of remaining bidders ݄ ൌ 	 ሺܾሺ௞	ାଵሻ	, . . . , ܾሺ௞ሻሻ is the history of bidders. For 
dynamic GSP, if bids can change iteratively, agents eventually learn information about 
other agents that implies equilibrium is robust independent of the underlying distribution 
an ex post BNE strategy profiles for any set of distributions of advertisers’ private values.  
(Varian, 2007), analyzed the ad position auction with complete information, based on the 
two-sided matching assignment game  (Shapley & Shubik, 1972) (Demange et al., 1986), 
and (Roth & Sotomayor, 1992). The work of (Shapley & Shubik, 1972) showed 
properties of the two-sided markets are robust to generalizations of the two-sided labour 
markets model. The ad positions (i.e., slot-s) in a web page are traded amongst 
advertisers (i.e., agent	ܽ) of valuations	ݒ௔௦ ൌ ݒ௔ݔ௦, ݒ௔ is expected profit PPC and	ݔ௦, is 
CTR. Ad agents simultaneously decide bids	ܾ௔, while each agent charged, if users click 
53 
 
 
 
on an ad slot, the bid value of agent below him in the ranking. The auction settles with 
Nash equilibrium. that is		ݑ௔௦ ൒ 	ݑ௔௧ → 	 ሺݒ௔ െ ݌௦ሻݔ௦ ൒ ሺݒ௔ െ ݌௧ሻݔ௧	∀ݐ,	other slots.  
The digital ad auction model is evolving to an exchange matching model that cross trade 
e-market visibility intelligence and liquidity for the efficient matching allocation of 
digital media assets. The combinatorial exchange (CX) matching trade problem is 
tackled, for instance, in the ICE proxy architecture of (Cavallo et al., 2005), in which 
bidders submit and refine bounds on TBBL bids directly to the CX that drive price 
dynamics and ultimately clear the CX. The TBBL leads to a concise formation of the 
efficient trade problem as an IP. In fact, linear prices	ߨ	are CE prices for the CX problem, 
if there is a feasible trade	λ ∈ ࣠ሺx଴ሻ	with prices	ߨ: ݒ௜ሺߣ௜ሻ െ ݌గሺߣ௜ሻ ൒ ݒ௜ሺߣ௜ᇱሻ െ
݌గሺߣ௜ᇱሻ∀ߣ௜ᇱ ∈ ࣠௜ሺݔ଴ሻ ,∀݅ that makes λ of CE ߨ prices an efficient trade (Bikhchandani & 
Ostroy, 2002). Algorithmically, the bid tree and TBBL calculate, iteratively, based on 
myopic best response iterative auction an optimal primal and optimal dual solution to 
solve for efficient matching allocation and price 〈ݔ, ݌〉 in a CX.  The ICE iterative model, 
however, would enforce activity rules to guide preference elicitation in each round, 
ensure incremental progress and prevent free‐riding that reduce the CX to a sealed‐bid 
auction and lose desirable properties. The ICE allows bidders specify lower and upper 
bounds on valuations and refine bounds across rounds that allow price discovery, useful 
preference elicitation, and termination with efficient trade despite iterative model. While 
there are no truthful MD solutions for AE, and BB sealed bid CXs due to impossibility 
results (Myerson & Satterthwaite, 1983), any payment rule can be leveraged and would 
allow ICE to inherit truthful bidding  in an ݁ݔ post Nash equilibrium, just as can be 
achieved in iterative GVA (Mishra & Parkes, 2007). The DAs in which truthful bidding 
is in DSE are known for unit demand settings (McAfee, 1992) and also for more 
expressive domains (Chu & Shen, 2008). The free exchange (FX) secures AE and IC best 
response trade as based on the GSP matching and pricing models that maximizes the FX 
exchange revenue, rather than leaving it on deficit; as in Parkes, iterative GVA (Parkes, 
2001) that adds further steps to enforce IC, while applying payment rules as Threshold 
payment rule on final payments to resolve BB problem (Parkes et al., 2001).  
54 
 
 
 
Chapter 4  
4 RBBL: Rule Based Bidding Language  
An inspiring motivation to conveying the rule-based bidding strategies with the attribute-
values of e-services is to facilitating the free market economy natural conduct of bidders. 
Our work follows this inherent microeconomic market concept based on the shared facts 
below. As a matter of fact, the constant learning of rational bidders at repetitive trades is 
what motivates realizing the truthful strategic behaviour of bidders using the rule-based 
bidding language. The RBBL would, also, facilitates multiple trading transactions of 
rather rapid response without scarifying privacy. This is due to the automatic deduction 
and aggregation of bidding rules and attribute-values of elicited e-services that facilitates 
bid formation by the free exchange platform for rather multiple automatic transactions of 
more rapid trades. In that vein, our work presents and examines the concept of bidding 
lifecycle in the current trading mechanisms. Our work facilitates the flexible bidding 
strategic conduct using the logical rules formula as presented in the RBBL model. An 
example elaborates on the application of the RBBL messaging by bidders and the free 
exchange deliberation and formation of elicited e-services and related bids. The desirable 
properties of the RBBL is examined and theoretically verified at the end of this chapter.   
4.1 Market Economy: Insights from Microeconomics Theory 
Generally, the resource matching allocation problem amongst societies relied, primarily, 
on three institutional economies (mechanisms) (Hall & Lieberman, 2010): (1) Traditional 
economy: A fair e-market that allocates resources according to traditional practices that 
govern the fair distribution of goods and e-services. Though, predictable and stable; 
traditional markets, often, lack innovation and growth, hence, likely converge to stagnant 
economies; (2) Command economy: a central authority that plans and allocates resources 
according to explicit enforced rules; and (3) Market economy: A free market in which 
resources allocated by bidder buying and selling decision making, primarily governed by 
opportunity cost, as influenced, most often, by the society. Adam Smith, remarkably, 
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observed bidders interacting in free markets act as if guided by “invisible hand” that leads 
to desirable e-market outcomes: “[The trader] neither intends to promote the public 
interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it... he intends only his own gain, and he is 
in this… led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was not part of his intention”.  
Prices are the instrument of invisible hand in directing economic activities, reflecting 
both value of goods to a society and cost to society of making goods that, in many cases, 
maximize the welfare of society. The invisible hand, though, is less able to ensure 
economic prosperity is distributed fairly (Mankiw, 2012). Free markets reward people as 
per their ability to produce goods other people are willing to pay for. While public 
policies, as welfare, attempt to achieve fair distribution of economic well-being, the 
invisible hand leads free markets to allocate resources efficiently, works best in economy 
of perfect competition. The invisible hand is , also, not invincible to e-market failure due 
to either externalities or monopolistic power. Nevertheless, Smith’s insight ensures free 
market invisible hand of competition is better than fair e-market regulation or 
government ruled economy. The activities of buyers and sellers automatically push e-
market price for a good towards equilibrium at which buyers and sellers are satisfied, and 
there is no upward or downward pressure on prices as supply and demand for the good is 
in balance (i.e., law of supply and demand).  
Economists often advocate free markets as the best way to organize economic activities. 
After all, in free market economy, no one is looking out for the economic well-being of 
society as a whole. Despite the decentralized and self-interested decision making, the free 
market economies have proven remarkably successful in organizing economic activities 
in a way that promotes overall economic well-being (Mankiw, 2012). However, caution 
must be taken at microeconomic and computational levels to realizing and eradicating the 
adverse strategies of e-market participants as fraud, deception, adverse selection (of 
buyers of partial information) and hidden actions (i.e., moral hazard), that often, harm the 
social welfare efficiency and result in e-market failures. The mechanism design (MD) 
theory perceives an agent might unilaterally seek to manipulate an outcome. For instance, 
in Vickrey auction, if agents having the highest and second-highest valuations collude, 
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then these agents can benefit. Also, there might be bidding across mechanisms, making 
collusion harder to detect. Other strategic behaviors are snipping (submitting bids near to 
auction closing) and free riding (submitting overvalued bids with no financial shield) and 
shading. Our work advocates free e-market economy and establishes that free strategic 
conduct would eradicate, eventually, the adverse strategies driven by restrictions. 
4.2 Strategic Impact of Constant Learning  
The rationale of advocating free strategic conduct is particularly inspired by the impact of 
constant learning at repetitive trades. The learning process motivates bidders to deliberate 
about e-market disruptions and, hence, change their preferences and strategies. This type 
of strategic adjustment is perceived as a truthful and rational reaction due to learning new 
facts. The truthful strategic reaction is also driven by the invisible dynamics of the free 
market economy that stabilize the self-interest and essential needs of bidders to scarce 
assets.  The free market economy draws, eventually, a rationally collaborative bidders 
response that delivers stable efficiency. The free expression of rational conduct would, 
hence, facilitate the truthful revelation of strategic conduct. Another compelling by-
product is that the bidding automation allow for more rapid trades. The restricted bidding 
conduct would, otherwise, provoke deceitful tactics and adverse strategies that result in e-
market failures. Our work proposes, hence, the free exchange that follows the free market 
economy that proved effective in organizing economic activities for the social well-being 
despite the self-interest of bidders. However, the free exchange stable efficiency would, 
often be better realized with thicker e-markets, uncongested interaction, and safe privacy 
(Roth, 2007). Another crucial factor is implementing fair mechanisms of no monopolies.  
The limited bidding scope to free choices may be traced to the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves 
(VCG) mechanisms (Vickrey, 1961) (Clarke, 1971) (Groves, 1973) that penalize 
(internalize) bidders externality levies for reporting untrue strategic preferences, to align 
payoffs with the social welfare, rather than the desirable self-prosperity. Evidently, the 
fact e-markets penalize or inhibit strategizing incites adverse reactions that lead to e-
market failure due to incomplete or false information revelation. The adverse strategies 
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may be manifested by fraud, deception, collusion, shilling, free riding, shading, snipping 
or hidden actions. The e-markets are, mostly, more vulnerable to adverse strategies than 
classic markets. The virtual bidders may use agents to collude, form coalitions or unleash 
agents of multiple identities for false name bidding.  
The strategic aspect of natural interactions in mechanisms has an incident in the Boston 
public school (BPS) choice under “Boston Mechanism”  (Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2011), 
where smart parents strategized and gained preferred seats, the reason why it switched to 
a deferred acceptance, Stagey Proof (SP) mechanism that, literally, disables the strategic 
choices, through less intense preference elicitation, in this case, for a better social welfare 
outcome and , of course, to avoid lawsuits by unsatisfied parents. While equity is justified 
at school choice level, e-market fairness is not a natural attribute of the decentralized 
matching allocation problem. In fact, our work takes notice, not of the solution, but a 
comment by one affected parent “I’m troubled that you’re considering a system that takes 
away the little power that parents have to prioritize... what you call this strategizing as if 
strategizing is a dirty word...” (Recording from BPS Public Hearing; 05-11-04).  
The strategic impact of the repeated trades and constant learning is empirically observed 
in the first-price auction as examined by (Edelman & Ostrovsky, 2007) on Yahoo!. The 
first price auction is found unstable as bidders shade true valuations and adjust bids 
frequently in response to others in a cycling behavior strategy as shown in Figure 8 
(source: (Zhang, 2005)). The cyclic behaviour often results in slower trades and a 
potential revenue loss. The empirical evidence of bid and ranking fluctuations in the 
generalized second price auction (GSP) auction established history dependent strategies 
motivate such fluctuations. The work of (Zeithammer, 2006) analyzed eBay auctions 
using real data and observed that forward-looking bidders change strategies and actions 
once having information about future auctions. Zeithammer argued bidding true valuation 
would be too high, as it exposes the bidder to winning immediately, while losing the 
opportunity for a better price for the same item on future trades. Instead, bidders bid less 
than their valuations, a strategy referred to as “shading”. The key prediction of the theory 
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of “forward‐looking” is bidders should shade more when there are more items coming up 
for auction and when more of those items are desirable to the bidders. Such findings 
would impact, also, seller strategies, raising the question of whether eBay auction limits 
the potential of trading institutions. In fact, allowing strategic selling may change the 
bidder’s strategy. That, of course, raises the question whether current auction models are 
strategically sustainable  
In (Nisan et al., 2011), the convergence of the GSP to VCG AE outcome is due to best 
response strategies that transform partial information to complete information models at 
repeated trades. Incidentally, our work takes note of Nisan’s remark “It is quite an 
embarrassment that the pricing rule used in ad auctions, almost universally is GSP, 
rather than the more theoretically	motivated VCG which mechanism design (MD) theory 
would suggest”. While (Nisan et al., 2011) recognized the value of GSP cognitive and 
computational simplicity over VCG, yet, the theoretical analysis relate GSP stable 
efficiency to the fact GSP auction converges from uncompleted information trading 
model a complete information IC trading by implementing repeated best response truthful 
direct strategies with, indeed, continuously repeated trades. In particular, showing that 
VCG prices are equilibrium of GSP auction does not address the question of how the 
bidders may reach equilibrium without having the required information. This issue was 
also addressed by (Cary et al., 2007), who show that the GSP auction of bidders with 
repeated best response strategies, would converge to the VCG equilibrium.  The work in 
(Varian, 2007) empirically analyzed the GSP data of Google and reported similar results 
to (Edelman et al., 2007) where the complete information locally envy-free equilibrium 
of the simultaneous-move game is observed in Google ad auction fairly accurately. The 
GSP, however, limits bidder choices. For any keyword, advertisers submit single bids; 
given different ad positions that may not sufficiently convey preferences of bidders..  
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Figure 8: First price auction cyclic behaviors  
4.3 Bidding Lifecycle: Bidding Automation for Rapid Trades 
The time wasted in the bidding processes at de facto e-marketplaces is rather an annoying 
user experience. For instance, a bidding process may take hours or days for an e-Bay or 
Amazon auction. Our work examines the “bidding lifecycle” that relates to the processes 
of creation, dispatch, and expiry of the bidding process. While the bidder agents manage 
their local problems and the formation of their RBBL messages, the FX deduces and 
aggregates the bidding rules to elicit preferences, generate the requests and asks and 
computes winning matches. Hence, the bidding lifecycle would have substantial 
influence on designing mechanisms. The following is an analysis of the bidding 
lifecycles in various e-trading mechanisms: 
Iterative Bidding: commonly used in partial revelation indirect mechanisms (i.e., 
English auction, Dutch clock auction, SAA (Cramton, 2006), iBundle (Parkes, 2006)) and 
has a simple bidding structure and semantics. The bidding lifecycle expires at every 
round of a single trade and requires manual setups and bid formations. The iterative 
biddings and indirect mechanisms distribute the computational workload between agents 
and the exchange. The manual updates, however, require excessive setup times. The 
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clock auction reduces the bidding delays by enforcing a timeout constraint to promoting 
faster trades.  Figure 9 depicts the iterative bidding for the free exchange e-marketplace. 
 
Figure 9: Iterative bidding  
Proxy Iterative Bidding: extends bidding lifecycle until e-market clears in the price 
taking model for a single trade as shown Figure 10, using proxy agents (i.e., iBundle Tree 
based bidding language (TBBL) (Parkes, 2006), Ascending proxy auction (Ausubel & 
Milgrom, 2006)) with valuation bounds (i.e., budget constraints) and provisional 
allocation. The proxy iterative bidding is computationally distributed with extended 
bidding lifecycle, however, for single trades. The bidders must set the valuation bounds at 
each trade and update proxy agents. 
 
Figure 10: Proxy iterative bidding  
Bidding programs:  the complete problem model is sent to the exchange (see Figure 11) 
in the form of complex bid structure that includes the formal local problem objectives and 
constrains (Nisan, 2000). In fact, it is the other extreme of information revelation bidding 
compared to the simple iterative bidding in which the bidding lifecycle extends until the 
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problem is fully solved. However, there are inherent critical issues as found in (Parkes, 
2001) like the privacy exposure problem that makes the bidding model impractical.   
 
Figure 11: Bidding programs 
One Shot Bidding: commonly used for complete information direct mechanisms (i.e., 
First and Second sealed bid auctions, GSP, VCG). The auctioneer collects single shot 
bids in sealed auction, and computes the winner determination. The bidding lifecycle is 
rapid for single trades. However, it requires setup at each trade. The computation model 
is distributed. Agents work on valuation and bid formation; while exchange computes 
winner determination allocation and pricing outcomes (see Figure 12).   
 
Figure 12: One shot bidding  
4.4 Rule Based Biding Language (RBBL) Model 
The RBBL is an expressive bidding language that has a directed acyclic graph (DAG) 
structure. Our work combines the expressive and structural attributes of the tree based 
bidding language (TBBL) in (Cavallo et al., 2005) with those of logical languages	ॷீ	 
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and ॷ஻in (Boutilier & Hoos, 2001) that include ॷ஻ைோ, ॷ஻௑ைோ, ॷீ஻	and	ॷ஻ைோ∗. In fact, the 
RBBL subsumes the expressive and structural attributes of the TBBL in (Cavallo et al., 
2005) and the logical languages	ॷீ,	 ॷ஻, ॷ஻ைோ, ॷ஻௑ைோ, ॷீ஻	and	ॷ஻ைோ∗in (Boutilier & Hoos, 
2001) using the logical rule and operators formulae in the bid DAG structure and 
semantics. Our work exploits the FOL to model the rules, formulae and other attributes 
like Q-levels and budget bounds. As shown in Figure 13, the RBBL symmetric DAG 
bidding structure consists of two segments, the attribute-values segment and the logical 
rules segment. The iconic attribute of the RBBL, however, is the addition of the logical 
rule formulae to the bid DAG message, which are simple rules that attribute to the local 
constraints of bidders, while preserving their privacy, contrary to the exposure problem of 
the bidding programs in (Nisan, 2000). The RBBL enables the repetitive adjustments of 
the preferences in response to constant learning at repetitive trade disruptions. The RBBL 
logical rule formulae enable bidders to expressing their free strategic conduct. The RBBL 
is symmetric model that allows for bidding requests and asks in a single DAG structure 
that may exploit diverse models of the rule formulae. For instance, our work uses the first 
FOL to model rule formulae and other bounding attributes like Q-levels and budget. 
The RBBL semantics and structure outlines the blueprint for the deduction and formation 
of diverse e-services and bid combinations by the free exchange. The RBBL message 
comprises (1) the attribute-value segment of factor-group-value leafs. The attribute-value 
includes the attribute short description, the group identifier and initial values of attributes. 
For instance, as shown in Figure 13 the attribute-value leaf ( ଷ݂.Cap: ݃ଶ:QP, ݒହ) designates 
ଷ݂: capability feature of, particular group ݃ଶ: optimization solver of a quadratic 
programming problem with assigned value	ݒହ by the bidder; (2) the logical rules internal 
control nodes that may include logical operator and logical rule formulae (i.e., FOL 
rules). The rules presents the control nodes of the RBBL DAG structure with often no 
values but rules applied on values. The FOL logical rules often update the values of the 
attributes or combinations following strategic aspects of bidders and the outcome of the 
constant learning at repeated trades. For instance, the FOL rule (൓Win_Before⇒	ൌ
ሺ൅ሺݒ௫, ߝሻ, ݒ௫ሻ ∨	൑ ሺݒ௫, ܷ௫ሻሻ means, if the bidder has not won before, increase the value 
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ݒ௫ that is the sum of the selected combined attributes by factor ߝ for next trade, as long 
as	ݒ௫ ൑ ܷ௫. Evidently, the node rules often change the initial true attribute or combined 
attributes values. The selected Q-levels and max budgets may be presented explicitly as 
an attribute or implicitly as a rule. 
As shown in Figure 13, the RBBL symmetric DAG bidding structure consists of two 
segments, the attributes segment and the logical rules segment.  The RBBL model 
outlines the blueprint for inferring the diverse bid combinations by the exchange e-
market: (1) the attributes segment comprises the feature-group-value leafs of the DAG 
structure. The attributes include the attribute short description, group identifier and initial 
true values of the feature. For instant, the feature leave ( ଷ݂.Cap: ݃ଶ:QP, ݒହ ) valuates the 
capability feature ଷ݂of the optimization solver to compute a quadratic programming 
problem ݃ଶ	for value	ݒହ; (2) the logical rules internal control nodes that may include 
logical operator and logical rule formulae (i.e., FOL rules). The rules presents the control 
nodes of the RBBL DAG structure with, often, no values but rules applied on values. The 
rules often update the values of the attributes or combinations following some strategic 
aspects being the outcome of constant learning and repeated trade disruptions. For 
instance, the FOL rule (൓Win_Before⇒	ൌ ሺ൅ሺݒ௫, ߝሻ, ݒ௫ሻ ∨	൑ ሺݒ௫, ܷ௫ሻሻ  means if the 
bidder has not won before, increase the value ݒ௫ that is the sum of the selected combined 
attributes by factor ߝ for next trade, as long as	ݒ௫ ൑ ܷ௫. Evidently, the node rules, often, 
change the initial true attribute or combined attributes values. The selected Q-levels and 
maximums budgets may be presented explicitly as an attribute or implicitly as rules.  
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The FX deliberates on the RBBL FOL rules and attribute-values to deduce the selected digital 
services and formulate the request and ask bids 
The RBBL symmetric bid structure Ц fp/ci/j vp/ci/j rp/ci/j of attribute-values 
fp/ci/j vp/ci/j , bidding rules rp/ci/j and activity period .
eci1,Qcj1,bci1
f1.Cat:g1.Optimal 
Solution Solver:v1
≥ (Qlevel ,Qx)=>
Request Bid 
f2.ID:g1.IBM Cplex 
Optimizer:v2
f2.ID:g2.Gurobi 
Optimizer:v3
f3.Cap:g1.MILP:v4
f3.Cap:g2.QP:v5
f4.Sup:
g1.Matlab:v6
XOR
TSX=>Bid(QP)
TSX=> AND
f4.Sup:g2.Java:v6
AND
ecik,Qcik,bcik
Win_Before =>
=(+(vx , vx ≤(vx,Ux)
• • • 
≥(Wins, 2) =>
=(-(vx , vx ≥(vx,Ly)
≤(BBudget,Bmax)=>
Request Bid
ecic,Qcik,bcic
• • • 
=(f2,Cplex)=>
=(+(vx , vx ≤(vx,Ux) epj1,Qpj1,bpj1
epjp,Qpjp,bpjp
epjq,Qpjq,bpjq
• • • 
• • • 
≤(tactive, texpiry) 
≥(Qp ,Qx)
=> Ask Bid
f3.Cap:g2.QP:v5
f1.Cat:
g2.Simulation:v6
f2.ID:g3.Matlab 
Stock Market:v7
AND
=(f5,Cloud_Proc)=>
=(-(vx , vx ≤(vx,Lw)
AND
≤(f6,Parallel_Proc )=>
=(+(vx , vx ≤(vx,Uz)
Ask 
Bidding
Request 
Bidding
AND ≤(tactive, texpiry) => Request Bid
 
Figure 13: RBBL bid symmetric DAG structure 
The FX collects the RBBL DAG messages and implements the automatic preference 
deduction algorithms (not covered) on rules and attributes sets to generate the 
combinations of requests and asks rather than solving a bidding program (Nisan, 2000). 
In fact, the rules act as filters (i.e., bid constraints) to reducing the complexity of the 
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feasible solution space. The RBBL internal logical rule formulae nodes compute the new 
attribute valuations and propagate the updated values within the DAG. The logical 
operators (i.e.,	ܱܴ, ܣܰܦ, ܱܴܺ, etc.), otherwise, combine the attributes and their current 
values for the next stage. The RBBL is expressive with more flexibility and conciseness 
that reduces the complexity of preferences to sets of attributes and rules.  
Compared with the bidding lifecycles of other mechanisms presented in literature review, 
the RBBL enables more rapid bidding lifecycle for multiple trades and hence expedites 
trades. The free exchange collects the bidding attribute-values and logical rules formulae 
to automatically deduce preferences, form bids, and computes winner determination with 
minimal preference elicitation. The RBBL facilitates, also, distributed computation, in 
which the request and ask bidders as well as the free exchange e-marketplace contribute, 
equally, in the computation and fulfillment of the social objective (see Figure 14).        
 
Figure 14: Rule based bidding  
The RBBL exploits the logical rule and operator formulae, concisely, while delivering the 
expressive semantics and structural attributes of other logical bidding languages. i.e., 
	ॷீ, ॷ஻, ॷ஻ைோ, ॷ஻௑ைோ, ॷீ஻	, OR‐ of‐ XORs, XOR‐ of‐ ORs, ܽ݊݀	ॷ஻ைோ∗.	 and TBBL languages.  
The RBBL bidding process: This example illustrates the process of RBBL flexible 
bidding and the free exchange deduction and aggregation of attribute-values and logical 
rules to forming targeted e-services and associated bids. As shown in Figure 15, there are 
two levels in the automatic construction of request and ask bids by the free exchange: 
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1) Bidder action: A consumer works on mathematical modeling and simulation wishes 
to bid for any commercial optimization solver e-service with a particular preference to 
either Gurobi or IBM Cplex Optimiser solutions. For simplicity, consider the part of 
the RBBL message instance in Figure 15 that includes only two attribute-values of the 
e-service: (1) category feature (ܥܽݐ: ଵ݂) and (2) Source ID feature (ܫܦ: ଶ݂	). The 
consumer would pay ݒଵ for any solver:ሺ ଵ݂. ܥܽݐ: ଵ݃: ܱ݌ݐ݈݅݉ܽ	ܵ݋݈ݑݐ݅݋݊	ܵ݋݈ݒ݁ݎ: ݒଵ) 
and would add more ݒଶ if the solver is a component of IBM Cplex or ݒଷ if it is part of 
Gurobi Optimizer that isሺ ଶ݂. ܫܦ: ଵ݃: ܩݑݎ݋ܾ݅	ܱ݌ݐ݅݉݅ݖ݁ݎ: ݒଷ).   The bidder is looking 
for a Q-level൒ ܳ௫ for any solver with limited budget ܤ஻௨ௗ௚௘௧ ൑ ܤ௠௔௫. The bidder has 
a strategy, if he couldn’t win a specific trade then he would increase the bid valuation 
ݒ௫ by ߝ in the next repetitive trade on the same e-service subject to a limited upper 
bound	ݒ௫ ൑ ܷ௫ ∈ Թା,	ݒ௫ is total attribute values that fan-in to the FOL rule. The 
bidder forms flexibly and concisely the RBBL message that include his preferences on 
requested e-services in the form of attribute-values and his bidding strategies in the 
form of FOL rules as shown in a part of Figure 15 then send it to the free exchange.   
2) FX action: The FX receives the bidder RBBL message and stores it in the database. 
The FX and bidders share common semantics repository of feature-group attributes. 
The FX identifies an offer from Gurobi for a solver. The FX searches for request 
matches and identifies our consumer as an eligible buyer. The FX aggregation might 
consider, for instance, the matching of max budgets and min costs for qualifying 
eligibility before constructing bids. The FX then, automatically deliberates on the 
RBBL message and examinesሺ ଵ݂: ଵ݃: ݒଵ) andሺ ଶ݂: ଵ݃: ݒଷ) attributes-values to form the 
requested e-services and bids. As shown in Figure 15, the red arrows indicate the 
transition state and activity flow of the logical operators on the attributes. The FX 
queries the attribute-value ሺ ଵ݂: ଵ݃: ݒଵሻ being offered by seller(s) and tags it as true to 
indicate eligibility. The ሺ ଵ݂: ଵ݃: ݒଵሻ attribute-value state transitions next to the Q-level 
FOL rule (൒ ሺܳ௟௘௩௘௟,	ܳ௫ሻ ⇒ ܤ݅݀ሻ that inspect the min required Q-level. If ܳ௟௘௩௘௟ ൒ ܳ௫ 
true, the active flow branches to the max budget FOL (൑ ሺܤ஻௨ௗ௚௘௧, ܤ௠௔௫ሻ ⇒ ܤ݅݀ሻ and 
also to bidding path of attributeሺ ଷ݂, ݃ଶ, ݒଷሻ. For the first bidding path, if	ܤ஻௨ௗ௚௘௧ ൑
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ܤ௠௔௫ the “true” flow, steps to the bidding expiry rule: (൑ ሺݐ௔௖௧௜௩௘, ݐ௘௫௣௜௥௔௬ሻ ⇒
ܴ݁ݍݑ݁ݏݐ_ܤ݅݀ሻ.  If	ݐ௔௖௧௜௩௘ ൑ ݐ௘௫௣௜௥௔௬ the FX forms ሺ݁௖ଵሺ ଵ݂, ଵ݃ሻ: ܳ௖ଵሺܳ௟௘௩௘௟ሻ: ܾ௖ଵሺݒଵሻሻ	  
request bid 	for e-service	݁௖ଵ. The FX inspects the FOL rule (൓Win_Before⇒
	=ሺ൅ሺݒ௫, ߝሻ, ݒ௫ሻ ∨	൑ ሺݒ௫, ܷ௫ሻሻ  in the other bidding path that combines attribute-value 
ሺ ଵ݂, ଵ݃: ܳ௖: ݒଵሻ		ݓ݅ݐ݄ attributeሺ ଷ݂: ݃ଶ: ܳ௖: ݒଷሻ. The FOL rule inspects the bidder 
winning status at repetitive trades and implements reactive strategy. The FOL rule 
increases the bid valuation ݒ௫ by ߝ in the next trade subject to upper bound	ݒ௫ ൑ ܷ௫ ∈
Թା (i.e.,	ݒ௫=	ݒଵ൅	ݒଷ ൅ ߝ) is total attribute values that fan-in to the FOL rule. The FX 
constructs, then, a second request bid	ሺ݁௖ଶሺ ଵ݂, ଵ݃, ଶ݂, ݃ଶሻ: ܳ௖ଵሺܳ௟௘௩௘௟ሻ: ܾ௖ଵሺݒଵାݒଷ ൅
ߝሻሻ	after validating 	ݐ௔௖௧௜௩௘ ൑ ݐ௘௫௣௜௥௔௬ as shown above. The FX generates, eventually, 
two request bids for the e-services ݁௖ଵ	and ݁௖ଵ : ሺ݁௖ଵሺ ଵ݂, ଵ݃ሻ: ܳ௖ଵሺܳ௟௘௩௘௟ሻ: ܾ௖ଵሺݒଵሻሻ	 and 
ሺ݁௖ଶሺ ଵ݂, ଵ݃, ଶ݂, ݃ଶሻ: ܳ௖ଵሺܳ௟௘௩௘௟ሻ: ܾ௖ଵሺݒଵାݒଷ ൅ ߝሻሻ. 
 
Figure 15: A sample instance of a RBBL bid structure and preference deduction 
4.5 RBBL Theoretical and Computational Properties 
Proposition 1: The RBBL logical rules and operator formulae expedites e-market trades.         
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Our work introduced and analyzed the bidding lifecycle concept that relates to the 
processes of creation (i.e., bidding), dispatch (i.e., execution) and termination (i.e., 
expiry) of bids. The bidding lifecycle captures the flow and duration of the trades. The 
RBBL logical rules and operators expedite the bidding lifecycle for multiple trades due to 
the automatic deduction and aggregation of logical rules and operators and the formation 
of the request and ask bids inside the FX system. Our work demonstrates empirically the 
performance benefits of the rules aggregation in the experimental analysis.  
Proposition 2: The RBBL subsumes the logical bidding languages (i.e., 	ॷீ, ॷ஻, , ॷீ஻	 
ॷ஻ைோ, ॷ஻௑ைோ, ॷ஻ைோ∗ ) and the tree based bidding languages (i.e., TBBL).  
The RBBL exploits the DAG model and enables ॷୋ୆	, ॷ஻ைோ, ॷ஻௑ைோ, ॷ஻ைோ∗and TBBL 
(Cavallo et al., 2005) semantics. For instance, the TBBL ܫܥ௬௫ operator is presented as an 
RBBL rule (i.e., ܴ1:൑ ሺActive_Attributes, ݕሻ∨൒ ሺActive_Attribute, ݔሻ ⇒ Bid. The 
RBBL, otherwise, subsumesॷୋ୆	, ॷ஻ைோ, ॷ஻௑ைோ, ॷ஻ைோ∗, as shown Figure 13, where the logical 
operators are utilized concisely. As for the bidding lifecycle, the RBBL lifecycle extend 
to multiple trades. The TBBL works for single trade; once ܫܥ௫௬ is selected for a choice 
with bounds (Lubin et al., 2008) it cannot change unless reconfigured for new trade.  
Proposition 3: The RBBL facilitates direct and indirect mechanisms in a single message 
structure. 
The RBBL logical rule formulae may serve for single shot bidding, otherwise for rule-
based iterative or incremental. Both scenarios are shown in a single RBBL bidding 
instance in Figure 13. For the iterative bidding, the bid value is incremented or 
decremented subject to diverse rule-based inspected situations. 
Proposition 4: The RBBL allows for capturing the CAP as an integer program (IP).  
Proof:  The work in (Boutilier, 2002) defines an IP formation for winner determination 
using	ॷீ஻	and provides positive empirical performance results using a commercial solver. 
The RBBL enable the free exchange to deliberate on the FOL bidding rules and attribute-
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values of the e-services to deduce the e-services and preferences and formulate the 
request and ask bids. The FX problem model would then reduce to a form that is similar 
to the ॷீ஻	 IP in (Boutilier, 2002) as shown in Figure 13 andFigure 15. Chapter 2 expands 
on the IP formal modeling. Hence, the computational feasibility translates to the RBBL. 
Formally, given a request bid RBBL instance ݅ of consumer c as shown in Figure 15, the 
RBBL bid model is ∐ 〈 ௖݂௜, ݒ௖௜, ݎ௖௜, ܳ௖௜ , ݐ௖௜ 〉௜௖  where the notations are defined in the problem 
description. The FX may then deduce the (݁௖௜௞, ܳ௖௜௞, ܾ௖௜௞ሻ for a selected e-service ݁௖௜௞of a 
particular Q-level ܳ௖௜௞and compute the total bid value	ܾ௖௜௞ of a trade ߣ௧௜௝௞௤ that is the true 
sum of attribute value RBBL leafs ൫ ௖݂௜, ݒ௖௜൯ and bid value revisions as applied by the 
active rules of the RBBL internal control nodes	൫ݎ௖௜൯ before expiry	ݐ௖௜  (i.e., 	ܾ௖௜௞ ൌ
∑ ݒሺ ௖݂௜ሻ ൅ ݒሺݎ௖௜ሻ௞ ሻ. The AE allocative efficiency indicates the set of selected satisfied 
attribute and control rules provide a max true total bid valuation. Given an RBBL 
message, ∐ 〈. 〉௜௖  and a bid-value ܾ௖௜௞(݁௖௜௞ሻ for e-service ݁௖௜௞ in tradeߣ௧௜௝௞௤, let ݏܽݐ௖௜ሺ݊ሻ ∈
ሼ0, 1ሽ denote if the attribute-value leaf or the active rule internal control node ݊	in the 
RBBL bid ݅ of consumer c	ሺi. e. , ∐ 〈. 〉௜௖ ሻ is satisfied with	if	ݏܽݐ௖௜ ൌ ൛ݏܽݐ௖௜ሺ݊ሻ, ∀݊ ∈ ∐ 〈. 〉௜௖ ൟ. 
For	ݏܽݐ௖௜  to be eligible for bid, 	∀∐ 〈. 〉௜௖ , ∀ߣ௧௜௝௞௤ ⇒ ݏܽݐ௖௜ ∈ ݒ݈ܽ݅݀	ሺ∐ 〈. 〉௜௖ , ߣ௧௜௝௞௤ሻ  means a 
given request (ask) is matched. The total value is the solution to the IP problem:  
ܾ௖௜௞൫݁௖௜௞൯ ൌ ݒ௖௜௞ ቆሡ 〈. 〉
௜
௖
, ߣ௧௜௝௞௤ቇ ൌ 	 ݉ܽݔ	௦௔௧೎೔∈	௩௔௟௜ௗ	൫∐ 〈.〉೔೎ ,ఒ೟೔ೕೖ೜൯ ෍ 	ݒ௖
௜௞ሺ݊ሻ	ݏܽݐ௖௜ሺ݊ሻ
௡∈∐ 〈.〉೔೎
		 
ܾ௣௝௤൫݁௣௝௤൯ ൌ ݒ௣௝௤ ቆሡ 〈. 〉
௝
௣
, ߣ௧௜௝௞௤ቇ ൌ 	 ݉݅݊	௦௔௧೛ೕ∈	௩௔௟௜ௗ	ቀ∐ 〈.〉ೕ೛ ,ఒ೟೔ೕೖ೜ቁ
෍ ݒ௣௝௤ሺ݊ሻݏܽݐ௣௝ሺ݊ሻ
௡∈∐ 〈.〉ೕ೛
 
This formation is equivalent to the IP mode of the original problem model in chapter 2∎.   
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Figure 16: RBBL bid instance for IP analysis 
This chapter presents the RBBL modeling and analysis, The RBBL model exploits the 
logical rules and operators formulae on the internal control nodes coupled with the 
semantics for propagating attribute-values leafs within the RBBL DAG structure. The 
RBBL is inspired by the constant learning of rational bidders throughout their repetitive 
e-trades. The RBBL facilitates conveying the free bidding strategic conduct using the 
logical rules and operators formulae. The logical rules expedite e-market trades due to 
automatic deduction of the rules, operators and attribute-values to construct the selected 
e-services and to form the relevant request and ask bids. The RBBL allows for symmetric 
bidding of consumers and providers with unique valuations of factor-group e-service 
attributes that include multiple Q-levels. For an ad problem, the attribute may be an age 
group, location or interest.  For a software app, the attribute can be e-service ID, 
capability, category, etc. The RBBL subsumes other logical bidding languages and is 
suitable for direct and indirect mechanisms. It allows, also, for capturing the CAP as an 
integer program (IP) for winner determination problem. 
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Chapter 5  
5 GSPM Double Auction Mechanism  
Our work targets a tractable GSP based DA approach that delivers truthful, efficient and 
stable matching with the proposed free exchange e-marketplace profitability. The GSPM 
DA exploits the multiple Q-levels cross-matching heuristics for a class of decentralised 
CAP of multiple units of a single e-service of distinct attribute-values and multiple Q-
levels. The RBBL allows for a unique valuation of each attribute while conveying the 
logical rules in the bidding structure. The free exchange employs the rules deduction, 
aggregation and formation on the stored attribute-value attributes of the RBBL to 
generate the multiple request and ask bids for a specific trade. Our work is motivated by 
the fact while GSP is not IC, the GSP repeated best response strategies (BBS) always 
converge to NE with VCG AE IC outcomes and payments, as analyzed and validated in 
(Edelman & Ostrovsky, 2007) (Varian, 2007) and (Nisan et al., 2011). The GSPM 
exploits the efficient GSP auction and the Nash stability of GSP repeated best response 
auction. The GSPM is tractable of polynomial time complexity. In fact, the best response 
strategy is, evidently, the rational strategic reaction to constant learning at repetitive 
trades that transform private settings to complete information stability.  
The GSPM DA follows the EM for single Q-level matching allocation while it applies the 
GSP discriminatory DA price matching model that exploits the forward and reverse GSP 
auctions as described in later sections. The GSPM pricing model narrows down the 
valuation preferencing space of request (ask) bidders to the second price in descending 
(ascending) order that results in AE, particularly, in thick e-market repetitive trades, 
while securing e-market profitability. However, while the single Q-level GSPM DA is 
AE, it might not be IC for multiple units of single items (McAfee, 1992) (Wurman et al., 
1998). The IC challenge of single Q-level GSPM DA inspires designing the multiple Q-
level mechanism that motivates the IC of bidders through their desire to be winners in the 
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narrower, more competitive Q-levels, in addition to the prospect that their true valuations 
might win them a higher Q-level e-service item in the multiple Q-level cross-matching.  
This chapter presents the different single Q-level and multiple Q-levels GSPM and EM 
DA algorithms. The chapter covers also the game-theoretic and computational properties 
of the GSPM DA mechanisms as well as the simulation algorithmic structure.  
5.1 Exchange Mechanisms 
The exchange mechanisms are emerging e-trading models for e-marketplaces that enable 
consumers to target potential users for, often, spontaneous impact throughout interactive 
user engagement and rational configuration. The exchange brings efficiency by eliciting 
prices, aggregating information, matching trades, and generating capital. The Facebook 
FBX, Google DoubleClick, Yahoo RMX, and Microsoft ad Exchange are few examples 
of the exchange e-marketplaces. The objective of the exchange mechanism is the stable 
and socially efficient matching allocation and pricing of the e-services. That, often, 
involves the rational self-interested agents of both providers and consumers (bidders). 
The bidders interact and collaborate probably at real-time given, often, their competitive 
local objectives to accept at equilibrium a system-wide outcome that satisfies them. The 
decentralized collaboration cannot, however, be modeled and implemented using the 
centralized models. This is due to the inherent challenges that tackle the decentralized 
and often conflicting local objectives of rational bidders, their constraints, preferences 
and valuations, decision making, self-interest, truth revelation and strategic conduct.     
Building an efficient exchange, hence, is a daunting task. The large number of e-service 
providers and consumers that bid for the e-services at real-time by interacting with is a 
key challenge that strains, considerably, the computational resources of e-marketplaces. 
The present exchange e-marketplaces would, often, tackle those challenges, for bounded 
rational agents in rather constrained non-strategic settings. However, the e-marketplaces 
are typically challenged with issues related to the decentralized game-theoretic stability 
and social efficiency amongst rational bidders on top of the computational efficiency.  
73 
 
 
 
5.2 GSPM and EM Double Auction Mechanisms  
As shown Figure 17 and Figure   18, the GSPM DA allocation rule follows the 
Equilibrium Matching (EM) (Wurman et al., 1998) for single Q-level and multiple Q-
levels settings. Hence, our work examines the single Q-level EM DA (see Figure 19). 
The proposed Single Q-level GSPM DA pricing rule exploits the GSP forward auction 
for buyers (Varian, 2007) (Edelman et al., 2007) and reverse-GSP auction for sellers. The 
forward and reverse GSP DA narrows down the pricing tolerance of request and ask 
bidders to the second price in rank that improves stable efficiency, particularly, in thicker 
e-markers, while securing e-market profitability. The fact while the single Q-level GSPM 
and EM DA mechanisms are AE, it might not be IC for multiple units of single items, 
inspires designing the multiple Q-level GSPM and EM DA mechanisms for the class of 
multiple units of multiple Q-level items that motivates IC. The bidders IC is motivated by 
their desire to be winners in the narrower Q-level category, in addition to the prospect 
their true valuations might win bidders even a higher Q-level item in the cross-matching 
phase. Our work maintains, though, that the partial information revelation of bidders 
converge to complete information settings at best response strategist to repetitive trades 
that translates eventually, to a stable efficiency for all mechanisms subject to the best 
rational reaction of bidders to their dynamic states. This is formally analyzed in (Nisan et 
al., 2011). It is, also, validated through our experimental analysis.  Figure   18 and Figure   
20 presents the multiple Q-level GSPM and EM DA mechanisms.   
5.2.1 Single Q-level GSPM Double Auction Mechanism 
The single Q-level GSPM DA follows the EM DA (Wurman et al., 1998) in computing 
the matching allocations. However, our work proposes a forward-GSP auction pricing 
rule for buyers, and a reverse-GSP auction pricing rule for sellers for the multiple units of 
a single-item of multiple attributes as shown in Figure 17, steps are as follows:  
1) Qualify request and ask bids’ eligibility by fetching and grouping bids of identical e-
service attributes (i.e., 	݁௖௜௞=݁௣௝௤ሻ. 
2) Sort the eligible asks	ܾ௣௝௤ in ascending order for forward-GSP auction and sort the 
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eligible bids ܾ௖௜௞in descending order for reverse-GSP auction with respect to request 
and ask values.  
3) Matching: start at the top, add ask‐request pairs to the matched list, if request-bid price 
ܾ௖௜௞ ൒ ܾ௣௝௤	ask-bid price.  
4) Compute the GSPM allocations and assign matched pairs ൫݁௖௜௞, ݁௣௝௤൯ to the winning 
buyers ܥ௜	and sellers ௝ܲ.  
5) Assign prices such that	݌௖௜௞ ൌ ܾ௖௜௞ାଵ, ܿ௣௝௤ ൌ ܾ௣௝௤ାଵ ∀݌௖௜௞, ܿ௉௝௤ ∈ሼԹା, 0ሽ. Every bid 
winner pays the second price below him in the bids ordered list, while every ask 
winner collects the second price below him in ordered list. For the last pair, if 
matched: 	݌௖௜௡ ൌ ܾ௖௜௡, ܿ௣௝௡ ൌ ܾ௣௝௡. Ask or bid bidders pays his bid or collects his ask. 
 
Figure 17: Single Q-level GSPM DA mechanism 
5.2.2 Multiple Q-levels GSPM Double Auction Mechanism 
The multiple Q-levels GSPM DA computes the allocation and pricing rules for multiple 
units of a single-item of multiple attributes, and multiple Q-levels. While the ask bidders 
offers the same particular e-service item, items are distinct in the assigned Q-levels. The 
bid bidders request the same e-service item, however, they are different in their minimum 
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requested Q-levels. The multiple Q-level GSPM sorts the Q-levels and applies a 
multilevel cross-matching allocation as shown Figure   18:  
1) Sort Q-levels in descending order starting with the highest. 
2) Group the request and ask bids based on sorted Q-levels such that∀	݁௖௜௞ ൌ
݁௉௝௤,݉݅݊ ܳ௖௜௞ ൌ ܳ௉௝௤ ൌ 	ܳ௠;	∀ܳ െ ݈݁ݒ݈݁ ൌ ܳ௠.   
3) For each Q-level, qualify the item eligibility by identifying and grouping the eligible 
requests and asks of identical e-service item attributes (i.e.,	݁௖௜௞ ൌ ݁௣௝௤ሻ.  
4) For each Q-level, sort the eligible asks	ܾ௣௝௤ in ascending order for forward-GSP 
auction and the eligible bids ܾ௖௜௞in descending order for reverse-GSP auction.  
5) Start at the top of first highest Q-level list in rank (i.e.,	ܳ െ ݈݁ݒ݈݁ ൌ ܳ௠௔௫ሻ. Add the 
ask‐bid pairs to the matched list ifܾ௖௜௞ ൒ ܾ௣௝௤ ∧ ݉݅݊ ܳ௖௜௞ ൌ ܳ௉௝௤ ൌ 	ܳ௠.  
6) Step to the next lowest Q-level in rankܳ െ ݈݁ݒ݈݁ ൌ ܳ௠ିଵ. Consider the unmatched 
asks ܾ௣ఫ௤തതതത of the same or higher Q-levels from previous steps (i.e.,ܳ௉ఫ௤തതതതത ൒ ܳ௠ିଵ). Add 
the ask‐bid pairs to the matched list ifܾ௖௜௞ ൒ ܾ௣ఫ௤തതതത ∧ ݉݅݊ܳ௖௜௞ ൑ ܳ௉ఫ௤തതതതത.  
7) The chance of winning higher Q-level e-services motivates the IC truthful revelation 
of the consumers. The providers’ IC is driven by getting more prospective consumers.   
8) Compute the matching allocations and assign the matched pairs	൫݁௖௜௞, ݁௣௝௤൯ to the 
winning buyers ܥ௜	sellers ௝ܲ.  
9) At each Q-level, apply the GSPM pricing rule, as in single Q-level	݌௖௜௞ ൌ ܾ௖௜௞ାଵ, ܿ௣௝௤ ൌ
ܾ௣௝௤ାଵ ∀݌௖௜௞, ܿ௉௝௤	∈ሼԹା, 0ሽ, ∀ܳ. For the last pair in each Q-level, if matched, then 
	݌௖௜௡ ൌ ܾ௖௜௡, ܿ௣௝௡ =ܾ௣௝௡.  every bidder pays his bid or collects his ask. 
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Figure   18: Multiple Q-level GSPM double auction 
5.2.3 Single Q-level EM Double Auction Mechanism 
The single Q-level Mth  EM DA follows (Wurman et al., 1998) in computing the 
matching allocation and the Mth pricing (last matched ask price) rule (see Figure 19) for 
multiple units of a single-item of multiple attributes of a single Q-level. The work use this 
base models for the proposed multiple Q-level, EM DA. The following steps describe the 
single Q-level Mth EM DA:          
1) Qualify the eligibility by identifying and grouping the request and ask of identical e-
service item attributes (i.e.,	݁௖௜௞ ൌ ݁௣௝௤ሻ.  
2) Sort the eligible asks	ܾ௣௝௤ in ascending order and sort bids ܾ௖௜௞in descending order.  
3) Process the matching: start at the top, add the ask‐request pairs to the matched list, if 
the bid price ܾ௖௜௞ ൒ ܾ௣௝௤	more or equal the ask price for the eligible pairs.  
4) Compute the matching allocation list and assign matched pairs	൫݁௖௜௞, ݁௣௝௤൯ to the 
winning buyers ܥ௜	and sellers	 ௝ܲ.  
5) Compute the EM Mth equilibrium pricing rule ܾ௣ெ as the last matched ask price (i.e., 
ܾ௣ெ ൌ ܾ௣௝ାଷ). Assign prices such that	݌௖௜௞ ൌ ܿ௣௝௤ ൌ ܾ௣ெ ∀݌௖௜௞, ∀ܿ௉௝௤ 	∈ ሼԹା, 0ሽ.  
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Figure 19: Single Q-level Mth EM double auction  
5.2.4 Multiple Q-level Mth EM Double Auction Mechanism 
Our work extends the single Q-level Mth EM and proposes a multiple Q-level EM DA 
that exploits a multiple EM points for the multiple Q-levels in computing the allocations 
and the pricing. The multiple Q-level, Mth EM DA follows the matching allocation of the 
multiple Q-level, GSPM DA. The multiple Q-level Mth EM DA applies a multiple cross-
level matching allocation as described below and shown in Figure   20. The following 
steps describe the subject multiple Q-level Mth EM DA mechanism: 
1) Sort the Q-levels in descending order. 
2) Group all request and ask bids based on the sorted Q-levels such that	∀݁௖௜௞ ൌ
݁௉௝௤,݉݅݊ ܳ௖௜௞ ൌ ܳ௉௝௤ ൌ ܳ௠;	∀ܳ െ ݈݁ݒ݈݁ ൌ ܳ௠.   
3) For each Q-level, qualify the eligibility by identifying and grouping the eligible 
requests and asks of identical e-service item attributes (i.e.,	݁௖௜௞ ൌ ݁௣௝௤ሻ.  
4) For each Q-level, sort the eligible asks	ܾ௣௝௤ in an ascending order and the eligible bids 
ܾ௖௜௞in a descending order.  
5) Start at the top of the highest Q-level in rank (ܳ ൌ ܳ௠௔௫ሻ. Add the ask‐bid pairs to the 
matched list if  ܾ௖௜௞ ൒ ܾ௣௝௤ ∧ ݉݅݊ ܳ௖௜௞ ൌ ܳ௉௝௤ ൌ 	ܳ௠.  
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6) Step to the next lower Q-level in rank (ܳ ൌ ܳ௠ିଵ). Consider all unmatched asks ܾ௣ఫ௤തതതത 
of the same or higher Q-levels (from pervious steps) (i.e., ܳ௉ఫ௤തതതതത ൒ ܳ௠ିଵ). Add the ask‐
bid pairs to the matched list if  ܾ௖௜௞ ൒ ܾ௣ఫ௤തതതത ∧ ݉݅݊ ܳ௖௜௞ ൑ ܳ௉ఫ௤തതതതത.  
7) Compute the matching allocations and assign the matched pairs	൫݁௖௜௞, ݁௣௝௤൯ to the 
winning buyers ܥ௜	and sellers	 ௝ܲ.  
8) Within each ܳ ൌ ܳ௠ level, apply the Mth price rule (last matched ask price) such 
that	݌௖௜௞ ൌ ܿ௣௝௤ ൌ ܾ௣ெ ∀݌௖௜௞, ∀ܿ௉௝௤ ∈ ሼԹା, 0ሽ, ∀݉݅݊ܳ௖௜௞ ൌ ܳ௉௝௤ ൌ ܳ௠. The Mth   price 
ܾ௣ெ, is the last matched ask price. For instance, as shown in Figure   20, there are 
multiple EM points (i.e.,ሺܾ௣ଶ, ܳ௠	),ሺܾ௣௝ାଵ, ܳ௠ିଵሻሺܾ௣௝ାଶ, ܳ௠ିଶ	), (ܾ௣௠, ܳଵ	)). In the case 
that the matching occurs at multiple Q-levels (i.e., ሺܾ௖௜ିଶ, ܳ௠ିଵ	ሻ andሺܾ௣ଶ, ܳ௠ሻ	), then 
apply the multiple Q-level cross matching allocation ሺ݅. ݁. ݌௖௜ିଶ ൌ ܾ௣ଶሻ that is the Mth 
matching price of ܳ௠ level.  
 
Figure   20: Multiple Q-level Mth EM double auction 
5.3 GSPM Economic and Computational Properties 
Definition 1: [GSPM and EM allocation rule]: Let ܲ ∪ ܥ,		the set of exclusive request 
and ask bidders ܲ ∩ ܥ ൌ ∅ as per the problem model assumption. Let ी ൌ ी௉ ∪ ी஼ the 
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set of eligible provider asks ܾ௣௝௤ ∈ ी௉ and consumer bids	ܾ௖௜௞ ∈ ी஼ of the same offered 
and requested e-service (i.e.,	݁௖௜௞ ൌ ݁௉௝௤) except for their Q-levels. Sort Q-levels in 
descending order and group bids ܾ௣௝௤	and asks ܾ௖௜௞ based on the sorted Q-levels such that, 
∀	݁௖௜௞ ൌ ݁௉௝௤ , ݉݅݊ܳ௖௜௞ ൌ ܳ௉௝௤ ∀ ܳ ൌ ܳ௠ (i.e.,	݉݅݊ ܳ௖௜௞ ൌ ܳ௉௝௤ ൌ 	ܳ௠ሻ.  Then sort bids 
(asks) in descending (ascending) order within each Q-level. Start at the top of the list of 
the highest Q-level (i.e.,	ܳ௠ ൌ ܳ௠௔௫ሻ. Add the ask‐bid pairs to a particular Q-level 
matched list ै௠ if	ܾ௖௜௞ ൒ ܾ௣௝௤ ∧ ݉݅݊ܳ௖௜௞ ൌ ܳ௉௝௤ ൌ ܳ௠. Step to the next Q-level (i.e.,ܳ ൌ
ܳ௠ିଵ). Consider unmatched asks ܾ௣ఫ௤തതതത of the same or higher Q-levels (i.e.,ܳ௉ఫ௤തതതതത ൒ ܳ௠ିଵ). 
Add the ask‐bid pairs to the matched list ै௠ିଵif ܾ௖௜௞ ൒ ܾ௣ఫ௤തതതത ∧ ݉݅݊ܳ௖௜௞ ൑ ܳ௉ఫ௤തതതതത and so on 
until all eligible bids are matched.   
Definition 2: [GSPM pricing rule]: the seller ask price for	݉ ∈ ሼ1…ܯ െ 1ሽ<ܯ	matched 
pair within any particular Q-level is		݌௉ሺܾ௣௠, ܾ௖௠ሻ ൌ ܾ௉ሺܾ௣௠ାଵሻ, the price of the second 
lower seller ask in rank	൫ܾ௣௠ାଵ൯. The buyer bid price for a matched pair is	݌௖൫ܾ௣௠, ܾ௖௠൯ ൌ
݌௖ሺܾ௖௠ାଵሻ, the price of second lower buyer bid in rankሺ	ܾ௖௠ାଵሻ. For the last match in a 
particular Q-level	݉ ൌ ܯ, buyers and sellers pay their exact request and 
ask	݌௉൫ܾ௣ெ, ܾ௖ெ൯ ൌ ݌௉ሺܾ௖ெሻ; and	݌௖ሺܾ௣ெ, ܾ௖ெሻ ൌ ݌௖ሺܾ௖ெ).  
Definition 3: [Single Q-Levels EM Mth Pricing Rule]: the ask-bidder price for ݉ ∈
ሼ1…ܯሽ	matched pair within a particular Q-level is	݌௉ሺܾ௣௠, ܾ௖௠ሻ ൌ ݌௉ሺܾ௣ெሻ, the ask price 
of the last matched pair	൫ܾ௣ெ൯ within the Q-level. The request-bidder price for a matched 
pair is	݌௖൫ܾ௣௠, ܾ௖௠൯ =݌௖൫ܾ௣ெ൯, the ask-price of the last matched pairሺܾ௣ெሻ within the Q-
level.  
Definition 4: [Multiple Q-Levels EM Mth Pricing Rule]: the ask-bidder price for 
݉ ∈ ሼ1…ܯሽ	matched pair within a particular Q-level (i.e.,	ܳ௣௠ ൌ ܳ௖௠) is		݌௉ሺܾ௣௠, ܾ௖௠ሻ ൌ
݌௉ሺܾ௣ெሻ, the ask price of the last matched pair	൫ܾ௣ெ൯ within ܳ௣௠ ൌ ܳ௖௠ Q-level. The 
request-bidder price for a matched pair is	݌௖൫ܾ௣௠, ܾ௖௠൯ =݌௖൫ܾ௣ெ൯, the ask-price of the last 
matched pair	ሺܾ௣ெሻ within ܳ௣௠ ൌ ܳ௖௠ Q-level. For the multiple Q-levels cross-matching 
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cases (i.e., (ሺܾ௣௠, ܳ௣௠ା௥ሻ	ሺܾ௖௠, ܳ௖௠ሻሻ, ݉, ݎ are integers. ݌௉൫ܾ௣௠, ܾ௖௠൯ ൌ ݌௖൫ܾ௣௠, ܾ௖௠൯ ൌ
݌௉ሺܾ௣ெᇱሻ the ask price of the last matched pairs of the higher Q-level ܳ௣௠ା௥ for requests 
and asks.  
Theorem 1: The VCG mechanisms (Vickrey, 1961) (Clarke, 1971) (Groves, 1973) are 
the only AE and SP mechanisms for bidder agents with quasi-linear preferences and 
general valuation functions amongst direct revelation mechanisms. 
Theorem 2: The GSPM DA mechanism is allocative efficient (AE). The GSPM DA 
maximizes the aggregate utilities of request and ask bidders by maximizing the aggregate 
bid values of buyers and minimizing the aggregate ask values of sellers.  
Proof: Consider a set of matching allocations	ࣥ for buyer agents	݆	of quasi-linear 
utility	ݑ௝൫݇, 	݌௝, ߠ௝൯ ൌ ݒ௝൫݇, ߠ௝൯ െ ݌௝≥ 0;	∀ݒ௝ሺ. ሻ is buyer ݆ bid value for the matching 
allocation 	݇ ∈ ࣥ; ∀݌௝ is buyer ݆ payment given type	ߠ௝ ∈ ߆௝. Let seller agents	݅	utility 
ݑ௜ሺ݇, ܿ௜, ߠ௜ሻ ൌ ܿ௜ െ ݒ௜ሺ݇, ߠ௜ሻ ൒ 0; ∀ݒ௜ሺ. ሻ  is seller ݅ ask value for allocation	݇ ∈ ࣥ, 	∀ܿ௜ 
is seller	݅ collection given typeߠ௜ ∈ ߆௜. Then, the social choice exchange mechanism 
outcome ݃൫ߠ෠	൯ ൌ ቀ݇൫ߠ෠൯, ݌൫ߠ෠൯ቁ is AE, ∀matching rule	݇: ߆ଵ ൈ …ൈ	߆௟ → ࣥ, ∀pricing 
rule	݌௜, 	 ௝ܿ:	߆ଵ ൈ …ൈ ߆௟ → Թ, and reported types	ߠ෠ ൌ ሺߠ෠ଵ …ߠ෠௟ሻ ݂݂݅: 
	݇∗൫ߠ෠൯ ൌ ܽݎ݃݉ܽݔ௞∈ࣥ ෍ݒ௝൫݇, ߠ෠௝൯ ൅௝
ܽݎ݃݉݅݊
௞∈ࣥ
෍ݒ௜൫݇, ߠ෠௜൯
௜
	∀݇ ∈ ࣥ 
	݇∗൫ߠ෠	൯ ൌ ܽݎ݃݉ܽݔ௞∈ࣥ ሺ෍ݒ௝൫݇, 	ߠ෠௝൯ െ௝
෍ݒ௜൫݇, 	ߠ෠௜൯ሻ
௜
, ∀	݇ ∈ ࣥ 
Following the above analysis, and as presented in chapter 2, given an instance 
ܨܺሺܾ, Q, ߣ, 	߬௧	ሻ	at period		߬௧, then the GSPM AE	ߣ∗௧	trade maximizes the collective bid 
values of buyers (i.e., ݒሺ݁௖௜௞ሻ ൌ ܾ௖௜௞), and minimizes the collective ask values of 
sellers(i.e.,	ݒሺ݁௣௝௤ሻ ൌ 	ܾ௣௝௤) at multiple Q-levels. The above equations are equivalent to 
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equation (2) as shown in chapter 2. The AE social welfare objective of the CAP in (2) 
maps, hence, to maximizing the total utilities the net FX e-market profit.  
Forward-GSP auction max bid valuations: A max buyer bid is her true value for a 
matching allocation. The buyer often strategizes by shading (lowering) her true bid value 
to increase utility. Consider the case of a unit-demand forward-GSP auction of a single 
Q-level e-service (i.e., similar factor-groups, from multiple sellers), then under the GSP 
auction rule, the best-response strategies of bidders converge to VCG efficient outcome, 
which is the only AE SP for agents with quasi-linear preferences (Edelman et al., 2007) 
(Varian, 2007) (Nisan et al., 2011)(see Theorem 1). The best-response true bids guarantee 
higher positions in the matched list that allow for the best wining chance while paying a 
lower second bid price in order. Also, bidders may risk losing possible matching 
allocation if they lower prices below the lowest matched pair. Furthermore, in the 
multiple Q-level matching, bidders would have a chance to win a better e-service item of 
higher Q-level using the multiple Q-levels cross-matching. In Definition 2, the 
݉௧௛	highest buyer bid	ܾ௖௠ and charged ݌௖௠ ൌ 	ܾ௖௠ାଵ for a winning match. Her 
utility	ݑ∗ሺ݉	ሻ ൌ ܾ௖௠ െ ݌௖௠ ൌ ܾ௖௠ െ ܾ௖௠ାଵ ൒ 0	since	ܾ௖௠ ൒ ܾ௖௠ାଵ. There is also no 
incentive if the ݉௧௛ bidder switches bids with the one above her in rankݑሺ݉ሻ ൌ ܾ௖௠ െ
݌௖௠ିଵ ൌ ܾ௖௠ െ ܾ௖௠ ൌ 0 ൑ ܾ௖௠ െ ܾ௖௠ାଵ. Hence, the GSPM achieves maximum (max) true 
bids for buyers at best response strategies.  
Reverse GSP auction minimum ask valuations: a min seller ask is her true cost for a 
matching allocation. The seller often strategizes by shading (rising) her true cost value to 
increase utility. The AE Reverse GSP auction of the min ask bidders is equivalent to the 
AE Forward GSP auction of the max bid bidders as presented in chapter 2. hence the 
same argument of the forward GSP auction is applied. The best-response true asks 
guarantee higher positions in the matched list that allow for best winning chance, while 
collecting a higher second ask price in order. Also, the ask sellers may risk losing 
possible matching allocation if they raise prices higher than the highest matched pair. 
Moreover, in the multiple Q-level matching, the sellers would have a better chance to win 
a buyer from the lower Q-levels using the multiple Q-levels cross-matching∎. 
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Definition 5: [Nash Equilibrium (NE)]: the NE “Symmetric NE (Varian, 2007)” of the 
simultaneous move game induced by the GSP auction is locally envy-free if an ask or bid 
bidder cannot improve her payoff by exchanging bids or asks with the bidder ranked one 
position above her” (Edelman et al., 2007). 
Theorem 3: The GSPM DA has NE with VCG AE outcomes in IC manner with repeated 
best response.  
Proof: consider the forward and reverse unit-demand GSP auctions for AE max bid 
buyers and min ask sellers. Using the analysis of (Edelman et al., 2007) for envy-free 
Nash equilibrium that is equivalent to the “Symmetric NE” (Varian, 2007) and the 
analysis in (Nisan et al., 2011), though IC is not dominant strategy under GSP, the full 
information GSP auction of the locally envy-free bidders and repeated best response 
strategies converges to NE with VCG AE outcomes in IC manner. In the GSP auction, 
there is no strategy profile from which all players but one do not wish to deviate and that 
strictly prefers to NE reached if all players follow the repeated best‐response strategies, a 
necessary argument to establish the IC of best‐response GSP auctions (i.e.,∄ state	ݏ ൌ
ሺݏଵ, … , ݏ௡ሻ ∈ ܵ, and player	݅ ∈ ሾ݉ሿ such that	∀݆ ് ݅, ݏ௝	is a best‐response to ݏ 
and	ݑ௜ሺݏሻ ൐ ݑ௜ሺܰܧሻሻ. In fact, unstable bidders would pay a price as high as the payment 
of the bidder who gets it in the VCG outcome, and thus, the unstable bidder would prefer 
to be allocated it in the VCG outcomes that require the IC of players. In GSPM DA if any 
buyer or seller agent ݅ maximizes expected utility with strategy	ݏ௜, given its preferences 
and strategy of other agents then the strategy profile ݏ ൌ ሺݏଵ, … , ݏ௟	ሻ is at NE state (Nash 
Jr., 1951), at which	ݑ௜ሺݏ௜ሺߠ௜ሻ, ݏି௜ሺߠି௜ሻ, ߠ௜ሻ ൒ ݑ௜ሺݏ௜ᇱሺߠ௜ሻ, ݏି௜ሺߠି௜ሻ, ߠ௜ሻ, ∀ݏ௜ᇱ ് ݏ௜. NE in 
GSPM requires every agent have perfect information about preferences of every other 
agent, agent rationality, and agents must all select the same Nash equilibrium∎.  
Definition 6: [budget-balance (BB)] A social choice matching function ݃൫ߠ෠	൯ ൌ
ቀ݇൫ߠ෠൯, ݌൫ߠ෠൯ቁ is FX post BB if ∀preferencesߠ෠ ൌ ൫ߠ෠ଵ …ߠ෠௟൯: ∑ ݌௜൫ߠ෠൯ ൌ 0௟௜ୀଵ ; no into or 
out transfers to the exchange. The AE and BB imply Pareto optimality. The ݃൫ߠ෠	൯	is FX 
post weak BB if∀ߠ෠:	∑ ݌௜൫ߠ෠൯ ൒ 0ூ௜ୀଵ ;  
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Theorem 4: The GSPM DA is weak BB that secures e-market profitability and grows 
with thick trades.  
Proof: In theorem 1, the AE social matching objective of the GSPM DA in of equation 
(2) maps to maximizing the net FX e-market profit ݉ܽݔ	ఒ೟ೂ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ߣ௧௜௝௞௤
ொ௝௣
௤ୀଵ௜௖௞ୀଵ௠௝ୀଵ௡௜ୀଵ ൫݌௖௜௞ െ ܿ௣௝௤൯ ൒
0	that is always positive, as the GSPM DA requires that ݌௖௜௞ ൒ ܿ௣௝௤ as a condition for 
matching. As per Definition 1, the eligible criteria of the GSPM matching (i.e.,	݁௖௜௞ ൌ
݁௉௝௤ ∧ ܳ௖௜௞ ൒ 	ܳ௉௝௤ሻ is that ܾ௖௜௞ ≥ܾ௣௝௤. However, as per the GSPM pricing rules of Definition 
2: 	ܾ௖௜௞ ൒ ݌௖௜௞൫ൌ ܾ௖௜௞ାଵ൯	for second bid in rank and ݌௖௜௞൫ൌ ܾ௖௜௞ାଵ൯ ൒ ܿ௣௝௤ሺൌ ܾ௣௝௤ାଵሻ for 
matching state, then	݌௖௜௞ ൒ ܿ௣௝௤. Hence, the GSPM DA maximizes the e-market 
profitability that grows thicker e-market trades. As ܾ௣௠ାଵ ൒ ܾ௖௠ାଵ based on the matching 
rule requirement, the e-market profit is	∑ ݌௜൫ߠ෠൯ ൌ௜ୀ௠ ܾ௣௠ାଵ െ ܾ௖௠ାଵ ൒ 0, ∀݉. For the 
last match	ܯ, the buyer (seller) pays (collects) his bid (ask).∎   
Definition 6 [Bidder Rationality (IR)]: A mechanism ࣧ is IR if for all preferences ߠ௜ it 
implements a SCF ݂ሺߠሻ with	ݑ௜ሺ݂ሺ	ߠ௜, 	ߠି௜ሻሻ ൒ ݑത௜ሺ	ߠ௜ሻ, ݑ௜ሺ݂ሺ	ߠ௜, 	ߠି௜ሻሻ, is the expected 
utility for agent ݅ at outcome, given prior beliefs about others preferences 
distribution	ߠି௜	and	ݑത௜ሺ	ߠ௜ሻ is the expected utility for non-participation. ࣧ is ex post IR 
if an agent can withdraw once learns the outcome, in which expected utility from 
participation must be at least its best outside utility for all possible types of agent.  
Theorem 5: The GSPM DA is ex-post Bidder Rational (IR), VCG AE and SP with quasi-
linear agent preferences monotonic choice-set and no negative externalities.  
Proof: The GSPM, VCG based exchange is IR when two sufficient conditions hold on 
agent preferences (Parkes, 2001): (1) Choice set monotonicity: feasible choice set ࣥ 
increases as more agents introduced; means an agent cannot “block" a selection, and (2) 
No negative externalities: Agent ݅ has non-negative value, i.e., ݒ௜൫݇ି௜∗ , 	ߠ௝൯ ൒ 0, means 
any choice not involving an agent has a neutral (or positive) effect on that agent. To show 
ex post IR, the utility to agent ݅ in the VCG equilibrium outcome of the GSPM must 
always be non-negative, given IC in equilibrium. The utility to agent ݅with type	ߠ௜is: 
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ݑ௜ሺ	ߠ௜, 	ߠି௜ሻ ൌ 	ݒ௜ሺ݇∗ሺߠ	ሻ, 	ߠ௜ሻ െ ቌ෍ݒ௜൫݇ି௜∗ ሺߠି௜	ሻ, 	ߠ௝൯
௝ஷ௜
െ෍ݒ௝൫݇∗ሺߠሻ, 	ߠ௝൯
௝ஷ௜
ቍ 
ݑ௜ሺ	ߠ௜, 	ߠି௜ሻ ൌ෍ݒ௜ሺ݇∗ሺߠ	ሻ, 	ߠ௜ሻ
௜
െ෍ݒ௜൫݇ି௜∗ ሺߠି௜	ሻ, 	ߠ௝൯ ൌ ܸ∗ െ ሺܸି ௜	ሻ∗
௝ஷ௜
 
ܸ∗ െ ൫ܸି ௜	൯∗ is non-negative because the value of the AE solution without agent	݅,	ܸି ௜ 
cannot be greater than the value of the AE solution with agent	݅	ܸ∗, as any choice with 
agents ݆ ് ݅ is also feasible with all agents (monotonicity), and has just as much total 
value (no negative externalities).∎ 
5.4 GSPM and EM Algorithmic Structure   
The GSPM Algorithms follow the free market economy model and compute different 
cost or payment prices for the matched winners. The multiple Q-levels e-services CAP 
extends the complexity of the multiple-unit auction, as the cross-matching are dependent. 
The bidders might be assigned an e-service of the same Q-level or higher contrary to the 
independent multiple unit demand auctions. The simulation model allows for repetitive 
trades, in which the FX applies the stored RBBL logical rules and operators for 
preference deduction and request and ask bid formation at each trade to capture the 
bidder dynamic reactions to disruptions at constant learning. Request and ask bids are 
either bounded by the min/max true attribute valuations or unbounded.  
The implemented algorithms and the activity flow structure of the simulated GSPM and 
EM double auction  mechanisms includes: (1) initial non repetitive setting stage that 
instantiates the simulation code variables, generates the random true and first traded 
requests and asks with random Q-levels, and implements the GSPM/EM e-trading 
algorithms for the non-repetitive stage, and (2) repetitive e-trading stage that revaluates 
the requests and asks based on the same instance of logical bidding rules of bidders. The 
rules examine the current and previous win and lose states of all bidders and compute 
accordingly the next move of request and ask revaluation. The stage implements, then, 
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the GSPM/ EM e-trading algorithms, repetitively until the last preset trades (i.e., twenty 
trades). The outline of the algorithmic flow model of the two stages is tabled as followed:  
I. The Initial Settings Stage 
 Generate the initial true ask and request bid valuations. (All Algorithms) 
 Generate the initial random traded bids. (All Algorithms) 
 Generate the random Q-levels for all bids.  (Multiple Q-level Algorithms) 
 Generate the random Q-levels for all bids. (Single Q-level Algorithms) 
 Sort Q-levels in descend order. Group, then, the true and traded requests and asks 
of each Q-level according to the sorted Q-levels. (All Algorithms) 
 Sort the true and traded requests and asks of each Q-level group. (All Algorithms) 
 Matching allocation for true and traded requests and asks. (All Algorithms)  
 GSPM Pricing and Metrics of true bids without learning.  
 EM Pricing and metrics for true bids without learning.   
II. The Repetitive e-Trading Stage with RBBL and GSPM Simulated Dynamics: 
 GSPM Pricing and Metrics of Single/Multiple Q-level bids and Learning. 
 EM M Pricing and Metrics of Single/Multiple Q-level bids and Learning.    
 Scenario#1: local rules inside FX update bids. (Unbounded Algorithms) 
 Scenario#1: local rules inside FX update bids. (Bounded Algorithms) 
 Scenario#2: bidders’ remote rules update bids. (Unbounded Algorithms) 
 Scenario#2: bidders’ remote rules update bids. (Bounded Algorithms) 
 Scenario#3: FX aggregated rules update bids. (Unbounded Algorithms) 
 Scenario#3: FX aggregated rules update bids. (Bounded Algorithms) 
 Sort Request and ask of each Q-level Group. (All Algorithms) 
 Matching allocation algorithm for true and traded bids. (All Algorithms) 
 Table winners and losers status change for next trades. (All Algorithms) 
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The GSPM DA implements the SORT() algorithm in Appendix A on randomly generated 
true initial requests and asks and randomly generated traded requests and asks, derived 
from the true requests and asks. There are also the related randomly generated Q-levels.  
The SORT() algorithm: (1) sort Q-levels in descending order, (2) group true and traded 
requests and asks based on sorted Q-levels, and (3) sort true and traded bids (asks) within 
each Q-level in ascending (descending) orders. While the Q-levels is not effective in the 
single Q-level models, the SORT () algorithm, however, applies all GSPM and EM DA.  
The MATCHING-ALLOCATION-RULE () algorithm in Appendix A, applies to all 
GSPM and EM DA mechanisms. All GSPM and EM matching allocations apply 
definition 1 for the matching allocations. The single Q-level GSPM pricing rule applies 
the GSPM-PRICING-RULE () algorithm in Appendix A. The pricing rule works for all 
GSPM DA mechanisms. All GSPM mechanisms apply definition 2 for the pricing rule of 
the winning bidders of the matched pairs of request and ask.  The bounded GSPM, 
applies the BOUNDED-RULES-UPDATE () algorithm in Appendix A that models the 
constant learning reaction at repetitive trades. The algorithm inspects the win and loses 
states of all bidders at the current and previous trades and computes then the request and 
asks adjustments for next repetitive trade based on the conveyed RBBL bounded 
revaluation rules. The BOUNDED-RULES-UPDATE () constrains the revaluation 
bounds to a maximum of the true initial bid valuations and to a minimum of the true 
initial ask valuations. This reactive learning scheme is applied to all Bounded GSPM and 
EM mechanisms. The EXAMINE-CHANGE-OF-STATES () algorithm examines the 
winning and losing change of states of all bidders at the current and previous trades. 
The single Q-level unbounded GSPM DA mechanism follows the bounded GSPM in 
applying the same algorithms of the matching allocation and pricing rules. However, the 
unbounded GSPM and EM apply the UNBOUNDED-RULES-UPDATE () algorithm in 
Appendix A that liberates the bounds of the rule-based adjustments due constant learning 
at repetitive trades. The UNBOUNDED-RULES-UPDATE () frees all rule-based bounds. 
This reactive learning scheme works for all unbounded mechanisms.   The single Q-level 
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Mth EM pricing rule applies the EM-PRICING-SINGLE-Q () algorithm shown in 
Appendix A. The pricing rule works for only single Q-level bounded and unbounded EM 
mechanisms. It is presented for demonstration, analysis and comparison.  The multiple Q-
level Mth EM pricing rule applies the EM-PRICING-MULTIPLE-Q () algorithm shown 
in Appendix A. The pricing rule works for multiple Q-level bounded and unbounded EM 
mechanisms. It follows definition 4.            
This chapter covers the modeling and analysis of the proposed multiple Q-level GSPM 
DA mechanism. Our work presents the single Q-level GSPM and EM DA mechanisms as 
a reference DA mechanisms for developing the matching allocation and pricing rules of 
the multiple Q-level GSPM and EM DA mechanisms. In that vein, the work introduces 
the multiple Q-levels EM DA mechanism that extends the single Q-level EM to multiple 
equilibrium price points for rather multiple trades. The multiple Q-levels of the EM DA 
work as multiple EM trades that clear at different EM prices. While the single Q-level 
GSPM and EM DA are AE they are not IC. Hence, the multiple Q-level GSPM and EM 
DA is introduced to improve IC using the multiple Q-levels cross-matching. The multiple 
Q-level, EM DA is compared with the multiple Q-level, GSPM DA for the game-
theoretic and computational properties, as presented in the experimental analysis of next 
chapter. The GSPM DA heuristics are polynomial time tractable and deliver social 
efficiency, strategic stability and weak budget balance that secures exchange profitability.  
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Chapter 6  
6 Experimental Results and Analysis  
The work here analyses the experimental findings of implementing the RBBL, rules-
based bidding language and the GSPM DA matching heuristics for the FX e-marketplace. 
The FX targets, particularly, the stable and efficient matching allocation of the request 
and ask bids on the e-services that the FX deduces and form out of the RBBL conveyed 
attribute-values, logical rules formulae, and multiple e-service Q-levels. This chapter 
tables the experimental simulation models and the implemented DA heuristics. The work 
derives, also the experimental findings and the conclusions out of the empirical analysis. 
6.1   RBBL Rule-based Bidding Experimental Model 
The RBBL is a promising flexible and concise expressive language model that may find 
applications in a wide scope of e-services, particularly, the e-marketplaces.  The fact that 
the RBBL bidding messages convey the logical rules and operators with rather multiple 
attributes, attribute values, Q-levels and other constraining attributes, require that the FX 
e-market system to have functional units that descript the logical rule and operator 
formulae, deduce and aggregate the preferences of bidders out of the logical rules, and 
generate the attribute combinations of the requested bids and offered asks. Our work, 
however, doesn’t cover the scope of reasoning and deduction of the rule and operator 
formulae. The presented experimental validation examines, nevertheless, the proof of 
concept and verifies the performance advantage of using rules aggregation. Our work 
uses MATLAB toolboxes to simulate the ask and request bidding behavior of a number 
of bidders with the assumption that bidders apply self-learning abilities at repetitive 
trades that translate to logical rules conveyed to the FX e-marketplace 
The presented RBBL experimental validation examines the proof of concept and verifies 
the performance advantage of using the RBBL rules aggregation. Our work uses the 
MATLAB to simulate the RBBL bidding model and the rule-based dynamic behavior of 
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the number of bidders with at repetitive trades. The simulation creates multiple Q-levels 
as attributes (i.e.,	ܳ௖௜௞, 	ܳ௉௝௤) with random initial values for a e-service request or ask 
ሺ݅. ݁. , 	݁௖௜௞, ݁௉௝௤ሻ. The simulation correlates the attribute-values with the Q-level (i.e., 
generate higher random values for higher Q-level). The random request and ask bids are 
then deduced by the exchange out of the multiple Q-level attribute-values and logical 
rules formulae. There is also a random variation between bids and true values. The FX 
collects the multiple Q-level attribute-values and the FOL rational rule formulae as 
shown in Figure 21. The depicted RBBL FOL rules instruct the free exchange to 
increment the attribute-values or combinations (i.e., ݒ௫ ൌ ݒ௫ ൅ ߜ ∗ … ሻ if the consumer is 
not a winner. Otherwise, at loss the request and ask bids stay as is or decrement attribute-
values (i.e., ݒ௫ ൌ ݒ௫ െ ߝ ∗ … ሻ. 
 
Figure 21: Attribute-values and rational rules of the RBBL validation 
The simulations work for three scenarios: (1) execute the RBBL rules inside the bidder 
agents; (2) execute the RBBL rule inside the FX with no aggregation to inspect the 
communication cost; and (3) execute the RBBL rule inside the FX with simple 
aggregation of bidder rules. The exchange applies two aggregation rules: (a) group and 
sort request and ask bids inside the FX according to the multiple Q-levels, rather than 
every trade inside the bidder agents; and (b) stop updating all request and ask bids that 
reach the upper or lower bounds for the next stage (i.e., for bounded mechanisms). For 
instance, the bounded GSPM applies a heuristic that inspects the win and lose states of all 
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bidders at the current and previous trades and computes the bid value adjustments for the 
next repetitive trade based on the RBBL rules. Another heuristic constrains the request 
and ask bid adjustment bounds to the maximum of the true initial request values and to 
the minimum of the true initial ask values. Figure 22 shows the rules processing times of 
twenty repetitive trades that use the bounded and unbounded multiple Q-levels GSPM 
and EM heuristics for one thousand request and one thousand ask bidders. The simulation 
applies the three rule based update scenarios mentioned above. The results of repeated 
experiments show similar performance patterns for any number of bidders.  
 
 
Figure 22: Rules processing times of twenty repetitive trades using the bounded and 
unbounded multiple Q-level GSPM and EM for two thousand bidders. 
Figure 23 shows the rules processing times for different number of bidders. The rules 
aggregation inside the FX saved roughly half of the average relative processing times of 
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all bidder agents that are locally simulated inside the FX. Also, the rules aggregation 
inside the FX saved almost two third of the average processing times of remote bidder 
agents (i.e., over local network). The performance advantage would be significant with 
thicker e-market trades of much larger number of bidders and transactions over best 
effort internet due to high communication cost and effective aggregations.  Obviously, 
even a simple aggregation of the RBBL rules inside e-exchange would deliver more rapid 
response and, hence, faster trades. It is also evident that the higher the number of bidders 
(i.e., thicker e-markets), the more effective the RBBL aggregation process. Of course, the 
communication cost would make the RBBL more desirable, particularly, in thicker e-
markets with a large number of online bidders. Our work, anticipate, also the preference 
elicitation deduction (not implemented) would have a more substantial impact.     
 
Figure 23: Rules processing times vs. number of bidders for the bounded and 
unbounded multiple Q-levels GSPM and EM trades 
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6.2 GSPM and EM Experimental Matching Models 
The GSPM DA matching is another prospective venue for the FX e-marketplace. The FX 
applies the GSPM DA heuristics on the generated requests and asks to compute efficient 
and stable matching allocation and pricing outcomes. A key theme in the GSPM is the 
fact it motivates the strategic IC of bidders while narrowing down the tactical scope using 
the second price in rank without blocking the rational free choice. The FX achieves 
truthful interactions by implementing an AE DA matching that exploits both the GSP and 
revere GSP for trading e-services of identical attributes and multiple Q-levels. For 
instance, a request bidder would be better off if she conveys a truthful valuation on an the 
e-service of particular Q-level, as it would minimize the risk of losing to others in the 
matched list at that Q-level, while having an incentive for a chance to be awarded an e-
service of rather higher Q-level using the GSPM multiple Q-level cross-matching 
heuristics. Another key aspect is that GSPM DA guarantees e-market profitability that 
grows with the rapid stable convergence of the thick e-markets. The GSPM ensures, 
hence, the stable social efficiency of the FX e-marketplace, while securing sufficient e-
market profitability that grow with number of satisfied bidders.        
The simulation work in this section targets the comparative analysis between the GSPM 
and EM (Wurman et al., 1998) DAs. The reason for choosing the EM for comparison is 
due to the fact while the GSPM is discriminatory pricing for symmetric DA the EM is 
uniform clearing pricing for symmetric DA. The EM computes the market competitive 
equilibrium of supply and demand and work efficiently at perfect competition of free 
market economy. The EM is, also, desirable for its efficiency and tractability, hence, 
widely used in diverse market auctions (i.e., energy market auction). The simulation 
implements, examines and reports the experimental results and findings of the eight 
GSPM and EM double auction mechanisms that exploits the conveyed RBBL instance 
message of as described in the previous section, for up to 2000 request and ask bidders 
that dictates their constant learning and reactive model: (1) Single Q-level bounded 
GSPM DA, a base model for the multiple Q-levels GSPM DA, (2) Single Q-level 
unbounded GSPM DA for testing impact of free unconstrained strategies, (3) Multiple Q-
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levels bounded GSPM DA, the core model,(4) Multiple Q-levels Unbounded GSPM DA, 
the core unbounded extension, (5) Single Q-level Bounded EM DA (Wurman et al., 
1998), (6) Single Q-level Unbounded EM DA, (7) Multiple Q-levels bounded EM DA, a 
new proposed extension of (5) for comparative analysis, and (8) Multiple Q-levels 
unbounded  EM  DA. The simulation implements, examines and reports the experimental 
results and findings of the four comparative analysis between GSPM and EM DA 
mechanisms that exploits also the conveyed RBBL instance as described above for  2000 
request and ask bidders that dictates the constant learning and reactive model.  
6.3 Bounded GSPM Double auction Mechanisms 
The matching allocation of the single Q-level and multiple Q-levels bounded GSPM DA 
mechanisms follow the GSPM matching allocation rule in definition 1. While definitions 
1 exploits, to some extent, the equilibrium matching (EM) allocation (Wurman et al., 
1998), it extends the matching allocations to the multiple Q-level cross-matching that 
motivates the IC. The pricing rules, however, follows our proposed GSPM pricing rule in 
definitions 2 for the requests and asks. One of the challenges that multiple Q-level GSPM 
mechanisms encounter is the instability of both AE and IC properties. This means there is 
no incentive for bidders to reveal their true valuations if they can reduce their traded bids 
and still win. As such our work extend the CAP model to include multiple Q-level items 
and introduce the multiple Q-level GSPM mechanisms that improve incentive compatible 
due to multiple Q-levels cross-matching. The cross-matching allows for matching bids of 
a particular Q-level and asks of the same or high Q-levels. The more the number of Q-
levels, the narrower the tactical maneuverability space of bidders.  A consumer may bid 
for an e-service of certain functionality at a minimum Q-level. The e-service providers 
may offer similar e-services of rather different Q-levels. Then the multiple Q-level 
GSPM DA implements the MATCHING-ALLOCATION-RULE () for cross- matching 
that allows winners to win an item of targeted Q-level or higher. Hence, the consumer 
would have an incentive to reveal truthful requests and asks to guarantee place in the 
winning list or increase chances to win an even higher Q-level e-service with the same 
bid. The same applies to ask bidders, where they increase also chances to win a place in 
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the matched list and give a higher chances to match with higher request bid bidders for 
lower Q-level e-services. This section describes and examines the main implemented 
algorithms and repots on the experimental findings.   
6.3.1 Experimental Bounded GSPM Description 
Table 1 depicts a GSPM requests and asks processing instance of twenty bidders at the 
first and twentieth repetitive trades with constant learning and strategic rule-based 
revaluations. The first two tables depicts the processing of the requests and asks through 
different algorithmic stages of the GSPM DA at first trade: (1) twenty sorted initial true 
requests and asks of single and multiple Q-level, (2) twenty generated random requests 
and asks that is purposely deviated at random from the initial true requests and asks 
(without learning and revaluation of rules), and (3) GSPM requests and asks matching 
allocations with applied GSPM pricing rule (i.e., payments and costs). The second table 
depicts the processing of the requests and asks through the algorithmic stages of the 
GSPM DA at the twentieth trade: (4) the same twenty sorted initial true requests and asks 
of single Q-level, (5) the twenty generated random requests and asks using RBBL logical 
rules, (6) the GSPM requests and asks matching with applied GSPM pricing rule. 
Apparently, the expected number of matched-pairs increases at repetitive trades due to 
the constant learning and rational reactions of bidders that adapts with the winning and 
losing states and prospects as described in the rules revaluation algorithms. The other 
observation relates to the constant fall of the variance between the requests and asks 
throughout the repetitive e-trading process until it reaches the stability of second prices or 
EM price or true setting bounds. In fact, this is a natural reaction of bid (ask) winners 
who attempt to lower (raise) valuations at constant learning of repetitive trade disruptions 
for achieving higher utilities. Bid (Ask) Losers, however, attempt to rise (lower) 
valuations for having a rather better chance to be in the winner matched list. The outcome 
as observed in the Table 1 and Figure 24 is an initial rapid drop of variance between 
requests and asks and an increasing number of matched pairs. Variance converges to 
stability as matched pairs converge to maximum matching or that of true settings.  For 
multiple Q-level, it is observed that the matched list per Q-level grows with repetitive 
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trades with some requests and asks Q-level cross-matched.  The allocation and pricing 
rules of single Q-level GSPM is applied for multiple Q-levels with rather cross-matching.                        
Table 1: Sample results of first and twentieth single Q-level (left set) and multiple Q-
levels (right set) bounded GSPM repetitive trades of twenty request and ask bidders  
 
6.3.2 Analysis of Bounded GSPM Trades 
The first set of Figure 24 depicts the constant learning trend as exploited by the RBBL 
rule instance of 200 request and ask bidders in the first and twentieth trades. Obviously, 
the second graph of the first set shows the rapid fall of the variance between requests and 
asks and the growing size of the matched list. In fact the final matched list is similar to 
that the initial true matched list shown in light colors. The losing bidders demonstrate the 
bounded aggressive corrective moves to increasing (lowering) their bids (asks) for a 
better winning chance that results in a more matched pairs. However, the winning bidders 
demonstrate a bounded conservative moves to decreasing (increasing) their bids (asks) 
that increases their utilities within their bounds and results in the fast drop of bids/asks 
variance. The second set demonstrates the impact of thicker e-markets (i.e., 200 request 
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and ask bidders). Obviously, the more the thicker e-markets is the more stable and rapid 
it converges to social efficiency due the converging very small difference between 
bid/ask and payment/cost values being the second prices as realized by (Roth, 2007).  
 
 
Figure 24: Traded vs. initial true matched pairs of the first and twentieth trades of  
the bounded single Q-level (upper set) and multiple Q-levels (lower set) GSPM  
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6.3.3 Analysis of Bounded GSPM Metrics 
Figure 25 depicts the metrics of two instances of 200 and 1000 single Q-level and 
multiple Q-levels request and ask bidders in the bounded GSPM e-market. The follwoing 
are the experimental findings:  
1. The U-Welfare of fixed initial values (fixed U-Welfare) is the utility social welfare 
that aggregates the utilities of bidders in reference to their fixed initial true 
requests and asks (i.e., sum (Initial true bids - current payments)+ sum (current 
costs- Initial true asks )). The fixed U-Welfare converges rapidly to a maximum 
stable AE bounds compared to the initial true welfare (i.e., green line) as request 
and ask utilities increase due to the rule based adjustments driven by constant 
learning at repetitive trades. That results in a rising asks/costs and falling 
bids/payment until they reach the stable bounds of the second price limits. The 
thick e-market increases the fixed U-Welfare significantly in reference to the true 
initial settings at thicker e-market trades.   
2. The U-Welfare of dynamic (current) values (moving Welfare) is the moving utility 
social welfare that aggregates the utilities of bidders in reference to the current 
trade true requests and asks (i.e., sum (current bids - current payments)+ sum 
(current costs-current asks)). The moving U-Welfare converges to a low stable 
utility welfare that is close to max item value. This is due to the sharp fall of 
differences between current bids (asks) and second price payments (costs) at 
repetitive trades. The thick e-markets have no effect on the converged utility 
value, but delivers instant convergence due to the faster stability of  requests and 
asks at thicker repetitive trades.       
3. The V-Welfare is the valuation social welfare that correlates with the e-market 
profit. The V-Welfare is equal to the moving U-Welfare and the e-market profit. 
Hence, the V-Welfare converges to the e-market profit as the moving U-Welfare 
converges to a stable low value at thicker trades. The V-Welfare totals the 
maximum bid and minimum ask values or equivalently the maximum bid minus 
maximum ask values which at thicker trades converges to the maximum payment 
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minus maximum cost values, or the FX e-market profit. The V-Welfare and e-
market profitability of bounded GSPM converge to stable positive value that is 
lower than that of initial settings due to the rule based adjustment that direct the 
convergence to lower value bids and higher value asks at constant leaning of 
repetitive trades. In fact, the winners maintain a bounded conservative moves to 
increase utilities while losers takes a bounded aggressive moves to join in the 
matched list until they reach the bounded true values. This is the free natural 
reaction of bidders that directs the V-Welfare stability as it balances the rising 
asks and the falling bids and converge to the second prices payment/cost or true 
bounds. The thicker e-market deliver higher, stable and more rapid instant 
convergence as the variance drops considerably. The GSPM DA guarantees, also, 
the e-market converge rapidly to a stable profitability that grow, also, with the 
economy of scale of thicker e-market trades.  
4. The bounded GSPM converges rapidly after few trades to the maximum number 
of the matched pairs of the true initial value settings shown in green line. This is 
due to the initial rapid and aggressive incremental fall of bids and rise of asks of 
the losing bidders to gain a winning seat in the matched list. The winners then 
takes a conservative moves close to the second prices to gain better utilities.      
5. The variance of bounded GSPM drops rapidly at the first initial trades to 
optimizing the random initial settings with larger delta adjustments of the requests 
and asks then it stabilizes with smaller changes as values get closer to the second 
price bounds. The variance converges, then, to a stable low value outcome due 
rather to the narrowing differences between the rising asks and the falling bids.   
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Figure 25: Metrics of the bounded single Q-level (upper set) and multiple Q-level 
(lower set) GSPM of 200 and 1000 request and ask bidders  
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6.4 Unbounded GSPM Double Auction Mechanisms 
6.4.1 Experimental Unbounded GSPM Description  
The instance in Table 2: follows the same settings of the Table 1. However, it is obvious 
that the unbounded GSPM DA allows losers to play rather more aggressive corrective 
moves and break risk neutrality for better winning chance within and across the multiple 
Q-levels. Hence, the unbounded GSPM matched list converges to complete matched list 
at repetitive trades with most losers turn into winners while narrows down the bids/ asks 
variance. The violation of the risk neutrality of allows losers an unbounded free choice 
and conduct. The first and final trades in Table 2: demonstrate how unbounded losers 
converge to winners through aggressive lowering (raising) of their bids (asks) in a way 
that breach risk neutrality. Winners, however, apply conservative moves to narrow down 
variance between requests and ask to increase their utilities. The multiple Q-level 
unbounded GSPM motivation follows the one of bounded GSPM in the previous section.    
 Table 2: Sample results of first and twentieth single Q-level (left set) and multiple 
Q-levels (right set) unbounded GSPM trades of twenty request and ask bidders 
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6.4.2 Analysis of Unbounded GSPM Trades 
Figure 26 shows the constant learning trend of 200 request and ask bidders in the first and 
twentieth trades. The second graph show an almost complete matched list that include all 
bidders with constant drop of the bid/ask variance similar to the bounded GSPM. The 
lower graph set shows the multiple Q-level matched list with some cross-matched pairs. 
The narrowing gap between requests and asks (falling variance) at each Q-level is 
obvious, as well. In fact, the losers demonstrate a rather unbounded aggressive corrective 
moves by breaching risk neutrality for a winning chance (i.e., often found in classic 
markets for clearing of slow moving items) by increasing (lowering) bids(asks) beyond 
initial true bounds (i.e., see the curve extension into the losers zone). The results exhibits 
the rapid convergence of thick e-market risk neutral winners to stable efficiency at each 
Q-level while the unbounded risk unneutral losers become winners at repetitive trades 
with the bounded conservative moves of winners within the initial winning space and the  
unbounded aggressive moves of losing bidders beyond the initial winning space to 
become winners. That result is a complete cross-matched list and lower variance. 
6.4.3 Analysis of Unbounded GSPM Metrics 
Figure 27 depicts the metrics of the Single Q-level and multiple Q-levels Unbounded 
GSPM DA mechanism. The analysis emphasizes the following experimental findings:  
1. The U-Welfare of fixed values keeps falling to the negative quadrant at repetitive 
trades and also with thicker e-markets of more bidders compared to that of the 
initial true settings due to, primarily, the violation of risk neutrality of losers.        
2. The moving U-Welfare of dynamic values converges to a stable low utility welfare 
that is close to max item value at thicker trades. This is due to the sharp fall of 
differences between current bids (asks) and second price payments (costs) at 
repetitive trades. The thick e-markets have no effect on the converged utility, but 
keep decreasing and converge to a stable low welfare at repetitive trades. 
3. The V-Welfare and e-market profitability keep increasing to values beyond that of 
the initial true settings due to the rule-based aggressive adjustments that direct the 
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unbounded convergence of the risk unneutral higher value bids and lower value 
asks of the losing bidders at constant leaning of repetitive trades. In fact, the 
winners maintain bounded conservative moves to second prices to increase 
utilities while the losing bidders take unbounded aggressive moves to join in the 
matched list. The V-Welfare and e-market profitability converge to stability when 
all requests and asks of now all joining winners get closer to the second prices. 
The V-Welfare and e-market profitability grow for all trades and thicker markets.  
 
 
Figure 26: Traded vs. initial true matched pairs of the first and twentieth trades of  
the unbounded single Q-level (upper set) and multiple Q-levels (lower set) GSPM 
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Figure 27: Metrics of unbounded single Q-level (upper set) and multiple Q-level 
(lower set) GSPM of 200  and 1000  request and ask bidders 
4. The unbounded GSPM e-market converges to the maximum complete matched 
pair that covers almost all ask-bid pairs at repetitive trades. This is a result of the 
unbounded reactions of bidders that disregard risk neutrality for a wining seat.   
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5. The variance drops rapidly at the initial trades due to the large delta adjustments 
of the requests and asks of losers. The variance converges, then, to stable low 
value due to the narrowing difference between the rising asks and the falling bids.   
6.5 Bounded Mth EM Double Auction Mechanisms 
The bounded Mth EM mechanism applies the matching allocation and Mth pricing rule of  
(Wurman et al., 1998), however, for single Q-level requests and asks. This Mth EM is 
described in chapter 4 while the pricing rule is based on definition 3.   
6.5.1 Bounded Mth EM DA Description   
The data Table 3 depicts the EM requests and asks processing of twenty bidders at the 
first and twentieth repetitive trades with constant learning and rule-based adjustments. It 
follows data Table 1 in structure. As in other DA mechanisms the repetitive trades 
increase the number of matched pairs. The other observation relates to the converging of 
requests and asks to almost same valuation in the twentieth trade with rather a minor 
change in the EM equilibrium price. In fact, this is a natural reaction of bid (ask) winners 
who attempt to lower (raise) their valuation for achieving higher utilities. Bid (Ask) 
Losers, however, attempt to raise (lower) their valuations for better winning chances.  As 
mentioned in chapter 4, our work, inspired by the theoretical model and the experimental 
finding of the multiple Q-level GSPM DA, proposes a generalized multiple Q-level Mth 
EM DA mechanism that exploits a multiple equilibrium matching points for the multiple 
Q-levels in computing the matching allocation and pricing rules for multiple units of a 
single-item of multiple attributes, and multiple Q-levels. The proposed multiple Q-level 
Mth EM DA follows the matching allocation of the proposed multiple Q-level GSPM 
mechanism.  The multiple Q-level Mth EM DA sorts the Q-levels, with asks of same Q-
levels and bids of same min Q-levels, and apply a multilevel cross- matching allocation 
as shown in Figure   20. The multiple Q-level Mth EM DA pricing rule, however, follows 
definition 4. The following steps describe the multiple Q-level Mth EM mechanism. The 
multiple Q-level cross-matching allows for matching between bids of a particular Q-level 
and asks from the same or high Q-levels. The multiple Q-level EM DA implements the 
105 
 
 
 
matching allocation algorithm#2 as d in definition 3 and the following multiple Q-level 
Mth EM pricing algorithm#8 as stated in definition 4.    
Table 3: Sample results of first and twentieth single Q-level (left set) and multiple Q-
levels (right set) unbounded EM trades of twenty request and ask bidders 
 
6.5.2 Analysis of Bounded Mth EM DA Trades 
Figure 28 shows the constant learning trend as exploited by the RBBL rule instance of 
200 bidders in the first and twentieth trades. Both repetitive trades converge each Q-level 
to the Mth equilibrium price (i.e., the last matched ask price in  a Q-level) that bid (ask) 
winning bidders have to pay(collect). In fact the final matched list is quite similar to the 
initial true valuation matched list as shown in light colors of the second graph of both 
sets. The losers demonstrate a bounded aggressive moves to increasing (lowering) their 
bids (asks) for a winning chance while the winners demonstrate a conservative moves to 
decreasing (increasing) bids(asks) their utilities that narrows down bids/asks variance. 
The second set reveals the insignificant impact of the thicker e-market on EM contrary to 
the GSPM. The observed outcome of repetitive trades is the very low variance of the 
106 
 
 
 
converging requests and asks and also the no e-market profits. In fact, EM e-markets 
profit is most often equal to zero, in which the GSPM DA find an inherent competitive 
advantage over EM DA.   
 
 
Figure 28: Traded vs. initial true matched pairs of the first and twentieth trades of  
the bounded single Q-level (upper set) and multiple Q-levels (lower set) EM DA 
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6.5.3 Analysis of Bounded Mth EM DA Metrics 
Figure 29, depicts the metrics of two instances of request and ask bidders in single and 
multiple Q-levels bounded EM DA. The following are the experimental findings:  
1. The fixed U-Welfare converges rapidly to the stable bounds of initial U-Welfare 
values (i.e., green line) for single Q-level model as request and ask fixed utilities 
keep increasing and converges to the EM price at repetitive trades that is close the 
mean of initial EM prices as shown in Table 3. The fixed U-Welfare of multiple 
Q-levels EM converges to a higher stable bounds, however, with respect to initial 
U-Welfare based on the rather more fuzzy means of the initial multiple Q-level 
EM prices, as shown in  Table 3. Another reason is the cross matching effect. The 
thick e-markets increase the U-Welfare significantly with respect initial settings 
due to increasing number of trades. This is due to the constant rising of asks/costs 
and falling of bids/payment until they reach the stable bound of initial true values.  
2. The moving U-Welfare converges to a stable low utility welfare. This is due to 
the sharp fall of differences between current bids (asks) and Mth EM payments 
(costs) at repetitive trades. The thick e-markets, while it  have no effect on the 
converged welfare value it delivers rapid convergence as the bids (asks) variance 
drops with thick e-market trades.        
3. moving U-Welfare keeps decreasing and converges to small value at constant 
learning of repetitive trades as the current bids/payments and current asks/costs  
converge to the same EM e-market Mth equilibrium price value with low variance.     
4. The V-Welfare falls rapidly and converges to stable low value with respect to the 
initial true V-Welfare. This is due to the large incremental valuation drops of 
initial winning bids and losing asks that stabilizes with smaller increments as 
requests and asks get closer to the EM pricing bounds. However, the losers keep 
bounded aggressive moves to join in the matched list, while winners maintain 
conservative moves to increase utility. The thicker e-market, while it increases the 
V-Welfare, it delivers instant convergence as the variance drops rapidly with 
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thicker trades. The e-market profitability, however, maintains a zero value for all 
trade as the ask/bid bidders collect/pay the same Mth EM price. 
 
 
Figure 29: Metrics of bounded single Q-level (upper set) and multiple Q-level, 
(lower set) EM DA, of 200 and 1000 request and ask bidders 
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5. The bounded EM DA converges to the maximum number of true matched pairs at 
repetitive trades (i.e., light green) . This due to the fewer bidders at each Q-level 
and the corrective style of losers to join the matched list.  
6. The variance drops rapidly at the initial trades due to the large delta adjustments 
of losers. The variance converges, then, to stable low value due to the narrowing 
difference between the rising asks and the falling bids close to the EM Mth price.   
6.6 Unbounded Mth EM Double Auction Mechanisms 
The Single Q-level Unbounded EM DA mechanism follows the bounded Single Q-level 
EM in the matching allocation and pricing rules. However, the unbounded EM applies 
the UNBOUNDED-RULES-UPDATE () algorithm that liberates bounds of the constant 
learning reaction at repetitive trades. The UNBOUNDED-RULES-UPDATE frees all 
rule-based bounds. This reactive learning scheme works on unbounded DA mechanisms. 
The Multiple Q-level Unbounded EM DA model follows the Multiple Q-level Bounded 
EM model in previous section. This section examines the unbounded choices of bidders.    
6.6.1 Unbounded Mth EM DA Description   
The data in Table 4 follows the same setting of the Table 3. However, it is obvious that 
the unbounded EM DA allows losers to play rather more aggressive corrective moves and 
break risk neutrality for better winning chance. Hence, the unbounded GSPM matching 
list converges to full list of all trades while reducing the bid/ask variance. The violation 
of the risk neutrality of allows bidders an unbounded free choice and conduct. The first 
and final trades demonstrate how unbounded losers may converge to be winners and 
impact the matched list through lowering (raising), freely, their bids (asks) and how 
winners narrow request and ask variance to increase their utilities.   
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Table 4: Sample results of first and twentieth single Q-level (left set) and multiple Q-
levels (right set) unbounded EM trades of twenty request and ask bidders 
 
 
6.6.2 Analysis of Unbounded Mth EM DA Trades 
Figure 30 shows the constant learning trend of 200 request and ask bidders in the first and 
twentieth trades. The second right graphs show an almost full matched list that include all 
bidders with constant drop of the bid/ask variance. In fact, the losers demonstrate a rather 
unbounded aggressive corrective moves and break risk neutrality for a winning chance 
by increasing (lowering) bids(asks) beyond initial true bounds (i.e., see the curve 
extension into the losers zone). The loser/winning dynamics results in a full matching and 
reduction of bid/ask variance. The lower set exhibits the rapid convergence of thicker e-
market to stable efficiency while unbounded losers become winner at repetitive trades. 
That attributes to the extension of the matching curve in the losers space as shown below.  
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Figure 30: : Traded vs. initial true matched pairs of the first and twentieth trades of  
the unbounded single Q-level (upper set) and multiple Q-levels (lower set) EM DA 
6.6.3 Analysis of Unbounded Mth EM DA Metrics 
Figure 31 depicts the metrics of the Single Q-level Unbounded EM DA mechanism. The 
analysis emphasizes the following experimental findings:  
1. The fixed U-Welfare falls rapidly from values close to the initial true welfare 
value shown in light green to rather lower positive values that converge to zero U-
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Welfare at repetitive trades. This is due to the violation of the risk neutrality that 
motivates losers to overbid by decreasing (increasing) their bids (asks) over true 
bounds that generates negatives utilities and force welfare to decrease gradually 
until all requests and asks matched at EM price and zero welfare.  
2. The moving U-Welfare  keeps decreasing and converges to stable lower values at 
repetitive trades as the current bids/payments and current asks/costs  converge  to 
the EM e-market Mth equilibrium price value.       
3.  The V-Welfare and e-market profitability falls rapidly and converges to stable 
lower value with respect to the initial true V-Welfare. This is due to the large 
incremental valuation drops of initial winning bids and losing asks that converges 
to more stable smaller increments as requests and asks get closer to EM pricing 
bounds. This V-Welfare stability is due the balancing effect of the rising asks and 
the falling bids that converge to the Mth pricings. The EM delivers almost no (i.e., 
zero) e-market profitability as the ask/bid bidders collect/pay the same EM price. 
Also, thick e-markets increase the V-Welfare and deliver instant convergence.    
4. The EM e-market converges slowly to the a full matched pairs list for single and 
multiple Q-levels that include all bidders (i.e., initial winners and losers) after few 
trades (see the green line for initial requests and asks valuation matched list) at 
repetitive trades. This due to the fewer bidders at each Q-level and the aggressive 
corrective style of losers to join the matched list.  
5. The variance drops slowly at the initial trades due to the large delta adjustments of 
losers. The variance converges, then, to stable low value due to the narrowing 
difference between the rising ask bids and the falling request bids close to the EM 
Mth price.   
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Figure 31: Metrics of the unbounded single Q-level (upper set) and multiple Q-level, 
(lower set) EM DA of 200 and 1000 request and ask bidders 
6.7 The GSPM and EM Comparative Analysis 
This section summarizes the comparative experimental findings between the GSPM and 
EM DA mechanisms for the single Q-level and multiple Q-levels requests and asks. Our 
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work here investigates, also, the bounded and unbounded bidder reactions due to their 
constant learning of e-market dynamics at repetitive trades.  
6.7.1 Single and Multiple Q-level(s) Bounded GSPM and EM DAs 
Experimental Matching Behaviour: Figure 32 depicts the matching patterns of the 
GSPM and EM DA mechanisms for bounded request and ask bidders of a single Q-level 
(left set) and multiple Q-levels (right set) e-service at the first and twentieth repetitive 
trades. The GSPM and EM DA exhibit a gradual reduction of the request/ask bids 
variance with the increasing matched list that converges to the initial true matched list. 
The GSPM thicker trades converge rapidly to stable efficiency as request and ask bids 
converge to the second prices. The Mth EM thick trades, however, have no effect. The 
losers demonstrates a bounded aggressive corrective actions by increasing (lowering) 
their request (ask) bids for a winning chance. The winners demonstrate conservative 
actions to improve their utilities. That results in reducing the request/ask bids variance. 
The EM repetitive trades converge to the Mth equilibrium prices. 
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Figure 32: Single Q-level (lefts set) and multiple Q-levels (right set) bounded GSPM 
and EM DA matching patterns at first and twentieth trades 
Experimental Metrics: Figure 33, depicts sample metrics of the GSPM and EM DA 
mechanisms of a two thousand bounded request and ask bidders of multiple Q-levels e-
services during twenty repetitive trades. The analysis extends to single Q-level models. 
1) The fixed U-Welfare of the GSPM or EM DA converges rapidly to a maximum stable 
AE bounds compared to the initial true welfare (i.e., green line) as ask and request bid 
utilities increase due to the rule adjustments driven by constant learning at repetitive 
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trades. The EM converges to higher welfare values compared to GSPM as the rising 
asks/costs and falling bids/payments of the GSPM converge to the stable bounds of the 
closer second prices, while the EM converges to the stable bounds of the rather distant 
EM price. Else, the thicker e-markets increase the fixed U-Welfare significantly.  
2) The moving U-Welfare of the GSPM and EM converge to a low stable utility. This is 
due to the rapid fall of differences between current request (ask) bids and GSPM 
second price payments (costs) or the Mth equilibrium price value at repetitive trades. 
The thick e-markets have no effect on the converged utility, but deliver instant GSPM 
convergence and faster EM convergence (slower in base) due to the faster converging 
stability of the bids and ask at thicker trades.       
3) The V-Welfare and e-market profitability converge to stable positive value that is 
lower than that of initial settings due to the rule based adjustment that direct the 
convergence to lower value bids and higher value asks at constant leaning of repetitive 
trades. The winners maintain bounded conservative moves to increase utilities while 
losers take bounded aggressive moves to join in the matched list until they reach the 
bounded true values. The thicker e-market deliver higher, stable and more rapid 
instant. The GSPM DA guarantees, also, the e-market converge rapidly to a stable 
profitability close to the V-Welfare that grow, also, with the economy of scale of 
thicker e-market trades. The V-Welfare of the EM DA, however, falls rapidly and 
converges to stable low value close to zero with respect to the initial utility. This is 
due to the large increments of initial request and asks bids that stabilize with smaller 
increments as request and ask bids get closer to the EM pricing bounds. However, the 
EM profitability maintains a zero value as ask/bid bidders collect/pay the EM price. 
4) The bounded GSPM and EM DA converge to the maximum number of matched pairs 
close to the true value matched pairs (shown in green). This is the natural matching 
progress of the bounded learners (bidders) at repetitive trades. 
5) The variance of the GSPM and EM DA drops rapidly at the initial trades due to the 
large delta adjustments of the request and ask bids of the losers. The variance then 
converges with smaller adjustments to a stable low value as the falling bids and the 
rising asks get closer to the GSPM second price or the EM Mth price bounds.    
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Figure 33: Sample metrics of the bounded multiple Q-level GSPM DA and EM DA 
for two thousand request and ask bidders during twenty repetitive trades 
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6.7.2 Single and Multiple Q-level(s) Unbounded GSPM and EM DAs 
Experimental Matching Behaviour: Figure 34 depicts the matching patterns of the 
GSPM and EM DA of unbounded request and ask bidders of single Q-level and multiple 
Q-levels e-service at the first and twentieth repetitive trades.  Both unbounded DA deliver 
a full matched list of all bidders (i.e., initial winners and losers). The losers demonstrate a 
rather unbounded aggressive corrective move and break risk neutrality for a winning seat 
by increasing (lowering) request (ask) bids beyond initial true bounds (i.e., see the curve 
extensions into the losers zone). The thicker DA e-market trades deliver a rapid stable 
efficiency of winners while losers join in winners at repetitive trades.   
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Figure 34: Single Q-level (left set) and multiple Q-levels (right set) unbounded 
GSPM and EM DA matching patterns at first and twentieth trades 
Experimental Metrics: Figure 35 depicts sample metrics of the GSPM and EM DA 
mechanisms of two thousand unbounded request and ask bidders of multiple Q-levels e-
services during twenty repetitive trades. The analysis extends to single Q-level models. 
1) The fixed U-Welfare of the unbounded GSPM DA keeps falling to the negative 
quadrant at repetitive trades, while the fixed U-Welfare of the unbounded EM keeps 
falling to rather positive lower values. The thicker e-market trades intensify the 
impact. This is due to the violation of the risk neutrality that motivates losing bidders 
to overbid by decreasing (increasing) their bids (asks) over true bounds that generate 
negatives utilities. The GSPM fixed U-Welfare drops to a negative zone as its bounded 
fixed U-Welfare shown in previous section get overrun by the negative utilities. The 
EM fixed U-Welfare drops to lower positive value, though, due to its higher bounded 
EM fixed U-Welfare. This pattern of tactical trading actions is often found in 
conventional markets or e-market, where there are some bidders who are stuck with 
their non-moving or slow-moving items. It also observed in markets where bidders 
might need a critical item or tactically inspecting the e-market valuation for an items.  
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2) The moving U-Welfare of the unbounded GSPM and EM DA keep decreasing and 
converges to a stable low welfare at repetitive trades. This correlates with the constant 
fall of differences between the current bids (asks) and the GSPM second price 
payments (costs) or the EM Mth equilibrium price at repetitive trades. The thick e-
markets have no effect, but delivers instant GSPM convergence, while keeps falling 
for EM until it converges to a stable low utility.      
3) The V-Welfare and e-market profitability of GSPM DA keep increasing to values 
beyond that of the initial true setting due to the unbounded aggressive adjustments that 
direct the unbounded convergence of the risk unneutral higher value bids and lower 
asks of the losers at constant leaning of repetitive trades. However, the winners 
maintain bounded conservative moves to second prices to increase utilities. The 
GSPM V-Welfare and e-market profitability converge to stability when all request and 
ask bids of now all joining winners get closer to the second prices. The V-Welfare and 
e-market profitability grow for all trades and thicker markets. The V-Welfare and e-
market profitability of the EM DA, however, keep falling and converge to stable lower 
value with respect to the initial true V-Welfare. These is due to the larger increments 
of request and ask bids that stabilize with smaller increments as request and ask bids 
get closer to the EM price. The EM delivers zero profitability as the request/ask 
bidders collect/pay the same EM price.   
4) The unbounded GSPM and EM converge to the maximum full matched pairs that 
covers almost all request-ask pairs at repetitive trades. This is a result of the 
unbounded reactions of bidders that scarify risk neutrality for a wining match. 
5) The variance drops rapidly at the initial trades due to the large delta adjustments of the 
request and ask bids of losers. The variance converges to stable low value due to the 
narrowing difference between the rising asks and falling bids. 
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Figure 35: Sample metrics of the unbounded multiple Q-level, GSPM DA vs. EM 
DA for two thousand request and ask bidders during twenty repetitive trades 
122 
 
 
 
6.8 Complexity Analysis of the GSPM and EM Mechanisms 
Our work examines the execution runtimes for all matching codes using the MATLAB 
tic-toc. A similar pattern of processing times is observed for GSPM and EM DAs at 
various trade settings. In fact, the most demanding function is the SORT () function that 
all DA mechanisms share for grouping, sorting and indexing. The blue curve in Figure 36 
depicts the average absolute processing runtimes of all DA allocation and pricing 
algorithms for up to 10000 ask or request bidders.  Figure 36 shows also the asymptotic 
݃ሺ݊ሻ ൌ ࣩሺ݊ log ݊ሻ ൅ ࣩሺ݊ሻ	upper bound curve in green of the	݂ሺ݊ሻ	that our work derived 
for the complexity of the experimental data pattern of the processing runtimes at different 
trades. The experimental results pattern is common between all DA mechanisms. The 
yellow curves are sample functions (i.e., ݂ሺ݊ሻ ൌ ܿ൫݃ሺ݊ሻ൯ that present an upper and lower 
bounds for the experimental data results, It designates a tighter bounds	݃ሺ݊ሻ ൌ
	Θሺ݊ log ݊ሻ ൅ 	Θሺ݊ሻ. However, our work maintains the upper bound complexity 
	ࣩሺ݊ log ݊ሻ ൅ ࣩሺ݊ሻ  as the worst case runtime of all algorithms.   
The GSPM DA is equivalent to finding a maximum bipartite matching in a bipartite 
graph ܩ	 ൌ 	 ሺܸ	 ൌ 	 ሺܾ௖௜௞	, ܾ௣௝௤ሻ, ܧሻ, where ܧ	contains one edge for each pair of bid ܾ௖௜௞ and 
ask ܾ௣௝௤ if ܾ௖௜௞ ൒ ܾ௣௝௤.	∀	݁௖௜௞ ൌ ݁௉௝௤ , ݉݅݊ܳ௖௜௞ ൌ ܳ௉௝௤ ∀ ܳ ൌ ܳ௠ . For ݊ bidders, the GSPM 
and EM run in ࣩሺ݈݊݋݃݊ሻ time for the sorting and in	ࣩሺ݊ሻ time for the matching in the 
worst case. The ࣩሺ݊ log ݊ሻ term is the worst case complexity of the sorting as found in 
the case of the merge sort, while the  ࣩሺ݊ሻ term, however, is for the allocation matching 
of the EM algorithms that is applied also to the GSPM algorithms. For the case of 
different ݊௖ bid bidders and ݊௣	ask trades the GSPM and EM algorithms would run at 
ࣩ൫݉݅݊൫݊௖, ݊௣൯ log݉݅݊൫݊௖, ݊௣൯൯ ൅ ࣩሺ݉݅n൫݊௖, ݊௣൯ሻ		times.   
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Figure 36 Complexity analysis of GSPM and EM algorithms 
124 
 
 
 
Chapter 7  
7 Conclusions and Future work 
Our work contemplates on the profoundly changing landscapes of e-marketplaces due to 
the massive growth and interactive marketing of e-services. While the prospects of the 
digital era are enormous, e-marketplaces are encountering inherent and persistent game-
theoretic and computational complexities that challenge the strategic and computational 
efficiencies of the matching mechanisms. In fact, the mounting complexities are inciting 
the industry to pursue more resilient delivery and revenue ecosystem friendly e-market 
mechanisms (Moore, 1996). Our work examines the limited bidding scope and strategic 
trading conduct of e-market mechanisms that often provoke adverse strategies and lead to 
e-market failures. The market economy of free rational conduct would, however, enable 
stable social efficiency by equalizing the dual self-interest and essential needs of bidders 
to the scarce assets. The dual dynamics inspire the collaborative strategies that discourage 
monopolies. The constant learning at repetitive trades motivates bidders to reason about 
e-market disruptions and adjusts preferences and strategic conduct in a rational manner. 
This type of strategic conduct is a truthful rational reaction that must be freely expressed. 
Our work targets the solution approach of a rather truthful, efficient and stable problem 
models of a class of CAP for multiple units of a single-item (i.e., e-service or app) of 
multiple-attributes, attribute-values and, particularly, multiple Q-levels that extend to the 
CAP of multiple units of multiple attribute items (i.e., multiple e-services). 
Our work introduces the free exchange by endowing it with the RBBL that enables the 
flexible and symmetric expression of free choice and strategic conduct. The RBBL 
structure includes multiple distinct attribute-values of various digital and the logical rule 
formulae. The RBBL bidding model enables a graph-based expressions of the multiple 
distinct attribute-values of various e-services, and also the expressions of applied logical 
rule formulae. The RBBL enables the free exchange to reasoning about the attribute-
values using logical rules deduction for a rapid automatic construction of e-services and 
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bid formations. Hence, the RBBL enables a rapid exchange clearing. Our work presents 
the formal model of the e-services CAP and expanded on how the RBBL allows for 
capturing the CAP as a formal IP for the stable and efficient winner matching allocation. 
However, our work does not expand on the smart aspect of the free exchange. Our work 
uses MATLAB to simulate the request and ask bidding behaviour and self-learning at 
repetitive trades that maps to logical rules conveyed to the exchange e-marketplace. 
Our work investigates, also, the inefficiencies of the exchange mechanisms with respect 
to allocation and revenue models. A fundamental challenge is the fact exchange models 
are hard to implement, as per Hurwicz impossibility theorem (Hurwicz, 1975) that states 
it is impossible to implement an AE, IC and BB social welfare function in a DSE settings 
even for simple exchange (Parkes, 2001) and quasi-linear preferences. This is also the 
case even without requiring IR. The work in (Green & Laffont, 1977) demonstrates no 
DSE AE and IC mechanism can be safe from manipulation by coalitions, even in quasi-
linear settings. Our work endows the free exchange, also, with the GSPM, GSP DA 
matching. The formal problem model captures the CAP as a IP for the socially efficient 
matching allocation. The free exchange deliberates on the logical rules for preference 
deduction and winner matching. The free exchange applies the GSPM matching on the 
induced request and ask-bids to compute an efficient and stable matching. The GSPM 
DA uniquely exploits the tractable forward and reverse-GSP auction heuristics that 
improve the truthful, efficient, stable, profitable, and tractable FX matching. The FX 
GSPM targets the symmetric, efficient an stable matching between multiple buyers and 
sellers of a class of multiple units of a particular e-service of multiple Q-levels.  
The free exchange improves truthfulness by implementing a multiple Q-levels GSPM. 
The request bidder would be better off if it bid truthfully on a e-service of a particular Q-
level, as it would minimize the risk of losing to others at that Q-level, while having an 
incentive to win a e-service of higher quality. The GSPM also secures e-market 
profitability that grows with thick trades and makes it lucrative to e-markets. 
126 
 
 
 
Given, the complexity of exchange impossibility theory (Hurwicz, 1975), our work 
proposes an exchange model that exploits the relaxed (weaker) properties of the e-
services CAP that translates to the multiple unit-demand matching with multiple Q-levels 
to improve the symmetric DA properties. Our model suggest also the application of 
constant learning at repetitive trades in rather thicker markets that transform efficiently 
the private information model to full information settings using our proposed FX model.        
7.1 Experimental Findings and Comparative Analysis  
The experimental analysis targets the algorithmic simulation and comparison between the 
GSPM and EM for the matching allocation and pricing outcomes of the CAP class of 
multiple units DA of a single-item (i.e., e-service). The single items (e-services) may be 
constructed from multiple attributes and multiple Q-levels using the RBBL tree based 
bidding attribute-values and logical rule and operators formulae. The simulation allows 
for repetitive trades. Requests and asks bids are either bounded or unbounded by the 
Min/Max request and ask bid limits. The simulation implements, analyses and reports the 
algorithms and the experimental findings of the presented GSPM and EM DA 
mechanisms that serve either bounded or unbounded bidders of single or multiple Q-level 
request and ask bids. The DA mechanisms exploit the conveyed RBBL instance of the 
bidders that dictates their rational reactions at constant learning. 
The experimental scenarios examines the performance advantage of using only the rules 
aggregation for a number of request and ask bidders with the assumption that bidders 
apply self-learning abilities at repetitive trades that maps to logical rules and conveyed to 
the FX. The RBBL rules aggregation inside the free exchange reduces the relative 
processing time of the remote (i.e., over local networks) bidder agents processing time in 
multiple folds. Furthermore, the reduction of processing time by the aggregation of rules 
increases significantly with thicker e-market trades over best effort internet. In addition, 
our work assumes that the smart deduction and minimal elicitation, that is to be explored 
in future work, would have a substantial performance improvement for more rapid trades.     
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The FX applies the GSPM matching on the induced and generated e-services and 
requests and asks bids to find an efficient and stable matching allocation and pricing 
outcomes. The FX e-marketplace facilitates truthful interactions by implementing the 
GSPM double auction matching that exploits the multiple Q-level forward and reverse 
GSP double auctions for e-trading e-services. The GSPM DA delivers stable social 
efficiency quite rapidly at the first trades with fairly thick e-market trades (i.e., more than 
100 bidders). However, the EM DA keeps unstable social efficiency for most repetitive 
trades. The GSPM stable efficiency is due to the pricing rule that narrows down the 
tactical maneuverability, the multiple Q-level cross-matching and the best response at 
repetitive trades. In fact, the rational reaction of bidders at constant learning of the e-
market dynamics drives both the GSPM and EM to converge to stable efficiency. The 
process transforms the exchange e-market from incomplete information to complete 
information truthful settings. However, there is no guarantee the EM DA would converge 
in a lower number of rounds due to the EM pricing model that allows for aggressive 
tactical moves of losers throughout repetitive trades until they converge to the EM prices.  
The GSPM DA secures the e-market profitability that grows with thicker trades. This is 
an inherent attribute of the GSPM DA matching. However, the EM DA mechanism 
delivers no profitability. The e-market profitability is lucrative to e-marketplaces that 
deliver the liquidity and the computational e-services. The bounded GSPM and EM DA 
converge to the maximum number of matched pairs close to the true value matched pairs. 
This is the natural matching progress of the bounded bidders at repetitive trades. The 
unbounded GSPM and EM DA converge, however, to the maximum full matched pairs 
that cover almost all ask-bid pairs at repetitive trades. This is a result of the unbounded 
reactions of bidders that scarify risk neutrality for a wining match. The unbounded GSPM 
DA and EM DA allows for negative utilities due to the unbounded aggressive 
adjustments of losers that direct the convergence of the risk unneutral higher value 
request bids and lower ask bids of the losers until they turn into winners. This is due to 
the violation of the risk neutrality by the losers over true bounds. Otherwise, the bounded 
conservative conduct of winners targets utility maximization. Our work examines the 
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unbounded model to investigate bidder’s behaviours at GSPM thicker and/or repetitive 
trades. An interesting observation is that GSPM DA delivers stable AE social efficiency 
for bidders of bounded GSPM trades and also for winners of unbounded GSPM trades. 
The losers of unbounded GSPM trades destabilises their allocation region due to their 
unbounded aggressive moves that breaks risk neutrality.        
It is also observed the variance of both GSPM and EM DA requests and asks drops 
rapidly at the initial trades due to the bounded or unbounded large delta adjustments of 
the requests and asks of losers aggressive moves. The variance converges, then, with 
rather the smaller adjustments of winners conservative moves to a stable low value as 
bidders hit their true valuation bounds or as the difference between the falling bids and 
the rising asks narrows down until they get closer to the GSPM second prices in order or 
the EM Mth price bounds. 
The complexity analysis of the diverse GSPM DA mechanisms examines the processing 
runtimes at diverse GSPM and EM trades.  Our work observed there is at no extra 
computational cost in implementing the GSPM algorithmic heuristics compared to the 
EM DA counterpart. In fact, the GSPM mechanisms utilize the EM algorithms for the 
sorting, grouping, indexing and the allocation matching that often demands the highest 
computation cost while applying linear pricing models. Hence, the GSPM DA would 
deliver better economic properties such as stable efficiency and e-market profitability for 
the same computational cost.          
7.2   Future Outlook  
This is ongoing research with promising prospects. The free exchange is an attempt to 
liberalize the e-market mechanisms that would drive their resilience through free, rapid 
and stable trades, social efficiency, self-prosperity, and e-markets profitability. However, 
there are potential aspects to be furthered such as how the free exchange smart engine can 
be computationally effective for the automatic deduction of the bidding rules and the 
formation of request and ask bids. There is also the scalability impact of thick e-market 
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trades and real-time performance. Another issue has to do with how the bidders may 
effectively generate the suitable strategic rules that deliver to their local constraints and 
objectives without exposure. The solution approaches in this research are anticipated to 
open new horizons for ecosystem friendly and computationally tractable mechanisms. 
The proposed free exchange facilitates the free rational strategic conduct that equalizes 
the conflicting forces of the essential needs to the scarce resources and the self-interested 
local objectives and local feasibility constraints. The free exchange with the flexible 
strategic conduct of bidders would eventually deliver a socially efficient and strategically 
stable and profitable e-marketplace. In fact, the free rational conduct is still an 
overlooked encounter in the digital era and mobile influence where bidders are the targets 
and are the real-time commodity.  The desirable properties of the FX e-market is verified 
through the experimental analysis of proposed FX model. Figure 37 outlines the FX 
trading platform with the proposed RBBL model and GSPM double auction mechanism. 
 
Figure 37: Free exchange e-marketplace trading platform 
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    Appendices 
Appendix A: GSPM and EM MATLAB Simulation Algorithms 
 
SORT (Bids, Asks, BidQS, AskQS) % Sort Q-levels and Request and Ask Bids 
% Bids is set of all request bids. 
% BidQS is set of all Q-levels of request bids. 
% Asks is set of all ask bids.  
% AskQS is set of all Q-level of ask bids. 
% (1) Sort all Q-levels in descend order. 
% (2) Group request and ask bids according to Q-level ranks. 
[sBidQS, sBidQSX] = sort (BidQS, ‘descend');  
[sAskQS, sAskQSX] = sort (AskQS, ‘descend');  
% sBidQS is set of sorted Q-levels of request bids. sBidQSX is sort index. 
% AskQS is set of sorted Q-levels of ask bidders. sAskQSX is sort index. 
% (3) Group Request and ask bids based on the sorted Q-levels. 
For j=1:1: buyers % Rearrange Request and ask based on sorted Q-levels 
 QBid (j) = int16 (Bids (sBidQSX (j))); %group traded requests based on Q-level 
 QTruBid (j) = BidTruVals (sBidQSX (j)); %group True request based on Q-levels 
End 
For j=1:1: sellers 
 QAsk (j) = int16 (Asks (sAskQSX (j)));   %group traded Asks based on Q-levels 
 QTruAsk (j) = AskTruVals (sAskQSX (j)); % group True Asks based on Q-levels. 
End 
For i=1:1: QS 
 For j=1:1: buyers % Count Number of Bids in each Q-level group 
  If (i==sBidQS (j)) 
   BidQS_size (i) =BidQS_size (i) +1; % Number of request Bids in Q-level=i 
 End  
End 
End 
For i=1:1: QS 
 For j=1:1: sellers % Count Number of Asks in each Q-level group 
  If (i==sAskQS (j)) 
   AskQS_size (i) =AskQS_size (i) +1; % Number of Ask Bids in Q-level=i 
  End 
 End 
End 
% (4) Sort the true and traded request and ask bids for each Q-level 
% sQBid and sQAsk are the sorted Requests and asks bids based on Q-levels. 
buyPointer =1; % Points to the start of each Q-level in bid list 
sellPointer =1; % Points to the start of each Q-level in Ask list 
For i=QS:-1:1 
 [B,X]= sort (QBid (buyPointer: buyPointer +BidQS_size (i)-1),'descend'); 
 Bt= sort (QTruBid (buyPointer: buyPointer +BidQS_size (i)-1),'descend'); 
 sQBid (buyPointer: buyPointer +BidQS_size(i)-1) = B;% Sorted Bids in Q-level 
 sQBidX (buyPointer: buyPointer +BidQS_size(i)-1)= X;% Sorted Index 
 % Sort True item Bid valuations to follow sorted Bids 
 sQTruBid (buyPointer :buyPointer +BidQS_size(i)-1) =Bt; 
 [B, X]= sort (QAsk(sellPointer :sellPointer +AskQS_size(i)-1),'ascend'); 
 Bt= sort (QTruAsk (sellPointer :sellPointer +AskQS_size(i)-1),'ascend'); 
 sQAsk (sellPointer: sellPointer +AskQS_size (i)-1) =B;%Sorted Asks in Q-level 
 sQAskX (sellPointer: sellPointer +AskQS_size (i)-1)=X; % Sorted Index 
% Sort True item Ask Valuations to follow sorted Asks 
 sQTruAsk (sellPointer :sellPointer+ AskQS_size(i)-1)= Bt; 
 buyPointer =   buyPointer +BidQS_size(i);% Step to next Q-level Bid list 
 sellPointer =   sellPointer+ AskQS_size(i);% Step to next Q-level ask list 
End 
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MATCHING-ALLOCATION-RULE (sQBid, sQAsk, BidQS_size, AskQS_size) % Match 
Request and Ask Bids and Allocate Winners (Same for all DA mechanisms) 
%sQBid/sQAsk: sorted request/ask bids. 
%BidQS_size/AskQS_size: number of request/ask bids in each Q-level.   
n = min (sQBid, sQAsk); %n is minimum size of sorted Requests and asks 
matched = 0; % Initial number of qualified matches 
msQBid = zeros(1,n); % Initial sorted match list of request bids. 
msQAsk = zeros(1,n); % Initial sorted match list of ask bids.  
sQAskT = sQAsk; %  
buyPointer   =  1; % Bid Start Pointer 
sellPointerS =  1; % Ask start pointer 
sellPointerE =  1; 
For i =Q-level:-1:1 % Inspect matching allocation For each Q-level 
     For j= buyPointer to buyPointer + BidQS_size(i)-1 
         For k=sellPointerS:1:sellPointerE+AskQS_size(i)-1 
           flag = 0; 
             If (sQBid(j) >= sQAskT(k))% sorted bid is more of equal ask?   
                msQBid(j)  = sQBid(j); % Select sorted Bid for match list                  
                msQAsk(k)  = sQAsk(k); % Select sorted ask for match list                  
                sQAskT(k)  = Big-M;% Big-M is very high to drop matched ask 
                matched    = matched+1; % Set number of matches in Q-level =i 
                flag= 1; 
             End 
            If (flag == 1)  
                 Break% Start with new bid and compare it with sQAskT asks  
            End 
         End 
     End 
   % Done with one Q-level? Then increment to next Q-level 
     buyPointer= buyPointer + BidQS_size(i);%BidQS_size no of bids in Q-level=i           
     sellPointerE=sellPointerE+ AskQS_size(i));%AskQS_size of asks in Q-level=i      
End 
 
GSPM-PRICING-RULE (msQBid, msQAsk, sBidQS, sAskQS, matched)%GSPM Pricing 
Rule for any Q-level ( Same for all GSPM DA mechanisms).  
% msQBid/ msQAsk: matched and sorted bid/ask sets,  
% sBidQS/sAskQS: bid/ask Q-levels,  
% matched: numbers matched bid/ask pairs for any Q-level.   
 
n       = min (sQBid, sQAsk); %n is minimum size of sorted Requests and asks 
Cost    = zeros (1, n); 
Payment = zeros (1, n); 
For i=1:1: matched-1; 
     If and(msQAsk(i)> 0,sAskQS(i)== sAskQS(i+1)) % sQAsk has same Q-level? 
        Cost (i) = sQAsk (i+1); % Ask value within Q-level group 
     Elseif and (msQAsk (i)> 0, sAskQS (i)> sAskQS (i+1)) 
        Cost (i) = sQAsk (i); % sQAsk is at the end of Q-level group 
     End 
     If and (msQBid (i)> 0, sBidQS (i) == sBidQS (i+1)) 
        Payment (i)= sQBid(i+1); % Bid Value within Q-level group 
      Elseif and (msQBid (i)> 0, sBidQS (i)> sBidQS (i+1)) 
        Payment (i) = sQBid (i); % Bid Value at the end of Q-level group 
     End 
 End 
If and (msQAsk (matched)> 0, msQBid (matched)> 0) % Matching of the last pair 
     Cost (matched)= sQAsk(matched); 
     Payment (matched) = sQBid (matched); 
End 
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EM-PRICING-SINGLE-QS (msQBid, msQAsk, SQAsk, sBidQS, sAskQS, matched)%EM 
Pricing Rule for Single Q-level EM DA Mechanism.  
% msQBid/ msQAsk: matched and sorted bid/ask sets,  
% sBidQS/sAskQS: bid/ask Q-levels,  
% matched: numbers matched bid/ask pairs for single Q-level    
 
n       = min (sQBid, sQAsk); %n is minimum size of sorted Requests and asks 
Cost    = zeros (1,n); 
Payment = zeros (1,n); 
For i=1:1: matched-1; 
     if and(msQAsk(i)> 0,sAskQS(i)== sAskQS(i+1)) % sQAsk has same Q-level? 
        Cost (i) = sQAsk (matched); % Ask value within Q-level group 
     Elseif and (msQAsk (i)> 0, sAskQS (i)> sAskQS (i+1)) 
        Cost (i)= sQAsk(matched); % sQAsk is at the end of Q-level group 
     End 
     If and (msQBid (i)> 0, sBidQS (i) == sBidQS (i+1)) 
        Payment (i) = sQAsk (matched); % Bid Value within Q-level group 
      Elseif and (msQBid (i)> 0, sBidQS (i)> sBidQS (i+1)) 
        Payment (i) = sQAsk (matched); % Bid Value at the end if Q-level group 
     End 
 End 
If and(msQAsk(matched)> 0,msQBid(matched)> 0) % EM matching for last pair 
     Cost (matched)= sQAsk(matched); 
     Payment (matched) = sQAsk (matched); 
End 
 
EM-PRICING-Multiple-QS(msQBid, msQAsk, sQAsk, sBidQS, sAskQS, 
AskQS_size, BidQS_size) %EM Pricing Rule for Multiple Q-levels EM DA.  
 
% msQBid/ msQAsk: matched and sorted bid/ask sets,  
% sBidQS/sAskQS: bid/ask Q-levels,  
% matched: numbers matched bid/ask pairs for single Q-level    
n       = min (sQBid, sQAsk); %n is minimum size of sorted Requests and asks 
Cost    = zeros (1,n); 
Payment = zeros (1,n); 
sellPointer =1; 
lastmsQAsk = zeros(QS); 
For i=QS:-1:1 % Set M Equilibrium Pricing for each Q-level 
    For k=sellPointer :1:sellPointer +AskQS_size(i)-1 
        if (msQAsk(k)> 0) % Does sQAsk has same Q-level? 
            lastmsQAsk (i) = k; 
        End 
    End 
    sellPointer = sellPointer + AskQS_size(i); 
End 
buyPointer   = 1; 
sellPointerS = 1; % Ask start pointer 
sellPointerE = 1; 
sQAskT = sQAsk; 
For i=QS:-1:1 
       For j=buyPointer :1: buyPointer+ BidQS_size(i)-1 
         For k=sellPointerS:1:sellPointerE+AskQS_size(i)-1 
             flag=0; 
             if (msQBid(j) >= sQAskT(k)) 
               if(k<= lastmsQAsk(i)) 
                    Cost(k)= sQAsk(lastmsQAsk(i));% M-Pricing 
                    Payment(j)= sQAsk(lastmsQAsk(i)); % Value within Q-level 
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               End 
                 sQAskT(k)= 99999; 
                flag= 1; 
             End 
            if(flag == 1) 
               break 
            End 
         End 
      End 
     buyPointer = buyPointer + BidQS_size(i); 
     sellPointerE= sellPointerE+ AskQS_size(i); 
End 
 
BOUNDED-RULES-UPDATE (BidWinnersNow, AskWinnersNow, sQAsk, sQBid, 
sQTruBid, sQTruAsk, delta_win, delta_loss, Bid_switch, Ask_switch) 
% Bid_switch and Ask_switch hold change of state of bidders. 
% Min and Max is for bounded adjustments of RBBL rules inside exchange 
For j=1:1:n 
    winnerNow = BidWinnersNew (j);% Recall current winners list 
    If (sQBid (j) >= sQTruBid(j))% Stop bidders at true valuation threshold  
        sQBid (j) = sQTruBid(j); 
    Elseif and ( winnerNow, not(Bid_switch(j)))% Buyers wins and still wins 
        sQBid (j) = sQBid(j)- delta_win*rand(1)*(sQBid(j)-Payment(j)); 
    Elseif and(not( winnerNow),not (Bid_switch(j)))% Buyer is still a loser 
       sQBid (j) = min(sQBid(j)+ delta_loss*rand(1)*sQBid(j),sQTruBid(j)); 
    Elseif and( winnerNow, Bid_switch(j)) % Buyer wins after losing 
       sQBid (j) = sQBid(j); 
    Elseif and(not( winnerNow),Bid_switch(j))% Buyers loses after winning 
       sQBid (j) = min(sQBid(j)+ delta_loss*rand(1)*sQBid(j),sQTruBid(j)); 
    End 
     winnerNow =AskWinnersNew (j); 
    If (sQAsk(j) <= sQTruAsk(j)) 
       sQAsk(j) = sQTruAsk(j); 
    Elseif and( winnerNow, not(Ask_switch(j)))  % Seller is still winner 
       sQAsk(j) = sQAsk(j)+ delta_win*rand(1)*(Cost(j)-sQAsk(j)); 
    Elseif and(not( winnerNow),not (Ask_switch(j)))%Seller is still a loser  
       sQAsk(j) = max(sQAsk(j)- delta_loss*rand(1)*sQAsk(j), sQTruAsk(j)); 
    Elseif and( winnerNow, Ask_switch(j)) ))% Seller wins after losing 
        sQAsk(j) = sQAsk(j); 
    Elseif and(not(winnerNow),Ask_switch(j))% Seller loses after winning 
        sQAsk(j) = max(sQAsk(j)- delta_loss*rand(1)*sQAsk(j),sQTruAsk(j)); 
    End 
End 
 
UNBOUNDED-RULES-UPDATE (BidWinnersNow, AskWinnersNow, sQAsk, sQBid, 
sQTruBid, sQTruAsk, delta_win, delta_loss, Bid_switch, Ask_switch) 
% Bid_switch and Ask_switch hold change of state of bidders. 
% Min and Max is for unbounded adjustments of RBBL rules inside exchange 
For j=1:1:n 
    winnerNow = BidWinnersNow (j);% Recall current winners list 
    If and( winnerNow, not(Bid_switch(j)))% Buyers wins and still wins 
        sQBid(j) = sQBid(j)- delta_win*rand(1)*(sQBid(j)-Payment(j)); 
    Elseif and(not( winnerNow),not (Bid_switch(j)))% Buyers is still loser 
       sQBid(j) = sQBid(j)+ delta_loss*rand(1)*sQBid(j); 
    Elseif and( winnerNow, Bid_switch(j)) % Buyer wins after losing 
       sQBid(j) = sQBid(j); 
    Elseif and(not( winnerNow),Bid_switch(j))% Buyers loses after winning 
       sQBid(j) = sQBid(j)+ delta_loss*rand(1)*sQBid(j; 
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    End 
     winnerNow =AskWinnersNow (j); 
    If and( winnerNow, not(Ask_switch(j)))  % Seller is still winner 
       sQAsk(j) = sQAsk(j)+ delta_win*rand(1)*(Cost(j)-sQAsk(j)); 
    Elseif and(not( winnerNow),not (Ask_switch(j)))%Seller is still loser  
       sQAsk(j) = sQAsk(j)- delta_loss*rand(1)*sQAsk(j); 
    Elseif and( winnerNow, Ask_switch(j)) ))% Seller wins after losing 
        sQAsk (j) = sQAsk(j); 
    Elseif and(not(winnerNow),Ask_switch(j))% Seller loses after winning 
        sQAsk (j) = sQAsk (j)- delta_loss*rand(1)*sQAsk(j); 
    End 
End 
 
 
EXAMINE-CHANGE-OF-STATES (BidWinnersOld, BidWinnersNow, AskWinnersOld, 
AskWinnersNow) %Examine Request and ask bidders New/Old Winning States. 
Status_changes = 0; 
Bid_switch = zeros (1, buyers);  
Ask_switch = zeros (1, sellers); 
For j=1:1: n 
    winner_before = BidWinnersOld (j); % Set win/lose state history  
    If xor (winner_before, BidWinnersNow (j)) % Inspect win/lose switching  
        Bid_switch (j) =1; % Set to one if state changes only. 
        Status_changes = Status_changes +1; % Set number of state changes 
        BidWinnersOld (j) = BidWinnersNow (j); % Save state for next trade 
    End 
    winner_before = AskWinnersOld (j); 
    If xor (winner_before, AskWinnersNew (j)) 
        Ask_switch (j) =1; 
        Status_changes  = Status_changes +1; 
        AskWinnersOld (j) = AskWinnersNew (j); 
    End 
End 
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